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INTRODUCTION 
 
The shrinkage in firm’s lifespan experienced in the last decades have made decline and 
distress a more and more ordinary setting for firm valuation. As pointed out by a study 
conducted by Foster (2012) and updated by Anthony et al. (2016), which investigates firm’s 
longevity in terms of permanence of the American companies in the index S&P 500, 
company’s lifespan, averaging around 61 years in 1958, significantly decreased to 25 years in 
1980 and to 20 years in 2005 and it is forecasted to further shrink to 14 years by 2026. 
Despite the fluctuations reported in company’s lifespan, indeed, the overall trend line, from 
more than 50 years of data, points out a downward sloped average firm’s longevity. This 
trend, even if partially driven by factors beyond the control of managers, such as technology 
shifts and economic shocks, is frequently determined by company’s inability to adapt and take 
advantage of environmental changes. Whenever a company fails to promptly capture and 
react to warning signals by progressively reinventing itself, indeed, a value destruction 
process is activated and fomented until putting into question the firm’s survival in the long 
term. When the firm starts to show the first signals of decline, however, its distressed features 
and the high uncertainty underlying its future prospects make the valuation of the firm’s 
economic value a complex task, in a context in which firm’s value itself is a key determinant 
of company’s future. Whenever default is involuntary or strategically triggered, indeed, 
claimholders will decide whether favor the company’s continuation as a going concern or 
support its liquidation on the basis of the firm’s value, and claimholders’ expected recovery, 
under each scenario. In a distress setting, however, traditional valuation methods, when 
applied according to the common practice, result, most of the times, in misleading outcomes, 
since they are generally designed for healthy firms with stable growth prospects. Adjustments, 
therefore, have to be introduced in order to correctly capture the effects of distress on firm’s 
value and to allow traditional valuation methods to produce results that are generally unbiased 
also in a distress context. 
After having provided an overview of the crisis phenomenon, having analyzed the main 
limitations of traditional valuation techniques and option pricing models in a distress setting 
and having reviewed the potential solutions, the thesis aims to propose a practical approach to 
distressed firm valuation based on a combination and integration of different valuation 
techniques, appropriately adjusted to incorporate distress. This approach is developed and 
tested in the framework provided by a real case of a company facing prolonged economic and 
financial distress: the case of Zucchi Group. Zucchi Group is a medium-size Italian company 
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operating in the household linen industry that started to reveal the first signals of decline in 
the early 2000s and has never experienced a stable performance recovery since that date, 
despite the several restructuring attempts implemented. First of all, in order to build a basis 
for the development of the assumptions underlying the valuation, an in-depth analysis of 
Zucchi Group’s crisis path was conducted through the comparison of key financial ratios over 
time and with comparable companies, detecting, in this way, the causes and the signals of the 
crisis, but also the group’s current strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, Zucchi Group’s 
external environment was scanned in order to identify opportunities and threats and to verify 
whether they have been appropriately captured and managed in the current restructuring 
attempt. On the basis of the strategic guidelines of the latter, then, future cash flows were 
forecasted and valued through a mixed version of the APV method, managing the uncertainty 
underlying the future performance through a scenario analysis, first, and the inclusion of a 
distress premium in the discount rate, then. The accuracy and reliability of the estimates were 
then tested by means of the application of the method of multiples in the continuing value 
formula and the comparison with Zucchi Group market capitalization.  
A second analysis was finally conducted in order to face another critical issue of distressed 
firm valuation: the estimation of debt market value. In particular, two different approaches 
were adopted, based on the use of the option pricing model and the application of the DCF 
model to cash flows to debt, to value Zucchi Group total debt as if it would have not been 
subjected to write-off according to the last debt restructuring agreement. Even if the practical 
applicability of these models comes at the expense of their comprehensiveness, the resulting 
estimates confirm that Zucchi Group would have never been able to repay its debt obligations 
despite the performance improvement expected from the implementation of the strategic plan, 
justifying the choice of creditors to grant a debt forgiveness.  
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CHAPTER 1: Corporate crisis status 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate crisis has been one of the most debated topics in corporate finance for a long time. 
The crisis is a typical phenomenon of firms’ life cycle that mature companies will face if they 
are not able to innovate and rediscover their growth roots. On the other hand, the recent 
financial crisis and the increasing complexity of the competitive environment in which firms 
operate, strongly impact companies’ value generation process and often question their ability 
to continue as a going concern, renewing the interest toward this topic both in corporate 
finance literature and practice. For a distressed company, indeed, the analysis of the corporate 
crisis characteristics, causes and signals is the starting point for understanding how the crisis 
would impact on its ability to generate cash flows in the future and for designing valuation 
methods that would deal with the criticalities and uncertainties which are typical of the crisis 
status.  
For this reason, the first chapter will provide an overview of the corporate crisis phenomenon, 
by recalling, first of all, various definitions of “crisis” that can be found in the literature and 
focusing on the distinction between decline and distress, but also between the related concepts 
of economic and financial distress (paragraph 1.2). Corporate crisis causes, then, will be 
investigated at three different levels (i.e., macro-economic, industry and company analysis) 
and adopting two different approaches (i.e., subjective and objective approach). At last, 
however, it will be recognized that companies fall into crisis as a consequence of the 
combination and interaction between internal and external factors (paragraph 1.3). 
The identification of the crisis causes, but also the analysis of the stages of firm’s crisis 
development, to which paragraph 1.4 is dedicated, start from the detection of the signals of 
decline and distress through the adoption of different methods based on intuition, ratio 
analysis or models for the prediction of the probability of default (paragraph 1.5). 
Recognizing the signals and the causes of the crisis on a timely basis, then, allows managers 
to promptly intervene by selecting and implementing the best strategy to break the company’s 
downturn. This topic will be discussed in the last paragraph of this chapter (paragraph 1.6), 
which analyzes liquidation, divestment and restructuring as alternative solutions for 
overcoming the distress, at a macro level, by focusing also on how restructuring efforts are 
interpreted by the market as soon as they are announced by the firm. Finally, for the sake of 
completeness, the tools available to overcome the crisis status will be investigated also from a 
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juridical point of view by ending the chapter with a brief description of the legal instruments 
available in Italy to support companies dealing with crisis.  
 
1.2 Concept and definition 
 
As stated by Pratt and Grabowski (2010), there is no universal definition of corporate crisis. 
Scholars and academics, in fact, have been more focused on identifying and classifying the 
components, causes, consequences and solutions of this phenomenon, without taking special 
care to universally identify the concept of crisis (Pozzoli & Paolone 2017). 
 
Zanda et al. (1994) defined as “at loss firms” those companies which report negative margins 
in the income statement, showing their inability to adequately reward the factors that, directly 
or indirectly, participate to the management of the business. The economic loss suffered by 
these companies, however, has to be systematic and irreversible (if restructuring actions will 
not take place), in order to determine a corporate crisis status (Falini 2011).  
First of all, in fact, it is necessary to distinguish decline by distress or crisis situations, to 
clearly understand the concept of corporate crisis.  
 
As summarized by Weitzel and Jonsonn (1989), the various definitions provided in the past 
conceive “decline” as: “(1) a reduction in some organizational size measure (e.g., workforce, 
market share, assets), (2) a stage in the organization's life cycle, (3) internal stagnation, or 
inefficiency, (4) a failure to recognize warning signals (internal or external) about changes 
needed to remain competitive, and, (5) a failure to adapt or change to fit external 
environmental demands.” (Weitzel & Jonsonn 1989, p. 94). 
In particular, Guatri (1995), in accordance with the previous definitions, describes the decline 
as the phase of the company’s life cycle in which first imbalances and inefficiencies appear, 
causing the deterioration of economic value over time. During this phase, as stated by 
Damodaran (2009), the company is generally characterized by: 
 stagnant or declining revenues: the firm is unable to increase revenues over an 
extended period of time, even when market conditions are positive; 
 shrinking or negative margins: the loss of bargaining power and the price reduction, 
carried out in order to prevent a further decrease in revenues, lead to declining 
operating margin; 
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 payment of large dividends and stock repurchase: given the few investment 
opportunities, cash flows generated by the existing assets or by asset divestitures are 
used to pay out large dividends and buy back stocks, if the debt is not enough for 
distress to be a concern; 
 frequent asset divestitures: declining company’s assets may worth more to other 
companies that are able to optimize their use. Furthermore, as the debt burden 
increases, there is a stronger need to divest assets in order to fulfill debt payments and 
avoid the default;   
 overwhelming debt burden: the firm’s inability to meet the terms of debt agreements, 
signed in the past, makes the debt refinancing more complicated, since lenders will ask 
more stringent provisions. 
The crisis, instead, consists in a further deterioration of the decline conditions and results in a 
serious instability status in which the company survival is at risk (Guatri 1995). During the 
crisis, indeed, external shareholders are aware of the firm distressed situation and this 
negatively impacts their level of trust in the company. As a consequence, for the distressed 
company, it becomes more difficult to access to bank lending, to obtain deferred payments 
from suppliers and to maintain a strong and positive reputation in front of clients.  
Therefore, even if the distinction is not so clear in practice, the decline can represent a 
physiological phase in the firm lifecycle, where decline moments and voluntary restructuring 
actions alternate (Sirleo 2009), while the crisis is a further development of the decline that 
appears as an irreversible situation without a significant external intervention. 
 
Another side from which the concept of corporate crisis can be investigated consists on the 
distinction between economic and financial distress. According to Correia and Poblaciòn 
(2015), a firm is economically distressed when the operational cash flows generated by the 
company are not sufficient to fund the reinvestments required to maintain production 
capacity. Without such reinvestments, the company net present value as a going concern 
might finally be lower than the value of its assets if broken up from the business and sold 
separately (Crystal & Mokal 2006). In this case, the business is no longer viable and 
liquidation becomes the most likely solution to distress (Nigam & Boughanmi 2017).  
However, it could be that the troubled company is only in a situation of financial distress. In 
this case the business is still viable and the company’s assets might be in their best value in 
use. The assets, however, are illiquid and the firm’s capital structure is such that the company 
is unable to pay back its debts when come due (Crystal & Mokal 2006).   
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According to Outecheva (2007), it is possible to group the various definition of financial 
distress provided in the literature by classifying them into three main categories: 
 Event-oriented definitions. Within the scope of this group, financial distress is 
interpreted as the crucial event whose occurrence determines the end of firm’s 
financial health time and the beginning of a financial illness period, requiring to adopt 
corrective measures in order to overcome the troubled situation. In particular, 
according to Beaver (1966, p. 71), financial distress can be defined as “the inability of 
a firm to pay its financial obligations as they mature” and can occur under different 
forms such as bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank account, nonpayment of a 
preferred stock dividend, but also as an attempt to restructure the debt in order to 
prevent the default on debt contract (Andrade & Kaplan 1998). 
 Process-oriented definitions. Definitions within this class suggest that financial 
distress is an intermediate phase between solvency and insolvency (Purnanandam 
2005). A company is financially distressed when it doesn’t fulfill debt covenants or it 
doesn’t meet its debt obligations (in term of both interest and principal payment), and, 
consequently, the yield on its bonds is materially higher than the interest rates at 
which banks are willing to grant credit to otherwise similar companies (Gordon 1971). 
The company will shift from a solvent to an insolvent state, however, only at the 
maturity date if the firm value is below the face value of debt. A company, therefore, 
can be distressed without defaulting. On the other hand, in any case, default and 
bankruptcy cannot take place without being preceded by a period of financial distress 
(Outecheva 2007). 
 Technical definitions. The body of literature falling within this last group defines 
financial distress in quantitative terms. Empirical studies investigating matters such as 
financial distress prediction or distressed companies’ performance and restructuring, 
indeed, use several indicators to identify a situation of financial distress. In particular, 
Whitaker (1999) defines financial distress as the first year in which the company’s 
cash flows are not sufficient to meet obligations and the firm experiences a negative 
rate of growth in market value. Similarly, Pindado et al. (2008) consider the fall of 
firm’s market value between two consecutive years as one of the characteristic 
defining financial distress, in combination with an EBITDA lower than financial 
expenses for two consecutive years (or, according to Asquith et al. (1994), EBITDA 
lower than 80% of interest expenses in any other year). 
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Anyway, regardless of the chosen definition, while economic distress is the consequence of 
difficulties arising from company’s operating inefficiencies, financial distress is directly 
connected with firm’s leverage decisions (Senbet & Wang 2012) and it is a typical result of 
high debt burden, combined with a difficult access to capital markets (Pratt & Grabowski 
2010). Nonetheless, isolating the effects of economic and financial distress is not 
straightforward in practice, since the two concepts generally result to be highly correlated. 
Indeed, operating inefficiencies, which are typical of economically distressed firms, make the 
company not being able to generate sufficient cash flow from its operating activities to satisfy 
its current obligations. This, in turn, has a negative impact on market and stakeholders’ 
assessment of the firm, leading to a decline in company market value (Ross et al. 1996) and 
causing the firm to suffer the negative effects of financial distress until the improved 
economic conditions are recognized again (Pindado et al. 2008). 
The connection between firm’s economic and financial dynamics, therefore, is so strong that, 
regardless the causes of the crisis, both dimensions result generally involved, simultaneously 
(Davydenko et al. 2012) or as consecutive phases of the corporate crisis path (Luerti1 1992). 
 
The concept of crisis, lastly, can be investigated from a juridical point of view. Unfortunately, 
however, the Italian legislator doesn’t provide a precise definition of corporate crisis. The 
article 160 of the Italian Bankruptcy Law only specifies that “crisis status” refers also to 
insolvency which, according to the art. 5, consists on the debtor’s inability to meet its current 
obligations on a regular basis. As stated by Disegni (2014), however, the insolvency status is 
only the final signal of the crisis, which encompasses different situations, starting from 
reversible economic and financial disequilibria, that can be managed and solved through a 
firm’s restructuring, until the irreversible insolvency status where the only solution is the 
liquidation of the company’s assets. 
 
In conclusion, the various perspectives adopted to analyze the phenomenon lead to several 
definitions of crisis, focusing on different aspects of the distress situation. Specifically, from a 
corporate finance perspective, the crisis is generally interpreted as the process of deterioration 
of financial and economic equilibria which leads, in turn, to the deterioration of economic 
                                                          
1According to Luerti (1992), the economic phase, characterized by the absence of profitability and efficiency 
and by firm’s inability to generate cash flows sufficient to meet the investment needs, is followed by the 
financial phase, in which a prolonged negative profitability and the loss of support from banks, shareholders, 
clients and suppliers lead the firm to default. Luerti (1992), then, identified also a third phase of corporate 
crisis, the juridical phases, in which the company files for bankruptcy or initiates other legal procedures aimed 
at restructuring the firm capital structure. 
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value for shareholders, creditors and other firm’s stakeholders (Aldrighetti & Savaris 2008). 
In this context, an in-depth investigation of the crisis phenomenon, starting from the 
identification of the causes originating the company’s downward turn until the assessment of 
the feasibility of proposed solutions, is the starting point to value the company’s ability to 
generate cash flows in the future and to continue as a going concern and provides, therefore, 
the basis for distressed firm valuation. 
 
1.3 Corporate crisis causes 
 
The identification of the causes leading the company to a crisis situation is fundamental to 
promptly act on the crisis by developing an appropriate strategic turnaround plan and/or a 
financial restructuring plan aimed at breaking the firm’s downward turn and the value 
deterioration process.  
Particularly, the investigation of the corporate crisis causes should encompass three different 
levels of analysis (Danovi & Indizio 2008):  
 Macro economic analysis 
 Industry analysis 
 Company analysis  
The first two levels of analysis allow to identify the external causes of the crisis, which 
consist on factors that are out of the firm control and are related to the environment in which 
the company operates. Among these factors, it is possible to distinguish macroeconomic 
variables by which all firms in all industries are affected, such as a demand shortage, the 
dynamic of the inflation rate, the volatility of the exchange rate or the interest rate level, from 
factors that impact only companies operating in a specific industry, such as changes in 
customers’ preferences and needs, technology shocks, regulation changes or the redefinition 
of the sources of competitive advantage. 
From a deterministic perspective and in accordance with classic industrial organization and 
organizational ecology theories, the environment plays the main role in determining the 
organization failure, since managers are constrained by exogenous factors reducing the scope 
for strategic choices at a minimum level (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). The deterministic 
approach, however, is not able to explain why some companies in the same industry fail while 
others succeed, even though they are all exposed to the same external factors. In addition, as 
stated by Falini (2011), changes in the external environment, notwithstanding their 
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unpredictable nature and pervasive effects on the company, generally cannot cause the 
corporate crisis by themselves. More often, instead, internal inefficiencies and managers’ 
deficiencies in detecting the signals of decline make the company unable to promptly react to 
the changing environment, leading to distress situations.   
Thus, along with macroeconomic and industry analysis, a further investigation has to be 
conducted at the company level in order to identify the internal causes of crisis. As suggested 
by Guatri (1995), the analysis can be performed by adopting two different approaches:  
 Subjective approach 
 Objective approach 
The subjective approach traces the origins of the crisis back to the inabilities and 
misbehaviors of individuals working in the company, in particular the managers. According to 
this approach, as suggested by Whitaker (1999, p. 123), “more firms enter financial distress as 
the result of poor management rather than economic distress”. Indeed, from a voluntaristic 
perspective, firms’ internal inadequacies in dealing with external threats are mainly due to the 
management misperception of environmental factors (Mellahi & Wilkinson 2004), that leads 
to inadequate operating, investment and/or financial decisions with a negative impact on the 
company performance. In accordance with the subjective approach, different researches have 
been conducted to identify the characteristics of the management team, e.g. cultural 
background, management skills, concentration of power and responsibility, which are 
frequently present in distressed companies, in order to determine their contribution to the 
crisis generation and development2. In addition, alongside managers, the supporters of the 
subjective approach criticize also the behavior of other individuals involved in the 
organization, such as employees or shareholders, which inefficiencies, wrong decisions and 
risk aversion can prevent the company to promptly react to environmental changes (Sirleo 
2009). 
However, the subjective approach shows different limitations in describing a complex 
phenomenon such as the corporate crisis, mainly because it doesn’t consider the role played 
by factors beyond the management control. For this reason, it is generally preferred to use an 
objective approach to the analysis of the company’s crisis, based on which five main causes 
of decline and distress can be identified (Guatri 1995): 
 
                                                          
2 For further details see Fallini (2011) and Danovi and Indizio (2008) 
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1. Inefficiency: one or more firm’s business units generate lower returns than 
competitors. Production is generally the function more prone to inefficiencies. In 
particular, production costs above the competitors’ average may be determined by 
assets obsolescence, lack of skills, low employees’ commitment and ineffective 
incentive plan. However, inefficiencies can concern other functions of the firm, such 
as:  
a. the commercial area: failure to achieve the marketing campaign objectives 
leads to excessive marketing costs;  
b. the financial area: unskilled CFO or firm’s low bargaining power against 
lenders determine a higher cost of capital compared to the competitors’ one;  
c. administrative function: deficiencies of the IT systems and excessive degree of 
bureaucratization lead to a discrepancy between the cost increase and the 
results obtained. 
 
2. Overcapacity/rigidity: the firm operates under conditions of production overcapacity 
due to: 
a. market share loss; 
b. permanent decline in the market demand; 
c. actual revenues that are lower than the expected ones, on which basis fixed 
investment decisions were made; 
d. increase in costs not offset by an equivalent increase in prices subjected to 
public control. 
In addition, the company overcapacity might be exacerbated by the rigidity of the cost 
structure, namely the high proportion of fixed costs on total costs, that prevents the 
firm to promptly adapt to the changing market conditions.  
 
3. Product deterioration: the product offering of the company is not aligned with the 
customers’ needs or cannot tackle the competition of other firms’ products and 
services anymore, leading to a decrease in product margin that falls below the level 
required to cover the fixed costs and to ensure a sufficient level of profit. Product 
deterioration can be due to insufficient investments in R&D, unsuccessful marketing 
campaign, achievement of maturity or decline phases in the product lifecycle or entry 
of a new competitor with a very effective or more innovative product mix. 
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4. Lack of innovation and planning: the company’s inability to anticipate, interpret and 
adapt to environmental changes creates serious obstacles to its innovation process. The 
lack of planning ability results into a focus on short term objectives as well as in a 
limited commitment of managers and employees. The lack of innovation, instead, 
consists on firm’s inability to exploit new growth opportunities leading to an 
inevitable weakening of its competitive position. 
 
5. Financial imbalances: companies characterized by excessive leverage, significant short 
term debt in respect to other forms of borrowing, low shareholders’ equity or 
insufficient liquidity reserves, are exposed to a larger risk of failing into a crisis. A 
strong and flexible capital structure, both in quantitative and qualitative terms (as 
pointed out by Halpern et al. (2009), debt composition plays a key role in influencing 
the firm’s probability of financial distress and bankruptcy), indeed, is a powerful 
resource to face the decline emerged at the operating/strategic level, since it gives time 
to implement corrective actions and delay the financial distress. On the contrary, an 
unbalanced capital structure further contributes to the deterioration of company’s 
profitability, by requiring the payment of higher interest expenses in respect to 
competitors.  
 
However, as stated by Fedele and Antonucci (2015), the financial imbalances might be 
generated from other causes of the crisis. For example, excessive debt can be the result of 
over investments, trade receivables collection problems, loss of customers due to product 
decay or ineffective marketing campaigns. All these factors gradually undermine the company 
survival as a going concern, finally weakening the firm from a financial perspective as well. 
In addition, as supported by Vance (2009), a firm is seldom in trouble for a single reason. The 
corporate crisis is generally the result of a combination of different causes that, acting 
together, reciprocally amplify their effect on the company performance and survival. Thus, 
the deterministic and voluntaristic perspectives to the analysis of the crisis should be 
combined and integrated with each other in order to understand how external and internal 
factors interact to cause the crisis. This interaction, in fact, can bring to “significant 
differences in the outcomes of the same internal factors across firms in different business 
environments and vice versa” (Mellahi & Wilkinson 2004, p. 34).   
Furthermore, the complexity of the phenomenon makes very difficult to develop an 
exhaustive and comprehensive list of all the possible causes that can originate the corporate 
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crisis. For this reason, as suggested by Danovi and Indizio (2008), it is preferable to adopt an 
entity based approach, which consists in investigating the different causes of the crisis 
according to their impact on the company’s KSFs and sources of competitive advantage.  
 
1.4 Stages of the crisis path 
 
As previously mentioned, a corporate crisis may occur at different levels of severity, starting 
from signals of reversible decline until reaching highly distressed situations in which the only 
solution might be liquidation. Even if it is not so easy in practice, the identification of the 
phase of the corporate crisis path in which the company is in, becomes fundamental for 
managers, to design and implement appropriate corrective actions, but also for other 
stakeholders to clearly understand the degree of risk connected with their position in the 
company. 
An examination of the corporate crisis path can be conducted by analyzing the frameworks 
proposed by Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988), Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) and Outecheva 
(2007), and by combining and re-elaborating them in order to obtain a more in-depth analysis 
of the crisis stages, as proposed in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 - The stages of company’s downturn. (Personal elaboration from Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (1988), Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) and Outecheva (2007)) 
The first phase of the corporate crisis path is the so-called “early impairment”. During this 
phase, the company fails to identify internal or external factors that may result into impending 
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losses. At this “blinded stage”, in fact, internal and external challenges are likely to be 
qualitative in nature and not yet reflected on the firm’s financial reports, since, for instance, 
the company may still be able to generate positive operating cash flows, or changes may 
occur in an environment that still appears supportive and stable. “At this early stage, however, 
it is still possible that decline can be reversed at relatively little cost by improving 
communications and monitoring, boosting employee morale, and other remedial steps.” (Dark 
2007, p. 219). 
The second phase of the crisis path is the financial distress. When external and internal 
factors, such as a drop in sales and internal inefficiencies, start to impact company’s 
profitability, the signals of performance deterioration come into light. As reported by 
Whitaker (1999), the operating income falls to 46.32% below the industry average during the 
early stages of financial distress. Managers, however, can judge the threat as temporary or be 
committed to the current strategy, therefore deciding to delay in taking corrective actions that 
generally are costly and disruptive. 
This “inaction stage” comes to an end when the overt indicators of declining performance 
continue to multiply and the company starts to take some corrective actions which, however, 
may result ineffective or inappropriate. So, during the “faulty action stage”, the increasing 
pressure encourages managers to examine different alternative options but, at the same time, it 
pushes the decision makers to favor easier and less expensive solutions, rather than pursuing 
costlier but required changes. 
This behavior leads the company to economic failure, a situation in which “the realized rate of 
return on invested capital, with allowances for risk consideration, is significantly and 
continually lower than prevailing rates on similar investments” (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006, p. 
4) or the company cost of capital. In addition, the company’s inability to generate sufficient 
revenues to cover costs gives rise to a permanent reduction in cash flows and cash shortage 
problems.  
If the firm is not able to break the downward spiral, failure rapidly evolves into insolvency. At 
this stage the company has a negative equity value, since its enterprise value is lower than the 
face value of its debt (stock-based insolvency) and the operating cash flows are insufficient to 
meet current obligations (flow-based insolvency; Ross et al. 1996).  
When the company is still insolvent at the debt maturity date, the firm defaults, being unable 
to honor the agreements with creditors. This stage, called “crisis stage”, is characterized by 
the explosion of the crisis, since the default represents an explicit signal of the company 
severe distressed situation. Indeed, with the default, insiders, but also public, investors and 
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other stakeholders become aware that “the balance sheet of the company cannot absorb the 
decline in performance because financial resources have been completely exhausted” 
(Outecheva 2007, p. 33).  
Even though defaulted, the company can still fight for maintaining itself as a going concern, 
entering in a phase called “death struggle” (Hambrick & D’Aveni 1988). During the crisis 
stages, indeed, the company has the last chance for reorganization and turnaround. 
Revolutionary changes in strategies, structure, management and ideology, accompanied by a 
debt restructuring, are necessary to avoid entering in the “dissolution stage”.  
At the “dissolution stage”, the crisis is irreversible and the company has no choice but to find 
buyers for its assets or file for bankruptcy. Capital depletion, loss of markets and reputations 
and the exodus of experienced personnel are only some of the factors that may prevent the 
company from continuing as a going concern and managers, once acknowledged the 
irreversible situation, should focus on effectively managing the company liquidation. 
Distressed restructuring, however, can also be implemented before the company defaults, in 
order to break the downward spiral of financial distress. The possible strategies and legal 
solutions to deal with the crisis are more deeply analyzed in paragraph 1.6.  
 
Another analysis of the crisis path can be performed by adopting the framework suggested by 
Buttignon (2008), which distinguishes three different phases on the basis of the following 
quantitative variables: company’s operating free cash flow, going concern value, face value of 
debt and liquidation value (Figure 1.2). 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – The firm crisis path. (Buttignon 2008) 
 17 
 
Particularly, in the first phase the crisis is only potential: the going concern value is 
decreasing because of the negative trend registered on operating free cash flows, but it is still 
higher than the face value of debt, that is assumed to increase, since negative operating free 
cash flows give rise to the need of external funds. In order to invert the trend of free cash 
flows, it is critical to identify the causes of decline and to promptly take corrective actions, by 
developing and implementing business turnaround plan and acting on the financial structure, 
through debt rescheduling requests or new debt instruments for refinancing.  
If corrective actions are not taken or the solutions implemented are not effective, the company 
difficulties to meet financial obligations, due to its inability to generate positive cash flows, 
can have a negative impact on the company’s relationships with customers, suppliers and 
employees, accelerating the decline in the company’s enterprise value. 
When the going concern value decreases until surpassing the level of the nominal value of 
debt, the crisis is no longer potential, but it is still reversible. This second phase is called by 
Kash and Darling (1998) as “chronic crisis stage” and it is a period of “make or break”. In 
fact, more radical strategic turnaround and financial restructuring plan are required to avoid 
the company liquidation, and they should be aimed to solve what appear to be company’s 
chronic problems by adopting solutions that go beyond “quick-fixes” and “band-aid” 
approaches. In particular, it is fundamental to find efficient solutions to restructure the current 
capital structure in order to reduce the debt level and make it less overwhelming. This result, 
for instance, can be obtained by asking creditors a debt write-off in exchange of equity rights 
or quasi-equity rights, such as warrants, options or convertible bonds.   
The crisis becomes irreversible when the liquidation value is higher than the company’s going 
concern value. At this stage, the company liquidation is the most efficient alternative, but 
hybrid solutions can also be carried out. Alongside the liquidation of some no firm-specific 
assets, which may worth more under liquidation than as employed in the company, there 
could be some assets’ subgroups whose business enterprise value is higher than the proceeds 
deriving from the sale on individual basis of the assets which compose the subgroup. In this 
case, a possible solution consists on splitting these business units from the company, through 
a spin-off. This solution may or may not be accompanied by a transfer of control over the 
business unit to a new ownership group. 
 
In conclusion, even though they analyze the crisis path from different perspective, all the 
proposed frameworks recognize the importance of the time variable in the company 
downward turn. The biggest challenge during the evolution of the distress, indeed, is to 
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recognize adverse dynamics as early as possible: earlier the decline situation is identified, less 
expensive and more effective are the available tools to restore the company performance and 
going concern value.  
 
1.5 Signals of crisis and methods to detect them  
 
The possibility to prevent or resolve the corporate crisis, before it results into the liquidation 
of company’s assets, depends on the management’s ability to detect the signals of decline and 
distress in a prompt and deepened manner. This requires managers to identify companies’ 
operating and financial difficulties as early as possible and to correctly classify them as either 
causes or symptoms of decline, in order to fully capture the underlying cause-effect 
relationships, which represent a critical starting point for the design of a successful turnaround 
strategy (Vance 2009). 
The investigation of signals of decline and distress, however, responds to the needs of 
stakeholders outside the management of the company as well, such as shareholders and 
creditors, to anticipate and recognize factors that can negatively affect the company health, in 
order to take the necessary measures to minimize the impact of such phenomena on their 
positions. 
Different methods can be adopted to detect signals of decline and distress, which are generally 
grouped by the literature in three categories3:  
 Methods based on intuition 
 Methods based on ratio analysis 
 Methods based on models 
 
1.5.1 Methods based on intuition 
 
The first group of methods is based on the recognition of the external manifestations of crisis 
factors (which are mainly qualitative in nature), often based on a simple intuition rather than 
as a result of the application of a formalized model. Given the impossibility to compile a 
comprehensive and universal list, Table 1.1 indicates an example of the elements which can 
reveal a decline situation.  
                                                          
3 This classification is proposed by several authors, such as Guatri (1995), Sirleo (2009), Fedele and Antonucci 
(2015) and Fiori (2016). 
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TYPE OF SIGNAL CRISIS SIGNAL 
EXTERNAL 
RECOGNIZABILITY 
POSSIBILITY OF 
INTERVENTION 
Market-related 
signals 
Belonging to mature or 
declining industries 
High Low 
Belonging to industries 
characterized by declining 
demand 
High Low 
Loss of market shares Medium Medium 
Operating/ 
Strategic signals 
Production inefficiencies Low High 
Sales/Marketing inefficiencies Medium High 
Administrative and 
organizational inefficiencies 
Low High 
Rigid cost structure Medium Medium 
Low products innovation and 
shift toward lower margin 
products mix. 
Medium Medium 
Lack of planning/scheduling Low High 
Low R&D investments and 
resulting productivity 
deterioration 
Medium High 
Exodus of managers and high 
qualified personnel 
Medium Medium 
Troubled relations with clients 
and suppliers 
Medium Medium 
Balance sheet/ 
Financial signals 
Financial imbalances and 
inefficiencies: 
- Deterioration of financial 
structure 
- Huge debt increase 
accompanied by a significant 
liquidity decrease 
- Difficulties in fulfilling debt 
payments and worsening of the 
relations with financial 
community 
High Medium 
Balance sheet imbalances: 
- Liabilities far greater than 
assets 
High Medium 
Table 1.1 – Signals of crisis and possibility to detect and act on them. (Personal elaboration 
from Guatri (1995), Sirleo (2009), Usdin and Bloom (2012)) 
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In addition to the listed signals, negative net income is another evident sign of company 
downturn. However, when losses in the income statements are significant and persistent, the 
crisis prediction is obvious by now indicating that the decline has already turned into distress 
and started to show negative effects also toward creditors (Sirleo 2009). 
 
1.5.2 Methods based on ratio analysis 
 
A more in-depth investigation of the signals of the crisis can be conducted through the 
analysis of the company’s financial statements and the calculation of key ratios. The ratio 
analysis allows to identify potential critical issues which may lead the company to decline, by 
questioning the differences resulted from the comparison of key ratios for a firm over several 
years (time series comparison), with other firms in the industry (cross-sectional comparison) 
or to some absolute benchmarks.  
A first area of investigation, on which the ratio analysis should focus, concerns the company’s 
profitability. A downward trend in revenues and a reduction in productivity, expressed by a 
declining EBITDA margin, represent the first signals of decline. The decrease in operating 
results makes the coverage of structural fixed costs and the payment of financial expenses 
more difficult, thus negatively affecting the company profitability, as captured by ratios such 
as ROE, ROA, ROS and ROIC. 
As suggested by Koller et al. (2015), ROIC is a better tool for understanding company’s 
performance, in respect to the other ratios. While the ROE mixes operating performance with 
capital structure and the ROA includes non-operating assets and ignores the benefits of 
operating liabilities (as account payables) in reducing the capital required from investors, the 
ROIC focuses solely on company’s operations. Thus, declining or below industry average 
ROIC can provide a signal of company’s operating inefficiencies, that is economic distress.  
Another dimension through which the signals of decline can come into light is the company’s 
liquidity. In particular, short term liquidity deficit or insufficiency, which generally 
characterizes distressed companies, can result from the analysis of ratios such as: 
 the current ratio: it measures the firm’s ability to pay its current liabilities; 
 the quick (or acid test) ratio: it captures the firm’s ability to cover its current liabilities 
from liquid assets, which are “quick” sources of cash; 
 operating cash flow ratio: it focuses on the company’s ability to cover its current 
liabilities with cash generated from operations. 
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For these ratios, it is difficult to identify a generally accepted threshold below which the 
company can be considered as having liquidity problems. For instance, as stated by Branch 
and Ray (2007), even though, the current ratio should be 2 or greater (according to common 
wisdom), the optimal level varies from companies to companies, industries to industries and 
over time. As supported by Palepu et al. (1996) indeed, even when the current ratio is higher 
than 1, suggesting that the firm can cover its current liabilities with the cash generated by its 
current assets, the firm can experience short term liquidity problems because some of its 
current assets are not easy to liquidate (for instance, the industries in which the firm operates 
can be characterized by a slow collection of accounting receivables). 
In addition, the assessment of the company’s liquidity should encompass the analysis of the 
firm’s working capital, generally performed through the calculation of ratios such as account 
receivables turnover, account payables turnover, inventory turnover or day’s receivables, 
day’s payables, day’s inventory. The negative trend in revenues, which characterizes a 
company in decline, lead to an increase in inventory due to unsold goods, while the delay in 
payments create tensions with the suppliers, which ask more stringent conditions. On the 
other hand, the need to maintain or increase sales can lead the company to decrease its 
attention on the selection of clients, increasing the account receivables collecting period. As a 
consequence, signals of decline situation can result into slow accounts receivables turnover 
and slow inventory turnover that put a strain on the company short term liquidity and may 
indicate excessive bad debt losses or obsolete inventory, which are signs of a poor working 
capital management4 (Pratt et al. 2000).  
 
Finally, the ratio analysis should also focus on the company’s capital structure in order to 
verify the presence of issues related to the company’s long term solvency, which may trigger 
financial distress. In this context, commonly used ratios are debt-to-equity ratio, debt-to- 
capital ratio and equity-to-capital ratio. High values of the first two ratios indicate aggressive 
leverage practices, generally associated with high level of risk that may result in volatile 
earnings because of the additional interest expenses.  
Judgments about the suitability/sustainability of the company’s capital structure can also be 
based on the insights provided by: 
 the interest coverage ratio, which indicates the company ability to pay interests on 
outstanding debt with its earnings; 
                                                          
4 On the other hand, also fast account receivables turnover and inventory turnover are not desirable, since they 
may indicate that sales are limited by an overly stringent credit policy or insufficient inventory.   
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 net debt to EBITDA ratio, which shows how many years it would take for a firm to 
pay back its debt if net debt and EBITDA are held constant. 
As well as for liquidity ratios, also for capital structure ratios it is very difficult to identify 
absolute benchmarks, since they can widely vary among industries. Nonetheless, as reported 
by Fazzini (2011), analysts usually use some parameters for judging the level of financial 
independence on the basis of the equity-to-capital ratio. In particular, equity-to-capital ratios 
below 33% signals risky areas, ratios from 33% to 50% signal less risky situations which 
should be closely monitored in any case, while ratios above 66% reveal a scarce recourse to 
financial leverage. 
The main ratios previously mentioned are listed in the Table 1.2. Alongside the ratio analysis, 
further signals of decline can be captured trough a cash flow analysis. By providing further 
insight into the firm’s operating, investing and financing policies through the examination of 
cash flows, this type of analysis allows, for instance, to assess how much strong is the firm’s 
internal cash flow generation and whether the firm is able to meet its short term financial 
obligations from its operating cash flows (Palepu et al. 1996). 
Profitability 
ratio 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑅𝑂𝑆 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 =  
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
Liquidity 
ratio 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
                                                𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 (𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑑 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡) 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 
=  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
Capital 
Structure 
ratio 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
 
Table 1.2 – Financial ratios as signals of firm decline. (Personal elaboration from Branch and 
Ray (2007), Pratt et al. (2000), Palepu et al. (1996))  
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1.5.3 Methods based on models 
 
Financial ratios, then, can be combined in different models with the purpose of predicting the 
company’s probability to going into bankruptcy. In this context, a first contribution was 
provided by Beaver (1966), whose study aimed to investigate the predictive ability of 30 
financial ratios through a univariate analysis. By considering 79 failed firms and 79 healthy 
firms and by comparing each firm of the first group with a firm of the second group operating 
in the same industry and with equal size, Beaver (1966) concluded that cash flow to total debt 
ratio presented the highest discriminatory and prediction power for as long as five years 
before actual failure. This result was confirmed and corroborated by Deaklin’s study (1972), 
which, similarly to Beaver’s analysis, was aimed to identify those ratios able to capture the 
differences between failed and healthy firm some years before the failure actually occurs.    
However, since the models of Beaver (1966) and Deaklin (1972) were based on univariate 
statistics, they presented the shortcoming of not considering the relationships between ratios 
in predicting bankruptcy. 
 
This limitation was overcome by Altman (1968), that developed a multivariate discriminatory 
model through which a score could be assigned to each publicly traded firm considered in his 
analysis. The score is calculated by weighting and adding up 5 different ratios describing 
company’s profitability, liquidity, leverage and solvency, which resulted to be the most 
explanatory ratios of company distress in Altman’s analysis of historical data (Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 – The Z-score model. (Altman 1968) 
 
Then, the obtained score allows to classify the firm as economically and financially healthy (if 
the Z score is higher than 2.99) or as in distress and so at high risk of bankruptcy (if the Z 
score is lower than 1.8). Z score levels between 1.8 and 2.99, instead, determine a grey area in 
which the results can be ambiguous and a further in-depth investigation is required.   
In the following years, this model was revised by Altman himself, in order to adapt it to 
private firms (Altman, 1993), and to non-manufacturers and emerging markets (Altman et al., 
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1995; 1997), but also by other authors in different countries, such as, for instance, Alberici 
(1975) and Appetiti (1984) in Italy, Taffler (1979; 1982; 1991) in the United Kingdom, 
Edmister (1972) and Blum (1974) in the USA5. 
The discriminatory model developed by Altman, however, merely allows to classify a 
company as healthy or distressed, without providing any quantification of the firm’s 
probability to going into bankruptcy. In order to overcome this limit, a new model was 
developed by Ohlson (1980), i.e. O-score model. This model, by adopting a probabilistic 
approach, allows to calculate a value between 0 and 1 representing the company’s probability 
of default, on the basis of an O-score computed for each company by considering 9 
coefficient-weighted financial ratios (Figure 1.4). 
 
 
Figure 1.4 – The Ohlson’s model. (Ohlson 1980)  
Alongside these accounting-based measures for the calculation of probability of default, 
market-based measures which rely on information available in the market about firms’ bonds 
and stocks prices, can also be adopted. A more detailed analysis of these methods is provided 
in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1. 
 
1.6 Strategies for dealing with the crisis 
 
Once detected the signals of company decline or distress and recognized the internal and 
external factors that cause the crisis situation, the manager has to focus on the identification of 
the best solution to deal with and overcome the crisis. The different peculiarities of each 
company and of the industry in which it operates, make impossible to define an “universal 
                                                          
5 For further information about the literature review in the field of corporate bankruptcy prediction models see 
Comuzzi (1995) and Lin et al. (2011). 
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recipe” to deal with the crisis, requiring to adopt an entity-based approach for the selection of 
the best strategy to get out of the economic and/or financial distress. As pointed out by the 
empirical analyses presented in the literature, indeed, several factors influence the choice. 
Among these determinants there are, for instance: the debt structure (Asquit et al. 1994), the 
lenders monitoring (Lai & Sudarsanam 1997), the ownership structure (Kang & Shivdasani 
1997), the stage of firm’s lifecycle (Koh et al. 2015), the company’s size (Datta 1995), the 
severity of distressed state and the resource slack available (Smith & Graves 2005). 
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some common principles that should drive the 
management of the crisis and the strategic assessment of the best solution to exit the distress 
situation: efficiency, timeliness and fairness (Buttignon 2008). Focusing on efficiency means, 
first of all, to reflect upon the best use of the distressed firm’s assets. From this perspective, 
the optimal solution is the one which envisages the allocation of assets to the most productive 
configuration, that is the configuration under which they generate the highest value, taking 
into consideration not only the value of the assets on individual basis, but also the value 
generated as a result of their combined use in the company. Secondly, the manager should 
intervene on the crisis in a timely manner, according to the timeliness principle, in order to 
block the deterioration process before it results into a fall in the firm’s value, as either 
enterprise value or liquidation value. The ongoing decline situation, in fact, may have 
negative effects on the company reputation giving rise to a decrease in the value of the 
company’s assets, in particular for the intangible ones (such as goodwill and brands), and it 
may prevent the investments needed for the maintenance and strengthening of internal 
resources and competencies fundamental for the value generation. Finally, efficiency and 
timeliness should be combined with the fairness principle, which should drive the allocation 
of costs and benefits of the selected crisis solution among the different stakeholders. 
Based on the combination of these principles, the firm shall select one of the following 
alternatives as the solution of the crisis6: 
 Liquidation 
 Divestment or going concern sale 
 Restructuring 
Liquidation should be considered as the last resort strategy, when other alternatives are not 
applicable or not efficient (Benson 2010). Under this solution the company’s assets are sold 
on individual basis and the firm ceases to operate. This alternative can be very attractive for 
                                                          
6 Actually, the company can decide to choose different options among liquidation, divestment and 
restructuring for different SBUs (Strategic Business Unit). 
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creditors when the company assets are liquid and the firm’s operating conditions are critical, 
reducing the creditors confidence on the success of a possible restructuring. In this context, 
the distribution of equity rights (such as shares, options, warrants) to creditors, by giving them 
the opportunity to participate to the potential upside of the restructuring plan, can be a 
solution to weak the creditors pressure toward liquidation. On the other hand, when the 
tangible assets are firm-specific, so that their asset value outside the company is very low, 
and/or when the crisis situation makes it difficult or impossible to monetize firm’s intangible 
assets, the liquidation results into a further deterioration of value and in the transfer of the 
losses suffered by the insolvent firm on creditors (Guglielmucci 2015). 
Divestment (or going concern sale), instead, consists on the transfer of the control over the 
company to a new ownership group which will become responsible for the costs and benefits 
of the restructuring plan. The acquirer can be a strategic buyer, e. g. another company looking 
for synergies, or a financial buyer, such as a private equity fund, which can exploit its skills 
and competencies to revitalize firms with poor performance, in distress or experiencing 
trading difficulties, with a subsequent return on its investment through a sale or an IPO. In 
both cases, the creditors can benefit from the improved company’s performance that can lead 
to an increase in the cash flows available to repay the debt. However, creditors often end up 
accepting a debt restructuring and its related costs and sacrifices, since creditors’ approval of 
capital structure changes are often a condition dictated by the buyer for its intervention in the 
distressed firm. 
Restructuring, at last, consists in a fundamental organizational change aimed to restore and 
improve company efficiency and profitably (Chalos & Chen 2002). This solution is 
implemented with the purpose of maintaining the company’s as a going concern under current 
ownership and can involve different corporate dimensions (Schweizer & Nienhaus 2017):  
 Managerial restructuring. It is generally recognized that company’s top management 
team plays a key role in driving the firm outside the distress situation (Lohrke et al. 
2004). Managers whose poor and inefficient planning and decision making abilities 
are considered as causes of the crisis, therefore, are generally replaced with new teams 
that, by usually including managers with acknowledged expertise in business 
turnaround, are believed more skilled in defining and implementing strategies for 
restructuring (Koh et al. 2015). Moreover, a change in the management team is a 
tangible evidence for bankers and investors that something is being done in the 
attempt to improve company’s performance, even when the factors originating 
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company crisis might have been beyond management’s control (Sudarsanam & Lai 
2001).  
 Operational restructuring. This kind of restructuring aims to restore profitability by 
minimizing operating inputs and maximizing output through the adoption of cost 
cutting strategies, revenues generating strategies, asset reduction strategies or 
combination effort strategies (Hofer 1980). In particular, operating assets reduction 
strategies include, for instance, the closure of surplus plants, the sale of unused 
machineries or the reduction of inventory, with the purpose of enhancing operations’ 
efficiency through an optimization of assets utilization, while combination effort 
strategies consist on a simultaneous implementation of cost cutting, revenues 
generating and asset reduction strategies. Operational restructuring, however, mainly 
has a fire-fighting nature, since it is primarily designed to generate cash flow in the 
short term, and may be for many companies a necessary but not sufficient action for 
recovery if used as a stand-alone strategy, as showed in their survey by Grinyer et al. 
(1988, ch.4) 7.   
 Portfolio restructuring. Distressed firms can opt for selling unprofitable or non-core 
lines of business with the purpose to halt cash drain and refocus the business portfolio 
on core competencies, but also forming strategic alliance, joint venture and licensing 
agreement with companies that present best fit in terms of relatedness and impact on 
market position (Shleifer & Vishny 1992, Sudarsanam & Lai 2001). Asset sales, in 
addition, rise cash that can be used to repay debtors and fund restructuring. 
 Financial restructuring. It consists on the reworking of firm’s capital structure in order 
to reduce the debt payment pressure by adopting equity based and debt based 
strategies (Koh et al. 2015). Equity based strategies generally include equity issues 
and entail the reduction or omission of dividends as consequence of liquidity 
constraints, restrictions regulated in debt agreements or strategic consideration, such 
as enhancing the firm’s bargaining position with trade unions (DeAngelo & DeAngelo 
1990). Debt based strategies, instead, involve the restructuring of firm debt through 
covenants waiver, interest reduction, debt rescheduling and/or extension, debt-equity 
swap or debt write-off, depending on the severity of the crisis.  
                                                          
7From Grinyer et al. ‘s study (1988), in particular, it emerges that sharpbenders, after having experienced a 
decline relative to competitors, achieved a significant and sustained performance improvement by adopting 
cost reduction strategies in combination with the implementation of strategic changes with a long term focus 
(product diversification, acquisition, new market focus, …).   
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Given the different interests of stakeholders involved, however, the choice of the best solution 
among liquidation, divestment and restructuring is not so easy in practice. As a general 
principle, the firm should opt for the alternative that generates the highest value for 
stakeholders as a whole, further analyzing how to fairly distribute this value among creditors 
and shareholders, in the attempt to equitably counterbalance, at least partially, the costs 
connected with the selected solution suffered by each category. However, claimholders not 
only frequently disagree about how allocating value and pain deriving from the selected 
solution, but they also have different opinions about company’s worth under each alternative. 
A common solution to bridge such disagreement over value consists on including in the deal 
insurance policy or earn-out payment provisions, which regulate the payment from one party 
to another of a sum linked to the future realized value of the firm (Gilson 2010). 
 
1.6.1 Market reaction to restructuring announcement 
 
Several empirical researches have been conducted to study how the solution selected to exit 
the crisis is interpreted by the stock market. A large part of this line of literature, in particular, 
focuses on the market reaction to restructuring announcement, producing mixed findings. 
While some studies point out a positive response to restructuring announcement (Brickley & 
VanDrunen, 1990, Markides 1992, Bunsis 1997, Khurana & Lippincott 2000), other 
researches identifies a negative (Blackwell 1990, Bens 2002, Lin & Rozeff 1993, Poon et al. 
2001) or statistically not significant stock price reaction (Strong & Meyer 1987, Lin & Rozeff 
1993). According to Chaney (1999), this lack of consistency in the empirical results may be 
explained by three main reasons. First of all, corporate restructurings are difficult to interpret 
for markets, since they require to balance the loss in profitability caused by restructuring costs 
in the short term with the expectation of improved cash flows further ahead. By creating 
discontinuities with the past, in addition, restructuring increases the level of uncertainty about 
future earnings and can impair analysts’ ability to forecast firm’s performance. Chaney’s 
research (1999), particularly, pointed out that, on average, analysts’ overestimation of future 
profits results to be higher in the year following the restructuring announcement than in the 
year prior to it.  
Secondly, markets may or may not anticipate the restructuring announcement. The time 
window selected for analyzing the stock market reaction, therefore, can significantly affect 
the results. For example, Bartov et al. (1998) identified a very small stock price response (-
1%) to the announcement of assets write-off for significant amounts (around 20% of firm’s 
total market value). According to the author, this finding can be explained by the fact that the 
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market had already recognized the firm’s troubles and an adjustment had already taken place 
in the stock price before the write-off announcement. On the other hand, the prolonged price 
correction experienced by the stock in the following years, reveals that investors fail to fully 
incorporate all the relevant information in the market values in a timely basis, even if they 
partially anticipate the assets write-off. 
Thirdly, the mixed findings in the literature can be often explained by the different type of 
restructuring analyzed by the empirical studies, even though in some cases contrasting 
evidences also result from researches examining similar restructuring choices.  
A first line of research in this field of the literature focuses on the analysis of market reaction 
to the announcement of top management change, and, therefore, on managerial restructuring. 
In particular, while Warner et al (1988) reported no significant price reaction at the 
management change announcement date, Furtado and Rozeff (1987) detected significant 
positive returns. On the contrary, Khanna and Poulsen (1995) observed a significant and 
negative market response to managerial turnover, regardless of whether the new manager 
comes from inside or outside the firm, suggesting that the managerial replacement is not 
interpreted by the market as a cure to financial distress. According to Bonnier and Bruner 
(1989), the lack of consistency in the results of previous mentioned studies arises from a 
“cofounding information effect” connected with the managerial change announcement. The 
final stock price reaction, indeed, is the sum of two opposite components: an information 
effect, that can be negative if the change suggests a worse than anticipated management 
performance, and a real effect, that would be positive if the change is believed in the 
shareholders’ interest. The component with the large absolute value, therefore, will determine 
the sign of the market response. 
A second line of research, then, investigates market interpretation of operational restructuring 
strategies, in particular cost cutting and asset reduction strategies. These strategies, which aim 
to optimize marginal productivity and downscale firm’s capacity, frequently involve sizeable 
layoff in troubled firms. As reported by Chen et al. (2001), layoff announcements are 
associated on average with a significantly negative stock market reaction. This finding, which 
is supported by several empirical researches (see Worrell et al. 1991, Lin & Rozeff 1993, 
Ursel & Armstrong-Stasse 1995, Iqbal & Shetty 1995, Lee 1997), points out that the market 
generally negatively interprets the announcement of workforce downsizing because of 
concerns that losses in valuable human capital, a resource that is critical to achieve and 
sustain the competitive advantage, will exceed the benefit deriving from costs reduction 
(Nixon et al. 2004). In addition, for financially distressed firms, the layoff announcement 
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reinforces the market knowledge about the firm financial difficulties, signaling that they are 
real and long-lasting (Wertheim & Robinson 2004). In this case, the layoff is mainly reactive 
in nature, responding to loss making activities and declining demand. Differently, when the 
layoff decision derives from pure-efficiency cost cutting actions aimed to maintaining 
competitiveness and enhancing performance, thus having a proactive nature, the stock market 
reaction to the workforce downsize announcement is observed to be less negative, if not 
positive (Palmon et al. 1997, Hahn & Reyes 2004, Hillier et al. 2007). 
Thirdly, investors interpretation of restructuring announcement has been also investigated in 
the literature for portfolio restructuring strategies, which are undertaken by the company with 
the purpose of eliminating no more profitable lines of business and refocusing on core 
competencies. In particular, Markides (1992) observed that refocusing announcements are 
associated with significant positive returns, while Bunsis (1997) detected a positive market 
reaction to assets write-off when the decrease in total assets value is a consequence of 
company’s exit from unprofitable segments. According to these findings, the market perceives 
divestiture as a value enhancing type of restructuring, since it is assumed to reverse, at least 
partially, the value destruction caused by prior unsuccessful diversification strategies (Berger 
& Ofek 1999). In particular, in a comprehensive review study, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) 
identified an average abnormal return to divestment announcement for firms analyzed in 18 
empirical researches of 1,2% (ranging from 0,3% to 3,4%). Even more interestingly, Lasfer et 
al. (1996) showed that excess returns at the sell-off announcement are far higher for 
financially distressed firms. Troubled firms, indeed, benefits from divestments not only 
because they can lead to a performance improvement by eliminating out of focus businesses 
that give rise to negative synergies, but also because the sale of assets can reduce the cost of 
financial distress. Therefore, by generating cash that can be used to meet debt obligations, 
divestments can steer the firm out of potential bankruptcy and associated direct and indirect 
costs. According to this finding, Powell and Yawson’s study (2012) over 1699 restructurings 
undertaken by UK firms during the period 1992-2002, pointed out that divestiture really 
improves the firm’s survival likelihood, differently from layoff actions, which resulted to be 
less likely to protect the company from exiting the market. This empirical research suggests 
that the market, which generally negatively reacts to layoff announcement and positively 
responds to divestiture announcement, seems to correctly value the consequences of these 
restructuring strategies on firm performance and survival.  
Finally, regarding the last type of restructuring strategies, i.e. the financial restructuring, 
empirical studies’ results seem to be consistent with each other about the market reaction to 
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financial restructuring announcement. In particular, by focusing mainly on dividends cut or 
omission and equity-for-debt swaps, they point out a significant negative stock price reaction 
to both announcements. According to the “dividend signaling theory”, the announcement of 
dividends payments helps to alleviate the informational asymmetry between managers and 
investors about the firm’s future prospects (Jensen & Johnson 1995). In particular, 
announcements of decrease or omission of dividends suggest that managers are pessimistic 
about firm’s future earnings and they don’t expect a recovery of company’s financial 
conditions in the short term. Therefore, managers, who are aware of the negative signal sent 
to the capital market, tend to defer dividends cut and omission until company’s poor prospects 
make them imperative (Ghosh & Woolridge 1991). Investors, on the other hand, understand 
managers’ strong reluctance in reducing dividends and, thus, interpret the announcement of 
dividends cut as a very informative decision and a more critical event than dividend increase, 
as supported by empirical evidences which point out a stronger market reaction to downward 
adjustments in dividend payment than to upward adjustments (Ghosh & Woolridge 1991).   
A negative stock market reaction is then documented in the literature also in relation to debt-
equity swap announcements (Kalra et al. 1996). When undertaken by financially healthy 
firms, indeed, these leverage-decreasing transactions can cause debt to equity ratio to fall 
below the optimal level, i.e. the one maximizing the firm’s value. Investors, however, 
frequently interpret debt-reduction exchange offer as negative, also when implemented by 
distressed firms. Even if this solution signals the management’s efforts to stave off further 
financial distress and, therefore, to protect the shareholders’ value, the announcement also 
conveys information that company’s financial conditions are more critical than otherwise 
indicated by other publicly available information (Lie et al. 2001).  Thus, the effects of the 
latter signal prevail on the former’s one, causing negative stock price reaction around debt-
equity swap announcement.  
 
In conclusion, for some types of restructuring, the literature seems to broadly agree upon the 
market reaction to their announcement. Empirical analyses conducted at a higher degree of 
granularity, however, point out that market interpretation of restructuring efforts strongly 
depends on firm’s characteristics and on the announcement’s information content (Ponn et al. 
2001). Therefore, the market can react differently to similar types of restructuring, depending 
on whether the restructuring announcement reveals more or less unfavorable information 
about the conditions of the company and future cash flows, than the market previously 
realized. Furthermore, company turnaround generally involves more than one corporate 
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dimension at the same time. Interaction between the different types of restructuring, therefore, 
can lead to stock market responses which are different from what it is generally expected for 
that kind of restructuring. As showed by Chalos and Chen (2002), for instance, investors tend 
to positively interpret layoff announcements when related to firm’s refocusing strategies, but 
not when connected to plant closing decisions, which generally signal expected decline in 
sales. Finally, the overall economic circumstances surrounding the announcement and the 
related investors mood are other elements that can further lead to differential responses to 
corporate announcements (Hahn & Reyes 2004).  
 
1.6.2 Legal tools in Italy for managing the crisis 
 
In order to efficiently and effectively manage the crisis, the macro-level analysis of the 
possible solutions to the crisis (liquidation, divestment, restructuring) should be fine-tuned by 
considering the legal tools provided by the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction in which the 
company operates for the purpose of dealing with the financial distress. 
In particular, In Italy, the Bankruptcy Law (Legge Fallimentare – l.f.) provides different legal 
options to assist the firm to overcome the distress, which are mainly focused on the 
maintenance of the company’s as a going concern and can be classified in two macro 
categories:  
 out-of-court workouts, which generally entail the drafting of a private agreement 
between the firm and its creditors and, in any case, consists in a no court-assisted 
process; 
 in-court resolutions, which imply the court intervention and assistance in the process 
for solving distress. 
Generally, the out-of-court workouts is preferred to the in-court solutions, since the latter are 
more expensive and have a larger impact on company reputation and credibility, given the 
implied higher outside knowledgeability and externalization of the crisis situation 
(Guglielmucci 2011). In addition, out-of-court legal options increase the flexibility of the 
restructuring process, by involving a direct communication and discussion between the 
management and the company’s stakeholders. On the other hand, out-of-court restructuring 
agreements, such as the debt restructuring agreement (art. 182 bis l.f.), are binding only for 
creditors that participate in the agreement, since based on a private arrangement, while the 
dissenting creditors must be paid in accordance with their terms if their credits are not already 
due and payable. Non-participating creditors can gamble that the restructuring will take place 
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despite the lack of their approval, potentially assuring them to receive a full recovery at the 
maturity date, since at that date the company should be financially stronger, having been 
subjected to the restructuring. This dynamic is known as holdout problem and, by creating the 
risk that not enough creditors will participate to significantly reduce the firm’s debt burden, it 
is one of the most common reasons why voluntary restructuring fail to occur (Moyer et al. 
2012). This problem, instead, doesn’t exist in case of court-assisted resolutions, which are 
able to bind also the dissenting creditors to the agreement. The court intervention and 
supervision, in addition, facilitate the success of the agreement, by blocking the creditors’ 
enforcement actions and protecting the payments made or the transactions carried out under 
the agreement from clawback actions in case of company subsequent failure.  
For the sake of completeness, a brief description of the institutions regulated by the Italian 
Bankruptcy law, illustrated in Figure 1.5, is provided in the following pages. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 – Legal tools in Italy for dealing with the crisis. (Buttignon 2016) 
 
Certificate Plan – Piano attestato di risanamento (art 67, co. 3, lett. d, l.f.)  
The Certificate Plan consists in a plan developed by the entrepreneur which describes the 
actions he intends to undertake in order to restore the company financial health and recover 
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the financial equilibrium, in the attempt of ensuring the company’s continuity as a going 
concern.  
The adoption of this legal instrument presupposes a “crisis status”, such as insolvency or at 
least debtor’s financial distress, including a temporary illiquidity or inability to pay its debts, 
and requires the preparation of a plan by the entrepreneur of the distressed firm. The plan is a 
unilateral act of the debtor, not subjected to any control by the court and not necessarily 
requiring creditors’ approval. Frequently, however, it is built on an agreement with current or 
new creditors (moratorium agreement, debt write-off, debt refinancing or rescheduling) and it 
may also include an agreement with partners different from creditors and unilateral initiatives 
of the entrepreneur, such as an equity increase or the contribution of new assets.  
Concerning the content of the plan, as summarized in the 2014 AIDEA-IRDCEC report and 
then more in-depth described in the new principles for the drafting of Certificate Plan (issued 
in October 2017), the plan shall be structured in three main part: 
 in the first part, the entrepreneur shall provide information about the company 
historical and current financial data, besides describing the crisis situation and 
performing an analysis of the causes; 
 in the second part, the entrepreneur shall present the strategy designed to overcome the 
crisis and the relative actions to be undertaken (action plan); 
 in the third part, a forecast about the progress and results of the plan from an economic 
and financial perspective, shall be provided, highlighting the expected impacts on the 
company’s competitive position. 
The truthfulness of the accounting data and the feasibility of the plan, then, have to be verified 
by a third party expert, which has to certificate the plan. The third-party expert shall be 
appointed by the debtor and shall be a registered auditor independent from the company and 
those bearing an interest in the restructuring to not compromise its independency of judgment. 
Since no court intervention is provided by the art 67, co. 3, lett. d l.f., the plan might remain 
unknown to creditors. However, the plan can be published in the competent Companies' 
Register upon request of the debtor, to gain certain tax benefits connected with the debt write-
off. 
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Debt restructuring agreement – Accordo di ristrutturazione del debito (art. 182 bis, l.f.) 
The debt restructuring agreement consists in an agreement for debt restructuring with 
creditors representing at least the 60% of the outstanding debt claims. The adoption of this 
legal tool presupposes a crisis status, including insolvency, while its main purpose, according 
to the case law, is to recover the company’s solvency. The procedure for the formation and 
implementation of the debt restructuring agreement can be articulated in three phases: 
 First of all, the agreement is negotiated with the creditors through an out-of-court 
process. The debtor can offer different conditions to each creditor and he is not 
obliged to respect creditors' classes and the pari passu principle. The restructuring 
plan underlying the agreement must be certified by an independent expert, who 
validates the truthfulness of the company's figures and the feasibility of the plan, 
evaluating, in particular, the firm’s ability to entirely satisfy non-participating 
creditors. The latter, indeed, must be paid within 120 days from the date of the 
validation of the agreement by the court, for credits already due and payable at that 
date, or from the expiry date, for credits not due and payable at the validation date. 
The agreement, then, is published in the competent Companies' Register. From this 
date, for the next 60 days, the creditors are prevented from starting or continuing 
precautionary or enforcement actions against the debtor. This protection can also be 
obtained before the publication in the Companies’ Register, during the negotiation of 
the agreement, by filing a petition for suspension (istanza di sospensione) to the 
competent court, which consists in an agreement proposal accompanied by a 
declaration certifying that the creditors involved in the negotiation represent at least 
the 60 % of the outstanding claims, and other required documentation.   
 Secondly, the court, after having decided on eventual oppositions, that must be filed 
within 30 days from the publication, validates the agreement. With the validation 
decree (decreto di omologazione), there is no risk of clawback for actions, transactions 
and payments carried out under and in performance of a debt restructuring agreement 
and the agreement produces the benefits of the pre-deduction of new financing.   
 Finally, the debtor must implement the debt restructuring agreement without any 
further intervention of the court.  
Given the characteristics of this legal instrument, the debt restructuring agreement is 
particularly suitable for restructuring plan of distressed firms in which the debt is concentrated 
on a limited number of creditors, so that it is easier to obtain the required approval of creditors 
representing at least the 60% of the outstanding debt (Bonfatti & Censoni, 2013). On the other 
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hand, the payment of dissenting creditors may require high liquidity, scarcely available for 
distressed firms.   
 
Composition with creditors – Concordato preventivo (art. 160 l.f.) 
Composition with creditors consists on a settlement approved by creditors representing the 
majority of the claims. Differently from the debt restructuring agreement, court intervention 
and supervision over the entire process assure creditors more protective rights and bind all the 
creditors. The objective prerequisite for the application of this legal instrument is the “crisis 
status” of the firm, a broad concept including not only insolvency but also any temporary 
difficulties to fulfill debt obligations.  
The procedure of composition with creditors is initiated by filing a petition with the court 
with many supporting documents, including the restructuring plan. This latter has to be 
certified by an independent expert appointed by the debtor, confirming the truthfulness of the 
debtor's figures and the feasibility of the plan. Moreover, the debtor may file a petition for 
composition with creditors simply by attaching the latest three financial statements and the 
list of creditors and related credits, while reserving the right to file the proposal to creditors, 
the plan and the other supporting documents within a term to be set by the court (concordato 
in bianco or concordato con riserva). This term is usually between 60 and 120 days, with the 
possibility to extend it by a maximum of 60 additional days. During this period, creditors are 
prohibited to start or continue enforcement actions and foreclosure proceedings over the 
debtor’s assets (automatic stay). These effects will be extended for the entire period of the 
procedure if the debtor is admitted to the composition with creditors. 
In addition, within the same term for the presentation of the plan and other required 
documents, the debtor can decide to deal with the crisis by negotiating and filing a debt 
restructuring agreement (art. 182 bis l.f.). 
Then, the court, after having determined that all the required conditions are met, starts the 
procedure by appointing a delegated judge and a judicial commissioner and scheduling a 
creditors’ meeting within 120 days. The proposal must be approved by creditors with voting 
rights representing the majority of the outstanding claims, while, where creditors have been 
dividend in classes, a majority must be reached in most of the classes. The approved 
composition with creditors, then, is validated by the court, and its correct application is 
monitored by the judicial commissioner, which supervises the management of the company, 
to which the debtor remains entitled (except for extraordinary administration acts, that have to 
be authorized by the delegated judge).  
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In addition, if the approved plan provides liquidation of company’s assets, one or more 
liquidators are appointed by the court. However, liquidation is only one of the possible 
solution to the crisis status provided by the composition with creditors tool, differently to 
what affirmed by the case law in the past. This legal instrument, indeed, can also be adopted 
to favor the firm restructuring and going concern, under the debtor or a third-party purchaser 
management, as pointed out by the recent reform introducing the “going-concern 
composition” (concordato con continuità aziendale, art. 186-bis l.f.). In this case, a 
certification from an independent expert is required to attest that the continuation of the 
business would maximize creditors’ satisfaction. 
For both type of compositions, however, any payments made or transactions carried out under 
a court-confirmed settlement are exempted from clawback actions. They are also protected 
from criminal charges and the risk of civil liability if the debtor subsequently becomes 
insolvent.  
If the debtor, indeed, doesn’t fulfill the obligations deriving from the plan or in case of fraud, 
the composition with creditors may be terminated or nullified, triggering bankruptcy. 
Filing for bankruptcy - Dichiarazione di fallimento (Title II, Chapter I l.f.) 
Bankruptcy consists in a court-supervised procedure for the liquidation of insolvent firm’s 
assets and the distribution of the proceeds to creditors. This procedure is initiated by a petition 
filed by creditors, the public prosecutor or the insolvent debtor himself, and requires the 
presence of an insolvency state, that consists in the debtor’s inability to meet its current 
obligations on a regular basis. In addition, bankruptcy cannot be declared if the company’s 
overdue debts amount to less than 30.000 € and it applies only to business undertakings that 
are not state entities or small businesses. 
During the proceedings, the authority to manage and dispose of the company’s assets is 
delegated to a bankruptcy administrator, that operates under the direction and supervision of 
the delegated judge and with the power to undertake clawback and other actions aimed at 
increasing the value of the estate. Upon completion of the bankruptcy procedure, the firm will 
cease to exist. 
Bankruptcy proceedings can also be closed as result of an in-bankruptcy composition (or 
bankruptcy agreement, concordato fallimentare, art 124 l.f.). With the purpose of speeding up 
the bankruptcy proceedings, during the course of bankruptcy, any creditor, the debtor or a 
third party may propose a bankruptcy agreement which provides for restructuring of debts and 
payment of claims by any possible means. The proposal can include the division of creditors 
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into different classes that may be subjected to different treatments, the sales of assets or the 
acquisition of all assets included in the bankruptcy estate and the assumption of the relevant 
liabilities by a third party or by one or more creditors, thereby taking the role of assignee 
(assuntore). The proposal, then, has to be approved by the majority of the creditors entitled to 
vote on it, counted according to the amount of the claims. 
 
In conclusion, the different legal options provided by the Italian Bankruptcy Law support the 
company dealing with distress and can result into the preservation of the company’s as a 
going concern or in the liquidation of the company’s assets. Regardless of the solution 
implemented, however, earlier the crisis status is detected, higher is the negotiation power 
toward creditors and the probability of success of the solution adopted, while lower are the 
costs and efforts required for overcoming the crisis. The importance of acting on the crisis in a 
timely manner has been particularly stressed by the legislator in recent times, who has 
introduced the so called “alert procedure” near the end of 2017. The purpose of this new legal 
instrument is to anticipate the emergence of the crisis signals in order to promptly fix them by 
favoring the negotiation between the firm and its creditors. This new procedure requires the 
creation of a new body in each Chamber of Commerce, which will be responsible for 
nominating three experts whose main task would be identifying a crisis solution to be agreed 
by debtor and creditors, and can be activated by the debtor, the supervisory body or the 
qualified creditors in presence of well-founded crisis clues.  
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CHAPTER 2: Valuation methods for distressed firms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the valuation of companies in distress has been a highly debated and investigated 
topic in the last decades, building a comprehensive and, at the same time, concrete model for 
valuing distressed firms still remain an open challenge and an alluring venture. Academic and 
professional contributions in this field of corporate finance literature, in fact, have focused 
mainly on stating critical issues and designing complex solutions with little practical 
applicability. Distressed firm’s features and, above all, the high uncertainty underlying its 
future prospects, indeed, pose several challenges in valuation, making the estimation process 
of distressed firms’ economic value very complex and less precise. In troubled companies, 
valuation’s strategic factors, probability of default and related consequences in terms of 
additional costs suffered by the firm, or, in the worst case, in terms of net proceeds deriving 
from assets liquidation, significantly affect the firm’s value. Estimating such variables, 
however, is not straightforward and strongly influences the accuracy of the model. These 
critical issues are discussed in paragraph 2.2. 
The most used corporate valuation methods are then analyzed, with the purpose of identifying 
strengths and limitations, as well as possible solutions and adjustments, of each technique 
when applied in distress setting. Specifically, while the asset approach (paragraph 2.3) results 
to be particularly useful in liquidation scenarios, the income approach is preferred whenever 
firm’s continuation as a going concern is expected, but with uncertainty about the degree of 
firm’ recovery in future prospects. This latter approach, in particular, encompasses three main 
techniques: the Discounted Cash Flow method (paragraph 2.4.1), the Adjusted Present Value 
method (paragraph 2.4.2) and the Capital Cash Flow method (paragraph 2.4.3). The different 
treatment of debt tax shields makes these models more or less appropriate to measure 
distressed firm’s enterprise value depending on the company’s debt strategy. A market check 
on the value estimate resulting from the application of the asset approach and income 
approach, then, is provided by the market approach or relative valuation, whose suitability to 
distress setting is discussed in paragraph 2.5. However, when these traditional valuation 
approaches result in an estimate of firm value under a going concern or liquidation scenario 
lower than outstanding debt face value, erroneously suggesting that the equity is worthless, a 
practical solution might be to consider the equity as a call option on firm’s assets and compute 
its value through the option pricing model (paragraph 2.6).  
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2.2 Critical elements in distressed firm valuation 
 
Valuation plays a key role in a distress scenario since it provides what should be the criteria 
for the selection of the best strategy to overcome the crisis, i.e. the value generated under each 
alternative solution for the stakeholders as a whole. The characteristics of distressed firms, 
however, make firm valuation, that is a difficult task at the best of times, even more complex. 
Traditional valuation methods, indeed, are built for firms with positive growth rates and 
operating margins, which are implicitly assumed to continue as a going concern in the future. 
Declining revenues, shrinking operating margins and high leverage levels, however, can cast 
significant doubts about the firm’s survival causing traditional valuation techniques to 
produce misleading results, if not adequately adjusted in order to reflect the consequences of 
distress, among which the possibility of firm’s liquidation. 
In particular, when estimating firm’s intrinsic value, the valuation of distressed firms requires 
to face several issues that make the valuation process more challenging than for healthy firms 
(Damodaran 2009): 
 First of all, existing assets, by earning less than the cost capital, can be value 
destroying, leading the firm to opt for asset divestitures, which in turn give rise to 
further estimation issues. Divestitures, indeed, make forecasting more difficult by 
creating discontinuity with past data and requiring an estimation of the expected 
proceeds.  
 Secondly, reinvestment rates can be negative in future years (because of assets 
divestiture), leading to negative growth rates, when the declining company continues 
to invest in new assets ignoring that reinvestment will lower the firm value since these 
assets may actually earn less than the cost of capital.  
 Thirdly, distress significantly impacts discount rates. Dividends and buybacks which 
can characterize declining firms at the early stages of crisis path, when debt is not 
enough for distress to be a concern, reduce the market value of equity leading to an 
increase in debt ratio (if debt is not proportionally repaid). In addition, the increase in 
default risk and the dissipation of debt tax benefits, due to negative operating profits, 
rise the after-tax cost of debt, while the higher earnings volatility leads to an increase 
in the cost of equity. 
 Finally, distressed firms may cease to exist during or at the end of the explicit forecast 
period or they can reach a steady state but with a negative growth rate expected in 
perpetuity, giving rise to issues in computation of the terminal value. 
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Given these issues, assumptions of positive growth rates, cost of capital equal to cost of 
capital of healthy firms in the same industry, but also margin and excess return in line with 
historical averages, which usually drives the valuation of healthy firms, result to be 
overoptimistic and lead to an erroneous estimation of firm’s value when using traditional 
valuation methods to estimate the intrinsic value of declining and distressed firms. These 
issues, in addition, cannot be solved by focusing on firm’s relative value, instead of firm’s 
intrinsic value, since the firm’s distressed conditions, by resulting into negative and, therefore, 
meaningless earnings multiples and by making the identification of comparable firms more 
difficult, cause estimation challenges also when adopting relative valuation techniques 
(Damodaran 2009). 
 
2.2.1 Strategic factors 
 
When applied to distressed firms, therefore, traditional valuation methods require to be 
adjusted in order to adequately reflect the consequences of distress on firm’s value. In this 
way, as supported by Gilson et al. (2000), these valuation techniques will produce estimates 
of value that are generally unbiased. The same authors, however, by comparing values 
estimated through comparable companies and capital cash flows techniques, on the basis of 
the forecasts contained in their reorganization plan, to the market value observed for 
distressed companies emerging from firm restructuring, found that the ratio of estimated value 
to market value varies from less than 20% to more than 250%. This indicates that even if the 
valuation methods, appropriately adjusted to capture the effects of distress, produce unbiased 
results, the estimated values are not very precise. According to Gilson et al. (2000), however, 
these large valuation errors cannot be totally attributed to the models selected for the 
valuation or to potential errors in underlying assumptions.  
As suggested by Crystal and Mokal (2006), indeed, valuation uncertainty is largely due to the 
so called “strategic factors”. Since the output of the valuation process “determines the size of 
the pie to be divided among firm’s claimants and drives projected payout and recoveries” 
(Altman and Hotchkiss 2006, p. 103), the estimate of the firm value will be influenced not 
only by the different information held by corporate insiders and outside stakeholders, but also 
by the conflicting interests of the parties involved in the negotiation of the restructuring plan. 
In particular, junior claimants tend to push for upwardly biased estimates of firm value 
because this increases the probability and the amount of their recovery after senior payments 
are fulfilled. On the opposite side, senior claimants favor downwardly biased estimates, since 
this allows them, thanks to the priority rule, to maximize their share and, therefore, to gain a 
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greater portion of the firm in case of a subsequent performance improvement. Similar 
incentives drive estimates supported by managers, who tend to value the firm above its 
liquidation value to save their position, but below the real value (if it is higher than the 
liquidation value), so that they can delivered “abnormally” good stock performance after the 
firm’s restructuring (Senbet & Wang 2012). In addition, when they receive stocks or stock 
options in the restructured firm as incentive compensation, a downwardly biased estimate of 
firm value makes their compensation to appear lower and leads to the determination of lower 
exercise price, given that options are generally issued at-the-money (Gilson et al. 2000).  
In a distress setting, however, strategic behavior can influence firm’s enterprise value and, 
therefore, corporate securities price, not only though “bargaining in default”, which 
determines how the firm’s value will be split among different claimholders, but also through 
the “strategic default decision” (Davydenko & Strebulaev 2007). A large part of the 
approaches to corporate securities valuation inspired by the Merton’s model (1974), to which 
paragraph 2.6.1 is dedicated, indeed, agrees on attributing a significant portion of the 
premium on risky debt (from 30% to 40%, according to Mella-Barral and Perraudin’s study 
(1997)) to strategic debt service. This notion, firstly introduced by Hart and Moore (1989), 
refers to the opportunity of equity holders, when liquidation is costly, to voluntary 
underperform their debt contractual obligations in order to extract concessions from creditors, 
without triggering liquidation. Upon default, indeed, creditors will be willing to renegotiate 
debt contract provisions whenever rejecting the equity holders’ offer and liquidating the firm 
would leave debt holders even worse off. This strategic behavior of shareholders is 
anticipated by bondholders and reflected on higher credit spreads and, therefore, lower debt 
values. Specifically, as pointed out by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) and Mella-Barral 
(1999), the effects of shareholders strategic actions on corporate bonds price and spreads 
appear to be higher for firms whose creditors are particularly vulnerable to strategic threats. 
This includes firms with few tangible assets and/or largely specifics investments, high 
managerial equity ownership and simple debt structures. 
According to Gilson et al. (2000), in addition, the strategic behavior of claimholders is highly 
likely when the market valuation process is substituted with an administrative bankruptcy 
process, as typically happens for distressed firms. The administrative bankruptcy process, 
indeed, may limit the amount and quality of available information, creating rooms for 
strategic valuation. As suggested by Crystal and Mokal (2006), when the company becomes 
distressed and formally files for bankruptcy, there would be fewer investors interested in 
acquiring company’s stocks and, therefore, fewer analysts have the incentive to collect 
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information about the bankrupt firm. Since the evidence shows that estimated values based on 
analysts’ forecasts are more in line with market values than the estimates based on 
management’s forecasts, the lack of this superior analysis ends up with exacerbating the 
uncertainty underlying the estimated value.  
 
In conclusion, the strategic use of valuation and the lack of market information strongly affect 
the dispersion of valuation errors and, thus, the accuracy of the estimated value of distressed 
firms. The starting point for a more precise valuation of distressed companies, therefore, 
should be a critical analysis of the management forecasts, in order to verify whether they are 
the expression of a feasible restructuring plan or the result of a strategic use of valuation, and 
the development of assumptions and projections which allow to adequately capture the effects 
of distress situations and attempted solutions. In particular, this requires to focus the attention 
on the following valuation elements, usually ignored in the valuation of healthy companies, 
that significantly affect the value of distressed firms and make its valuation more complex: 
 Probability of default 
 Liquidation value 
 Costs of distress 
 
2.2.2 Probability of default 
 
The probability of default8 is the degree of likelihood that a firm will be unable to meet its 
promised debt obligations (interest or principal). In particular, the default risk is a function of 
three main variables: firm’s ability to generate cash flows from operations, financial 
obligations terms and amounts, degree of liquidity of firm’s assets (Damodaran 2006). All 
things being equal, higher the size of cash flows relative to firm’s financial obligations, 
greater the stability of cash flows and more liquid the assets of the firm, lower is the default 
risk. On the contrary, default becomes an actual risk when, as it happens for troubled firms, 
operating inefficiencies make the company unable to generate sufficient cash flows to service 
its debt, triggering or contributing to financial distress, which, in turn, negatively affects the 
firm’s relations with suppliers, customers, creditors and other third parties, increasing the cost 
of financing and lowering firm’s bargaining power in asset sales. Troubled companies’ 
characteristics, therefore, make the default highly likely and require that default scenario and 
                                                          
8 In this dissertation probability of default, probability of distress and probability of bankruptcy are considered 
interchangeable terms, according to Damodaran (2002, 2006, 2009). Actually default doesn’t necessarily trigger 
bankruptcy and, as stated by Pindado et al. (2008), default, as defined by credit rating agencies, can be a more 
limited concept than financial distress.  
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associated probability are carefully taken into account in valuation. In fact, as pointed out by 
Jennergren (2013), a small annual probability of default brings to a noticeable decrease in 
firm’s value.  
As regards the estimation of probability of default, the literature provides different 
methodologies which can be grouped into two main classes (Altman & Hotchkiss 2006, Resti 
& Sironi 2007): 
 Credit scoring models 
 Capital market models 
The first group refers to statistical models mainly based on accounting data and measures 
which are used as an input in order to assess the company financial health. It comprises linear 
discriminant analysis, such as the “Z score model” first developed by Altman (1968) and 
described in paragraph 1.5.3, and regression models (linear, logit and probit), including the 
“O-score model” (Ohlson 1980) illustrated in the same paragraph.  
As already discussed, differently from the Altman’s model, the Ohlson’s model allows to 
derive a probability of default for the company being valued starting from the obtained score. 
Nonetheless, this model presents several limitations which are common for credit scoring 
models and affect the reliability of the estimated probability of default. First of all, as stated 
by Resti and Sironi (2007), the weights and, therefore the meaningfulness, of the 
economic/financial indicators used to predict default are not fixed as suggested by the models, 
but they can change over time because of the effect of the economic cycles, financial markets 
variables and other determinants. Secondly, a large part of credit scoring models ignores 
qualitative factors, such as the company reputation, the quality of the management and the 
stage of economic cycle, which significantly affect the company performance and likelihood 
of default. In addition, accounting-based models fail to incorporate a measure of asset 
volatility, that is crucial in assessing the firm’s probability of default since it reflects the 
likelihood that the firm’s assets value will decrease to such an extent that the company will be 
unable to meet its financial obligations (Hillegeist et al. 2004). 
 
Volatility, alongside prices and returns observed in bond and stock market, instead, is used as 
an input in capital market models to estimate the likelihood of default of the issuing company. 
Among these models, it is possible to distinguish approaches based on corporate bonds price 
and spread from structural models.  
The first subgroup includes the approach proposed by Damodaran (2009) which involves the 
computation of bond price by discounting at the risk-free rate the expected cash flows, which 
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differ from promised cash flows because of the probability of default. Assuming constant 
annual probability of default (𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠), the price for a bond with fixed coupon maturing in N 
years can be derived as follow: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  ∑
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 (1 − 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑓)𝑡
𝑡=𝑁
𝑡=1
+  
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 (1 − 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑁
(1 + 𝑟𝑓)𝑁
 
When corporate bonds are traded in the market and the appraiser knows bond’s maturity, face 
value and coupon rate, the previous equation can be solved for the unknown variable, that is 
the probability of default.  
An alternative approach, instead, is proposed by Resti and Sironi (2007), which use bonds 
spread to compute the cumulative probability of default for a period of T years (𝑝𝑇), that is the 
probability that the issuer will default between today and the end of the Tth year. This model, 
which expresses interest rates as continuously compounded rates and assumes investor’s risk 
neutrality, requires two main input: 
• the spread (𝑑) between the yields of the zero-coupon corporate bonds and the zero-
coupon yields of risk-free securities (𝑟), and 
• an estimate of the expected recovery rate (𝑘) on firm’s bonds in case of default. 
If the investor in corporate bonds is assumed risk neutral, he should be indifferent to the two 
alternative investments when the final value of one euro invested in the corporate bond is 
equal to the value of one euro invested in the risk-free bond. Analytically:  
(1 − 𝑝𝑇)𝑒
(𝑟𝑇+𝑑𝑇)𝑇 + 𝑝𝑇𝑘𝑒
(𝑟𝑇+𝑑𝑇)𝑇 =  𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑇 
From this equation it is possible to compute the cumulative probability of default as: 
𝑝𝑇 =  
1 − 𝑒−𝑑𝑡𝑇
1 − 𝑘
 
which shows that the cumulative probability of default increases when the time horizon 
increases, since it takes into account the default risk of the previous periods plus the risk in 
year T.  
Cumulative probability of default, however, can also be derived in an easier way starting from 
the company rating and looking at the associated probability of default estimated by rating 
agencies on the basis of historical default rates of bonds in each rating class. This approach, 
however, by delegating the computation of default probabilities, takes for granted that rating 
agencies accurately and correctly estimate them (Damodaran 2009). The probabilities of 
default identified by adopting this approach, in addition, are based on past default experiences 
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and assume that no shifts in rating standards occur over time. Regarding this aspect, the 
approach based on bonds spread is preferable to the use of credit rating since it is a forward–
looking model which is able to estimate the default rates expected by the market in the future 
(Resti & Sironi 2007). However, this approach presents some limitations too. First of all, it 
assumes that all the spread between the yield of corporate bond and the yield of risk-free 
security can be attributed to default risk, while it frequently depends on different elements, 
such as a liquidity premium. In addition, this model assumes the investor as risk neutral, 
while, in reality, the investor asks a premium to trade a risk-free investment for a risky one. 
When the investor is risk averse, the result of the last presented equation, which represents the 
risk-neutral probability of default, overestimates the real-life probability of default. An 
overestimation of this measure, however, also results from the adoption of the approach based 
on bond price when a partial payment of either the coupon or the debt face value occurs in 
default, since this approach assumes that the coupon is either entirely paid or not at all 
(Damodaran 2009).  
Finally, a limitation common to all the models based on bond price and spread is their 
inapplicability to firms that do not issue bonds listed in the market, as well as to bonds with 
special features such as convertibility.  
 
The second subgroup of capital market models for the estimation of default probability is 
composed by methodologies generally referred as structural models. These models, indeed, 
focus on the structural traits of a firm which determine its probability of default (the asset 
value and the debt value) and the volatility of assets value, measuring, in this way, both 
financial and business risk.  
A first structural model was developed by Merton in 1974, which first applied the Black and 
Scholes’ options pricing model (1973) (described in paragraph 2.6) to default risk. 
The Merton’s model assumes that a firm has one single liability, a zero coupon debt, with a 
market value equal to B that requires the repayment of the principal (F), in a lump sum upon 
maturity (at time T). In addition, since the market value of firm’s assets (V) fluctuates in a 
partially unpredictable way, the instantaneous percentage change in the firm’s value (dV/V) is 
assumed to be described by a geometric Brownian motion (Resti & Sironi 2007): 
𝑑𝑉
𝑉
=  𝜇𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑣𝑑𝑧 =  𝜇𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎𝑣𝜀√𝑑𝑡  
where: 
• 𝜇 is the expected instantaneous yield on the assets; 
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• 𝑑𝑧 is a random disturbance, calculated as the product of a standard normally 
distributed term 𝜀 and the square root of time; 
• 𝜎𝑣 is the variability rate of the geometric Brownian motion. 
The stochastic evolution of assets percent changes and the uncertainty underlying their future 
path, which increases with the time horizon, are described in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 – Default probability in the Merton’s model. (Resti & Sironi 2007) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the probability of default is equal to the area under the normal 
distribution which reflects all negative assets yields that are big enough to cause the asset 
value to be lower than the repayment value of the debt at maturity, i.e. 𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹.  
In the latter case (𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹), shareholders, thanks to the limited liability principle, have the 
option of defaulting and leaving the company in creditors’ hands, rather than repaying the 
debt. This can be interpreted as a put option granted by company’s creditors to shareholders 
on the value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of debt (F) at 
maturity (T). 
According to the Merton’s model, therefore, the probability of default can be computed 
starting from the Black and Scholes formula for calculating the value of a put option: 
𝑃0 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑁(−𝑑1)𝑉0 
𝑑1 =  
ln (
𝑉0
𝐹 ) + (𝑟 +
1
2 𝜎𝑉
2) 𝑇
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
 
𝑑2 =  𝑑1 −  𝜎𝑉√𝑇 
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where 𝑁(. ) is the standard normal cumulative density function, 𝑁(𝑑) indicates the probability 
associated with a value less than or equal to d and r the risk-free rate. 
Since the probability of default expresses the probability that the market value of firm’s assets 
will be less that the repayment value of debt at maturity, it is equal to the probability of 
exercising the put option implicit on debt, which can be calculated through the Black and 
Scholes model as:  
𝑝 = Pr(𝑉𝑇 < 𝐹) = 𝑁(−𝑑2) = 1 − 𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
The resulting probability (p)  is a risk-neutral probability of default, since the expected return 
on assets (𝜇) was replaced by the risk-free rate (r) in the formula for computing the put option 
value.  
In particular, as illustrated by the previous formulas, all other things being equal, the 
probability of default increases as: 
• the beginning market value of assets (𝑉0) decreases; 
• the nominal value of debt (F) increases; 
• the volatility of the market value of assets increases (higher 𝜎𝑉, indeed, makes the 
distribution more “squashed” and the tails thicker); 
• the debt maturity (T) increases. 
The Merton’s model, however, even though it is effective in showing the determinants of 
default probability, presents several limitations when turning from theory to actual use (Resti 
& Sironi 2007): 
 the assumption of a single zero coupon liability where interest and principal are repaid 
in a lump sum upon maturity is too simplistic in real life, where firms have complex 
capital structure and can default at any time, regardless of the debt maturity; 
 the assumption of normally distributed assets returns may not be realistic; 
 some inputs of the model, in particular the market value of assets and the volatility of 
asset returns, are not directly observable on the market and difficult to estimate; 
 risk-free interest rates are assumed constant and this doesn’t allow for an analysis of 
the relation between interest rate risk and equity risk. 
Another model belonging to the structural models class was developed, starting from 
Merton’s intuitions, by KMV, a provider of quantitative credit analysis tools acquired by 
Moody’s Corporation in 2002. This model, known as the KMV model, estimates the 
probability of default on the basis of the firm’s distance to default (DD). The estimation 
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process starts with the definition of the default point, that is the critical default threshold 
computed as the sum of all short-term debt (STD) and 50% of long-term debt (LTD):  
𝐷𝑃 = 𝑆𝑇𝐷 +  
1
2
𝐿𝑇𝐷 
This model recognizes that firms have a more complex capital structure than the one assumed 
in Merton’s model, and they usually finance their activities with both short term and long 
term debt. Even if it is fundamental that the firm is able to meet its short term obligations, 
which have to be fulfilled in the near future, the firm doesn’t necessarily become insolvent 
when its asset value falls below the total level of debt, since the long term debt need to be 
reimbursed in the more distant future.   
Once calculated the default point, the distance to default is then computed as the difference 
between the value of assets and the default point, divided for the product of asset value and 
assets standard deviation:  
𝐷𝐷 =
𝑉0 − 𝐷𝑃
𝑉0 ∗  𝜎𝑉
 
Starting from the empirical link between the distance to default and past rates of default, a 
probability of default, defined in the KMV model as the expected default frequency (EDF), is 
then associated to the computed distance to default. 
By adopting this estimation procedure, differently from rating agencies, the KMV model 
provides probabilities of default that are highly reactive to changes in the financial conditions 
of the firm being valued and expected default frequencies that don’t significantly swing as 
economic cycles change (Resti & Sironi 2007). On the other hand, this model presents all the 
limitations common to capital market models. The use of markets data as an input brings the 
benefit of basing the estimation on data, by nature, more objective than the accounting data, 
which can be manipulated by managers and other individuals in the firm, and makes the 
resulting estimates internationally comparable, since input data are not affected by national 
accounting rules (Hillegeist et al. 2004). On the other hand, the use of market data gives rise 
to models’ limitations, since it makes them not applicable to unlisted firms or listed firms 
which bonds are not traded in the market. In addition, if capital markets are illiquid, 
inefficient or unable to adequately reflect all available information, market data become 
unreliable and the estimate of default probability misleading (Resti & Sironi 2007). 
 
Finally, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to point out that in addition to credit 
scoring models and capital market models, there is a third group of models for computing the 
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probability of default which combine both accounting data and market information, such as 
the Moody’s RiskCalc v3.1 model. The latter, allows to assign a credit rating to unlisted firms 
on the basis of a score calculated using company’s financial ratios but also the average 
distance to default for a group of comparable listed companies, as inputs. By combining 
financial statement ratios with distance to default measures, the model outputs, such as the 
default probability, become more reactive and forward looking than the traditional credit 
scoring models’ outputs, since this hybrid measure takes into account the sentiment of the 
capital market about the prospects of the industry in which the company operates (Resti & 
Sironi 2007).  
 
In conclusion, several approaches can be applied in order to compute the probability of 
default, bringing to different outcomes. Each of them, however, presents its own limitations 
and is anchored on a specific interpretation of the definition of default, making it difficult to 
universally identify the best method to be adopted when estimating the default likelihood. 
 
2.2.3 Costs of distress 
 
Another element that cannot be ignored when valuing a distressed company, then, is the cost 
in which the firm incurs when it falls into distress. The estimation of these costs, indeed, plays 
a key role not only for the definition of the optimal capital structure, but also for a complete 
valuation of the effects of high leverage on firm’s value. According to the literature, among 
costs of distress, it is possible to distinguish between:   
 Direct costs of distress: they include legal, accounting and administrative costs in 
which distressed firm incurs when it attempts to solve the crisis through firm 
restructuring or liquidation. These costs mainly consist in quantifiable out-of-pocket 
expenses for lawyers, accountants, turnaround specialists, financial advisers, expert 
witnesses and other professionals assisting the troubled firm.  
 Indirect cost of distress: they include unobservable opportunity costs and lost profits 
caused by the firm’s deteriorating financial conditions. Drop in sales, indeed, can 
result from customers’ reluctance to deal with firms failing into distress, while 
working capital increase and cash flows reduction may be the consequences of stricter 
terms asked by suppliers in the attempt to protect themselves against possible 
company default. Key employees, in addition, may decide to leave the firm while 
managers may fail to exploit growth opportunities because of a loss of management 
focus on running the business and the presence of financial constraints. All these 
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elements cause the company to further lose market share in favor of competitors and 
force the firm to sell assets at depressed prices finally leading to a decrease in firm’s 
value additional to the one caused by economic distress.  
Direct and indirect costs of distress, however, impact the firm’s value to a different extent.   
Direct costs of distress are easier to identify and measure, since they are directly observable, 
and their estimation represents the main objective of different researches in the literature, 
which finally point out that these costs are relatively low, even though not negligible. Warner 
(1977), by studying bankruptcies in the railroad industry, concluded that direct distress costs 
amount to 4% of market value of firm one year prior to default. Altman (1984) estimated, for 
12 retailers, direct costs of distress equal to 2.8% and 4% of firm’s value five years prior and 
just prior bankruptcy9, respectively. Weiss (1990) studied 37 cases collecting documents from 
7 bankruptcy courts and he estimated average direct cost of distress of 3.1% of the market 
value of equity plus the book value of debt at the year prior to the bankruptcy filing, within a 
range from 1% to 6.6%. Lubben (2000) used a sample of 22 large corporate bankruptcy filed 
in 1994 and calculated that the professional fees for legal advice amount on average to 1.8% 
of the distressed firm’s total assets. Several other studies, then, as pointed out by Altman and 
Hotchkiss’s review of the literature (2006), report average direct costs within the range 
identified in Weiss’s research, providing further evidence of the little, but not trivial, impact 
of distress direct costs on the firm’s value prior to bankruptcy. 
Indirect costs of distress, on the contrary, even though more difficult to estimate because not 
directly observable, are expected to amount for a higher percentage of firm’s value. Altman 
(1984), for instance, found that indirect costs average to 10% of firm value just prior to 
bankruptcy. Indirect costs, however, were calculated by comparing expected and actual 
profits, assuming the resulting difference as a consequence of financial distress and without 
considering, instead, that the performance worsening might have been the result of the same 
economic factors that had brought the company into financial distress.  
Opler and Titman (1994) recognized and investigated this reverse causality problem by 
analyzing companies in industries that experience economic distress. Their study showed that 
companies with higher leverage ratio prior to the onset of economic distress, experience 
greater market share losses and lower operating profits than their less leveraged competitors, 
consistent with the theory that financial distress is costly. These results were then 
corroborated by Andrade and Kaplan’s study (1998), which, by investigating 31 financially 
                                                          
9 Note that the studies cited in this paragraph analyze firm’s distress in the framework provided by the US 
bankruptcy law, according to which filing for bankruptcy can involve firm’s liquidation (Chapter 7) or 
restructuring (Chapter 11).    
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but not economically distressed highly leveraged transactions, estimated the net costs of 
financial distress to amount between 10% to 20% of firm value. Distressed firms, indeed, are 
forced to curtail capital expenditures, sell assets at depressed price and delay restructuring in a 
way that appears to be costly. More recently, Davidenko et al. (2012) concluded that the 
average cost of default is approximately equal to 21.7% of the market value of assets. Their 
analysis started from the observation of debt and equity market prices before and after the 
default, and then required to adjust the price reaction to default in order to neutralize the 
effects of the partial anticipation of default by investors on the pre-default prices. These 
effects indeed, without proper adjustments, lead to price reaction that captures only a fraction 
of the total distress costs, since firm’s value prior to default already incorporates some of 
these costs.  
Despite the presence of differences in estimation results, which can be attributed to factors 
such as the industry in which the firms operate and the type of legal procedure to which the 
analyzed firms are subjected, all the previous mentioned studies provide evidence about larger 
impact on firm value of indirect costs of distress than direct costs.  
Almeida and Philipson (2007), however, suggested that many past studies incorrectly estimate 
the present value of distress costs. A standard method for calculating ex-ante distress costs 
consists in multiplying ex-post estimates of these costs (as the ones resulted from Andrade 
and Kaplan’s study (1998)) by historical probability of default. This method, however, 
ignores discounting and capitalization. Altman (1984), instead, proposed to compute the 
present value of distress costs by assuming risk neutrality and discounting the product of 
value losses due to default and historical probabilities by a risk-free rate. As suggested by 
Almeida and Philipson (2007, p. 2558), however, this method doesn’t take into account the 
fact that distress is more likely to happen in bad times and, therefore, “risk-averse investors 
should care more about financial distress than is suggested by risk-free valuations”. Given the 
limitations of these methods, Almeida and Philipson (2007) decided to develop a new 
methodology to estimate the present value of distress costs, which takes into account the 
systematic component in the risk of distress through the use of risk-adjusted probability of 
default derived from corporate bond spreads. According to this method, the NPV of distress 
costs (Φ), expressed as percentage of firm assets, can be computed as (Almeida & Philipson 
2008): 
Φ =
𝑞
𝑞 +  𝑟𝑓
𝜙 
where 𝜙 are the costs of financial distress when they occur and 𝑟𝑓 the risk-free rate. 𝑞, instead, 
is the risk-adjusted probability of default calculated starting from the spreads at which bonds 
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with the same rating of the firm being value trade in the market. The spread between 
corporate and government bonds is then adjusted in order to eliminate risk premiums 
additional to the default premium, such as liquidity premium, incorporated in the spread. The 
spread, therefore, is reduced by its part that is not likely to reflect default risk, which can be 
derived from the spreads between short maturity AAA bonds and Treasuries.  
By applying this method, Almeida and Philipson (2007), starting from the ex-ante cost of 
distress estimated by Andrade and Kaplan (1998), compute a risk-adjusted NPV of distress 
costs of 4.5% of pre-distress value for a firm with BBB ratings, which is higher than the 
output (1.4%) obtained by using a historical default probability and, therefore, ignoring risk 
premia.    
 
In conclusion, as pointed out by the above mentioned studies, the magnitude of distress costs 
is far too substantial to be ignored in valuation. In addition, the estimation of distress costs, 
plays a key role in optimal capital structure determination. Briefly describing this topic, since 
it goes beyond the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to notice that firms decide the 
optimal level of debt on the basis of the trade-off between tax benefits and distress costs 
which maximize the firm’s value. A more complete valuation, however, should also take into 
account other advantages and disadvantages of debt financing, as suggested by Damodaran 
(2014). Alongside distress costs, indeed, higher leverage increases agency costs deriving from 
conflicts of interests among debtholders and equityholders, which finally result into higher 
interest rate on debt and decreasing financial flexibility. On the other hand, borrowing adds 
discipline to management, since, by creating the commitment to make principal and interest 
payments, it forces managers to use cash flows more efficiently.  
 
2.2.4 Liquidation value 
 
As already discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, distressed firms can decide to 
adopt different strategies in order to overcome the crisis, among which firm’s assets 
liquidation. When there is no hope for rehabilitation and the firm’s prospects appear so weak 
as to make it unreasonable to invest further efforts, time and money in the attempt to restore 
profitability and financial health, the only solution might be to liquidate firm’s assets and use 
the resulting proceeds to repay company’s obligations. Whether proposed by distressed firm’s 
shareholders or forced by its creditors, firm’s liquidation represents the preferable alternative 
to exit the crisis when the company value as a going concern is lower than its liquidation 
value. The estimation of the liquidation value, therefore, becomes fundamental when judging 
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whether the firm’s assets are “worth more dead than alive” (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006, p 
21), on which basis the most valuable strategy for overcoming the crisis is selected, but also 
when valuating distressed firms subjected to restructuring plan which feasibility and cash 
flow projections are characterized by high uncertainty. In the latter case, the possibility that 
the restructuring plan is not successfully implemented or reveals itself as ineffective should be 
taken into account when valuing distressed firms, either by including liquidation scenario in 
the scenario analysis (paragraph 2.4.1.1) or by calculating the firm’s value as weighted 
average between going concern and liquidation value, where weights are based on the 
probability of default (paragraph 2.4.1.4). 
Liquidation value reflects the expected proceeds resulting from the sale of assets of the firm 
as it steps out of business and ceases to operate and it sets a floor for the value of the entity, 
below which the estimate cannot fall (Guatri & Bini 2009, Rosen et al. 2011). Since 
liquidation cannot be pursued without additional costs, however, the amount that can be 
recovered from assets sale should be computed net of legal and professional fees, litigation 
costs and asset disposal expenses that the company usually faces when subjected to 
liquidation process. The resulting value represents the amount available for satisfy the firm’s 
claimants, according to the priority rule.  
There are different approaches that can be adopted when estimating firm’s liquidation value. 
Gabehart and Brinkley (2002) and Tham and Pareja (2004) suggest to adjust the company’s 
assets book value to their corresponding fair value in secondary markets, following an asset-
based approach. Damodaran (2002), instead. proposes to base the estimation of the liquidation 
value on the book value of the assets, adjusted for any inflation during the period. Both 
approaches, however, present some limitations, in particular when valuing distressed firms. 
As argued by Crystal and Mokal (2006, p. 2), assets will be disposed at market value “when 
assets are individually exposed to the relevant markets through a suitably lengthy and 
extensive process of advertising, where reasonable efforts are made to identify potential 
purchasers, and where an appropriate level of negotiations is carried on with the identified 
parties in order to obtain the best price.” Liquidation in distressed scenario, however, 
frequently takes on the features of forced liquidation, which occurs quickly, often through an 
auction sale, and without a great deal of marketing for the firm’s assets, leading to low 
realization of assets’ value far from their market values. Valuations based upon accounting 
book value, instead, by reflecting what the firm has invested in the assets, don’t take into 
account that frequently, for distressed and declining firms, existing assets earn a return lower 
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than their cost of capital, leading to assets intrinsic value well below their book value 
(Damodaran 2009).  
An alternative approach proposed by Damodaran (2009) consists on estimating the company’s 
liquidation value on the basis of the earning power of the existing assets by considering the 
cash flows from existing assets as a perpetuity without growth, assuming that no buyer will 
pay for future investments in distress sale. 
However, also this approach might lead, at the end, to an overestimation of the proceeds 
received in case of liquidation since it doesn’t take into consideration some important factors 
that affect the firm’s liquidation value. First of all, when the asset specificity is high and the 
secondary market for assets is thin, the liquidation value will be lower than in circumstances 
in which assets are easily redeployable and frequently traded in liquid markets (Altman & 
Hotchkiss 2006). Secondly, the liquidation value will result as depressed when the other firms 
in the industry, which often represent the highest valuation potential buyers of firm’s assets, 
are distressed as well (Shleifer & Vishny 1992).  When the shock that causes the seller’s crisis 
is industry-wide or antitrust regulation prevents buyers from acquiring the liquidated assets of 
competitors, indeed, assets might have to be sold to players outside the industry. The latter, 
however, don’t have a deep knowledge on how to manage and value these assets, and, fearing 
to overpay, they will finally push prices of assets in liquidation well below their value in best 
use. In addition, the firm highly distressed situation negatively affects the seller’s bargaining 
power and increase the urgency to sell, finally leading to a fire sale in which the firm’s assets 
are sold at heavily discounted prices, far below from the value reflecting the asset’s earning 
power.  
When estimating firm’s distress sale or liquidation value, therefore, a solution might be to 
compute it by assuming that the distress sale will generate only a portion of the assets’ book 
value or of the present value of the expected cash flow in a DCF model (Damodaran 2009). 
The discount on firm’s book or DCF value, however, is not easy to compute. This percentage, 
indeed, can be estimated starting from the proceeds received by other distressed firms in the 
industry subjected to liquidation, but it then requires to consider all the previously mentioned 
factors and firm’s characteristics that impact on the liquidation value, making necessary a 
case by case analysis.  
 
Once recognized the importance of the role played by strategic factors in distressed firms 
valuation and understood the different solutions (and corresponding limitations) that can be 
adopted to estimate probability of default, costs of distress and liquidation value, which are 
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critical determinants of value in a distress setting, the analysis now focuses on how these 
elements can be incorporated in the most used valuation methods. The latter are generally 
classified into three groups, depending on whether they estimate the firm’s enterprise value 
starting from the value of individual assets (asset approach), the stream of expected future 
cash flows (income approach) or a sample of comparable companies (market approach).  
 
2.3 Asset approach 
 
The asset approach estimates the company value as the sum of the values of the individual 
assets (included not booked intangibles) owned by the firm. In particular, individual assets 
value can be determined by adjusting the book value of each asset to its fair market value 
(adjusted book value method) or by estimating the cost to replace the company’s assets in the 
balance sheet (replacement cost method). There is, however, a key difference in valuing a 
collection of assets and a business (Damodaran 2005). When a company is expected to 
continue to operate as a going concern, indeed, its value is determined not only by existing 
assets but also by expected future investment and their profitability. For such reason, asset 
approach is best used when a business is non-operating or has generated losses which put its 
survival into question. One special case of asset-based valuation, indeed, is liquidation 
valuation. As already discussed in paragraph 2.2.4, however, while determining the 
replacement costs is not so straightforward in most cases, estimating the value at which assets 
can be sold is particularly complex in a distress setting, since the urgency of the liquidation 
can depress the negotiated asset price well below the fair market value.  
 
2.4 Income approach 
 
As discussed in paragraph 1.6, however, liquidation is not the only possible solution to 
corporate crisis but, instead, it is often the last resort strategy which is frequently undertaken 
only after repeated restructuring attempts reveal themselves to be unsuccessful. In particular, 
whenever creditors are asked to judge equity holders’ proposal of restructuring, they will 
decide whether support or not the continuation of company’s activity on the basis of the 
comparison between the firm’s value, and expected recovery, under liquidation scenario and 
the firm’s value expected from the proposed restructuring plan. While the asset approach can 
be reasonably adopted to estimate liquidation value, the income approach results to be more 
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suitable to value the company under a going concern hypothesis, by focusing on future stream 
of cash flows and allowing to take into account different potential future scenarios in the 
valuation. 
The main valuation methods falling under this approach are:  
 Discounted Cash Flow method (DCF) 
 Adjusted Present Value method (APV) 
 Capital Cash Flow method (CCF)  
 
2.4.1 Discounted Cash Flow method  
 
The discounted cash flow (DCF) method is a widely used technique in corporate valuation 
since it is considered by many experts to be the most useful methodology to measure an 
asset’s intrinsic value (Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). By estimating future cash flows and 
discounting them at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the DCF method correlates 
the firm’s value to its capacity to generate a cash flows stream sufficient to adequately satisfy 
the return expectation of investors (Borsa Italiana 2004). 
Valuing a company’s equity through the DCF method requires to implement a four steps 
process (Koller et al. 2015, Borsa Italiana 2004): 
1. Valuation of company’s operations: it involves the calculation of the present value of 
operating free cash flows explicitly forecasted for a specific period of time (𝑛) and the 
estimation of the present value of a terminal value (𝑉𝑇), which captures the value 
generated by future cash flows beyond the explicit forecast period, by discounting 
operating free cash flows (𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 ) and the terminal value at the WACC. The sum of 
these two components determines the business enterprise value.  
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  ∑
𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
+  𝑉𝑇 
 
2. Identification and valuation of non-operating assets: equity investments or 
nonconsolidated subsidiaries, non-operating receivables and other non-operating 
assets are expected to generate cash not included in the operating free cash flows 
calculation. The value of these assets, in fact, has to be estimated separately and added 
to the business enterprise value in order to obtain the firm’s enterprise value: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
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3. Determination of the market value of net financial position (NFP) and other non-
equity claims such as debt equivalent (unfounded pension liabilities and restructuring 
provisions), employee options and preferred stocks.  
4. Equity value calculation: it requires to subtract the market value of net financial 
position, other non-equity claims and minority interests from the enterprise value. 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑁𝐹𝑃 − 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠
− 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 
Given its dependence on expected cash flows and discount rates, the DCF method is designed, 
and thus easier to use, for firms which generate positive cash flows that can be reliably 
estimated for future periods and whose underlying risk and uncertainty can be appropriately 
assessed (Damodaran 1994). In addition, this valuation method implicitly assumes that the 
firm is a going concern with a potentially infinite life.  
Negative cash flows, high and not stable debt to equity ratio and the possibility to going into 
liquidation, therefore, are only some of the features of distressed firms that make the DCF 
method more difficult to be implemented when valuing firms in trouble, giving rise to 
misleading valuations. The traditional DCF model, indeed, will continue to produce reliable 
estimate of value, despite the failure to incorporate distress in valuation, only if the following 
conditions are met (Damodaran 2009): 
1. there is no possibility that the firm will file for bankruptcy; 
2. the company is able to fund its investment and financing needs, even during bad 
times, thanks to the ease of access to capital markets, thus avoiding to be forced to a 
distress sale; 
3. expected cash flows and discount rate are adjusted in order to reflect the probability 
and the risk associated with distress, while the proceeds received in case of distress 
sale should be equal to the present value of the firm’s expected cash flows as a going 
concern.  
In practice, however, these conditions hardly hold and the application of traditional DCF 
valuation results into an overestimation of the distressed firm value. First of all, indeed, the 
recent global crisis not only casts into doubt the survival of a greater number of firms, 
including larger and more established companies for which the probability of distress is 
generally lower, but also dries up the access to capital, making bankruptcy a more and more 
ordinary setting for valuation. In addition, even if the distress effects can be reflected in 
higher cost of capital and lower expected cash flows as the probability of default increases, 
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the most significant risk of distress, that is the loss of all future cash flows, is not 
appropriately considered in the DCF valuation. The DCF method, indeed, still assumes that 
the company will be able to generate cash flows in perpetuity, strongly contributing to the 
determination of the business enterprise value through the terminal value, or, in any case, that, 
if subjected to a distress sale in the future, the firm will obtain proceeds equal to the present 
value of expected cash flows as a going concern. This assumption, however, is quite 
unrealistic, since, generally, distress negatively affects the firm bargaining power to ask for 
the fair market value of its assets, that result to be even lower in case of forced liquidation, in 
which the sale occurs quickly and without a great marketing effort (Gabehart & Brinkley 
2000). 
Other solutions, therefore, have to be identified in order to avoid that the DCF model leads to 
misleading estimate of firm’s value when the company is distressed. The study of the possible 
solutions starts from a more in-depth analysis of the difficulties associated with valuing 
distressed firms through the DCF technique, focusing in particular on the most challenging 
components of the model, i.e. the estimation of the expected cash flows and terminal value 
and the calculation of the cost of capital. 
2.4.1.1 Expected cash flows and terminal value estimation 
Free cash flows are the cash flows generated by the firm that are available to all investors 
after having met all operating expenses, investments and taxes. FCFs are computed starting 
from the Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes (NOPLAT), that is the after tax-profit 
generated from core operations available to all investors, in the following way (Koller et al. 
2015): 
𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
As it is possible to deduce from the formula, FCFs exclude flows generated by non-operating 
assets and financing items, making the FCFs independent from the firm’s capital structure. 
Valuing a company through the DCF method, requires, first of all, to forecast the free cash 
flows that the company is expected to generate during the explicit forecast period. This task is 
particularly challenging for firms in distress. Starting point for the estimation of future cash 
flows, indeed, is generally the analysis of the historical performance in order to identify the 
key value drivers and try to predict how they will evolve in the future. The projection of cash 
flows for distressed firms, however, cannot strongly rely on past performance, since the 
difficulties recently faced by the firm create discontinuities in historical data (Damodaran 
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2009). For instance, assets that earn less than the cost of capital and the inability to meet its 
financial obligations with operating cash flows are some of the characteristics of distressed 
firms that push them to divest existing assets. Depending on the stage in the crisis path which 
the company is in, more asset divestitures may be expected in the future in respect to the past, 
making the estimation of expected cash flows more difficult. Analysts, indeed, should not 
only be able to identify the assets that will be sold and estimate the proceeds that the firm 
expects to receive, but also to reflect the effects of the divestiture on operating revenues and 
earnings, since the divested assets will not contribute anymore to the earnings generation.  
Nonetheless, an in-deep analysis of the historical performance results to be useful also when 
valuing distressed companies, since it allows to identify the main determinants of decline and 
verify whether they have been adequately captured and proposed to be solved also in the 
restructuring plan. In addition, by comparing the company’s historical financial results with 
the management projections at the basis of the restructuring plan, it is possible to express a 
first judgment about the plan feasibility, on which analyst’s estimation of future cash flows 
should be based (Massari & Zanetti 2008). The company’s history, finally, affects the 
financial statements as of the valuation date, that is the starting point for the application of the 
DCF valuation (Buttignon 2014). When the distress erupts and becomes known to public, the 
firm actual situation should be fairly disclosed to third parties. This may require to make some 
adjustment on trade receivables and inventories, but also on liabilities, in the financial 
statement, while accounting tricks such as deferring expenses to report improved earnings 
should be stopped, showing the real income or losses realized by the firm.  
The firm distressed situation and the company attempts to face the crisis through isolated 
asset divestitures or structured restructuring plans, therefore, by creating discontinuity with 
past data, not only increase the level of details required for the assumptions made about the 
cash flows expected during the transaction period from distress to financial health, but also 
amplify the uncertainty about the actual realization of cash flow forecasts in the future.  
One solution to deal with these critical issues and, at the same time, to reflect the effect of 
distress on the projected cash flows, consists on the implementation of a scenario analysis.  
By adopting this technique, as proposed by Damodaran (2009) in his “Modified discounted 
cash flow valuation” model, the expected cash flows can be estimated for each year as:  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑡
𝑗=𝑛
𝑗=1
∗ (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡) 
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where 𝜋𝑗𝑡is the probability of scenario j in period t and 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡  is the cash flows 
forecasted under that specific scenario in that period.   
As suggested by the formula, the scenario analysis requires to consider all possible scenarios, 
reflecting different assumptions, from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic ones, about 
macroeconomic factors, competitors’ reactions, implemented strategies and financial policies, 
and to attribute probabilities to each scenario. In this way, the modified DCF valuation, 
differently from the traditional DCF valuation that, in practice, rarely considers different 
potential outcomes, takes into account also the possibility that the firm will not be able to 
successfully restructure its business and will cease to exist. In practice, however, the scenario 
analysis is frequently adopted in a simpler version involving the investigation of three 
scenarios - a best case, a most likely case and a worst case- or two scenarios - the going 
concern scenario and the distress scenario (Damodaran 2002, 2006). In the latter case, the 
expected cash flows for each year are estimated as: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 
 (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡) ∗  𝜋𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 + (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡) ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 ) 
where  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 represents the cash flows estimated in the going concern 
scenario, by assuming that the firm will return financially and economically healthy, 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 represents the cash flows estimated in the distress scenario, assuming that 
the company will be liquidated and 𝜋𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,,𝑡 is the cumulative probability that the firm 
will continue as a going concern in period t. It can also be calculated as:  
𝜋𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 =  ∏(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑛)
𝑛=𝑡
𝑛=1
  
where 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡 is the probability that the company will fail into distress in period t. 
Anyway, the application of the scenario analysis to modify the DCF model in order to 
incorporate the probability and the effects of distress into valuation presents several 
limitations. First of all, estimating the cumulative probability of distress for each year is quite 
complicated and it is often the result of analyst’s subjective choices (Massari & Zanetti 2008). 
In addition, the sometimes contradictory assumptions at the basis of the different scenarios, 
make it difficult to combine the going concern and the distress firm assumptions in the same 
model (Damodaran 2009). Finally, scenario analysis is generally a more useful tool for 
dealing with risk that results into discrete outcomes, such as the restructuring plan approval or 
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rejection by creditors, than for continuous risk, such as sales or debt to equity ratio changes 
(Damodaran 2009a). 
Another critical issue related to the free cash flow projections consists on the determination of 
the length of the explicit forecast period. According to Koller et al. (2015), the explicit 
projection period should be long enough for the firm to reach a steady state in which the firm 
reinvests a constant percentage of its operating profits into the business each year, growing at 
a constant rate, and earns a constant rate of return on both its existing and new invested 
capital. The explicit forecast period, therefore, should incorporates “all the changes in the 
cash flows that cannot be assumed to follow a smooth pattern, such as significant lumpy 
capital expenditures and asset disposals, reductions of operating expenses, turnaround 
consequences and/or atypical growth, and the effect of the economy cycle” (Arzac 2005, p. 
15). Thus, for distressed firms undertaking a restructuring process, free cash flows should be 
explicitly forecasted for the entire transition period during which the company is expected to 
shift from distress to financial health (Damodaran 1994), that generally consists, at least, on 
the duration of the restructuring plan.  
The value generated by the free cash flows expected beyond the explicit forecast period, 
instead, is captured by another important component of the DCF model: the terminal value. 
Two different methods are commonly used to calculate the terminal value (Altman and 
Hotchkiss 2006): 
1. A comparable company approach, that frequently involves the application of an 
EBITDA multiple to the free cash flows projected immediately after the explicit 
forecast period. 
2. A growing perpetuity formula applied to the FCF expected in the first year after the 
forecast period (t+1): 
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1 should reflect the firm’s normalized operating performance that is 
expected to be sustained indefinitely and g is the cash flows long term growth rate10. 
Although the first method is less correct from a theoretical point of view, since it mixes 
intrinsic and relative valuation, the comparable company approach can provide a market 
support to the valuation, making references to the multiple at which comparable companies 
                                                          
10 Alternatively, the terminal value can be calculated by using the value driver formula:   
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
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trade. If the DCF assumptions are not in line with the industry averages, however, the two 
methods can lead to different estimates of the terminal value, significantly affecting the 
overall firm’s intrinsic value. The terminal value, in fact, often accounts for a very large 
portion of the enterprise value and it approximately represents the 70.5% of the total value for 
firms undertaking a restructuring process, as showed by Gilson et al. (2000).   
The computation of the terminal value becomes even more complex for declining and 
distressed firms. Focusing on the second method proposed11, the calculation of the terminal 
value requires, first of all, the estimation of cash flows long-term growth rate, i.e. the growth 
rate that the firm is expected to sustain indefinitely, which therefore cannot be higher than the 
economy growth rate. This task can be very challenging when valuing a distressed firm, since 
it becomes necessary to consider the possibility that the firm might never reach a stable 
growth, being subjected to liquidation during the explicit forecast period. In addition, even if 
the firm is expected to reach the steady state, the continuous loss in market share experienced 
by the distressed company can lead to very low or even negative expected growth rate in 
perpetuity (Damodaran 2009). Secondly, lower return on capital, compared to the cost of 
capital, that frequently characterizes declining companies, gives rise to further estimation 
issues. If there are no reason for expecting improvements in the future, the most reasonable 
assumption might be that the firm will continue to earn a return on capital below the cost of 
capital in perpetuity. This assumption, however, will have significant consequences for the 
estimation of the reinvestment rate and the terminal value (Damodaran 2009). Finally, the 
application of the growing perpetuity formula for the calculation of the terminal value 
requires the estimation of a discount rate whose risk parameters should reflect the more stable 
firm’s situation. When restructuring plans are effective in improving the distressed firm’s 
financial and economic conditions, therefore, it is inappropriate to use a discount rate based 
on the high cost of debt and equity to which the company is subjected at the valuation date 
and it can cause terminal value to implode.    
2.4.1.2 Discount rate calculation 
Free cash flows and terminal value, then, are discounted at a rate that not only takes into 
account the time value of money, but reflects also the risk and uncertainty underlying future 
cash flows. This discount rate is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), defined as 
the opportunity costs and, at the same time, the return for all company’s investors deriving 
                                                          
11 Criticalities concerning the application of the comparable company approach in distressed firm valuation will 
be analyzed in paragraph 2.5. 
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from “investing their funds in one particular business instead of others with similar risk” 
(Koller et al. 2015, p. 283). In its simplest form, the WACC is computed as:  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  𝑘𝑒
𝐸
𝐸 + 𝐷
+ 𝑘𝑑(1 − 𝑇𝑚)
𝐷
𝐸 + 𝐷
 
where 
 𝑘𝑒 is the cost of equity 
 𝑘𝑑 is the pre-tax cost of debt 
 
𝐸
𝐸+𝐷
 is the target level of equity to enterprise value 
 
𝐷
𝐸+𝐷
 is the target level of debt to enterprise value 
 𝑇𝑚 is the company’s marginal income tax rate 
As showed by the formula, cost of equity, cost of debt and the firm’s target capital structure 
are the primary components of the WACC. When valuating distressed firm, each of these 
components has to be deeply analyzed in order to capture and try to incorporate the effects of 
distress on the cost of capital.  
Cost of equity 
The cost of equity, which expresses the rate of return required by investors to make an equity 
investment in the firm (Damodaran 1994), is the trickiest component of the WACC 
calculation, since it is not directly observable. Differently from debt, that the company has to 
pay in the form of prescheduled interests, indeed, equity has not an explicit and concrete price 
that the firm must pay.  
A commonly used approach to estimate the cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), on which basis the cost of equity can be determined as follows:  
𝑘𝑒 =  𝑟𝑓 +  𝛽 (𝑟𝑚 −  𝑟𝑓) 
where 
 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate and it is defined as the return expected by an investor from a 
risk-free investment. The latter is an asset whose returns are known with certainty by 
the investor over a specific period of time. Risk-free rate is commonly computed on 
the basis of the return of long term government default-free bonds; 
 𝛽 is a measure of the volatility or systematic risk of the investment. It captures how a 
firm’s stock price responds to movements in the overall market; 
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 (𝑟𝑚 −  𝑟𝑓) is the market risk premium expressed as the difference between the 
expected return of the market and the risk-free rate. It measures the excess return 
required by investors to move from risk-free securities to risky investments.  
While the risk-free rate and the market risk premium are common to all companies, beta 
varies across firms. Type of business, operating leverage and financial leverage, indeed, are 
the variables that determine this measure of risk (Damodaran 1994). In particular, cyclical, 
rigid cost structure and highly leveraged business are generally characterized by more volatile 
earnings and, therefore, higher beta. As a consequence, the application of a uniform beta for 
healthy and distressed companies, frequently characterized by a high degree of operating and 
financial leverage, is not appropriate in most valuation cases. As stated by Meitner and 
Streitferdt (2014, p.157), indeed, “using a uniform beta implies very strange risk patterns for 
the distressed company that – in most cases – cannot be observed in reality.”  
The calculation of beta for distressed firms, however, is not free from estimation issues. As 
suggested by Damodaran (2009), betas commonly determined through a regression analysis 
are not able to adequately capture the risk in the equity of a financially distressed firm. 
Referring to historical returns, often over long period of time reflecting, to some extent, firm’s 
healthier situations, the regression beta finally understates the true beta. In addition, rumors 
about company restructuring or impeding bankruptcy, can result into an increased stock price 
volatility but frequently with no relation to the market. Thus, regression betas might actually 
decrease during financial distress, since they reflect how a stock moves with the market. This 
result, however, is not necessarily misleading. The likelihood of shareholders’ recovery upon 
financial distress, indeed, can fundamentally affect the riskiness of equity as default 
probability increases. As demonstrated by Garlappi and Yan (2011), at high levels of default 
probability, all else being equal, the possible debt renegotiation and consequent asset 
redistribution actually reduce the equity risk and de-lever the beta equity. At low levels of 
default probability, instead, higher leverage results into an increase of the equity beta. As 
suggested by Garlappi and Yan (2011, p. 790), therefore, “in the presence of shareholder 
recovery […], equity beta and expected returns are hump shaped in default probability.”  
Damodaran (2006) proposes two solutions to overcome the limitations of using regression 
beta when estimating the cost of equity for distressed firms. 
According to the first approach (CAPM beta adjusted for distress), the beta adopted in the 
CAPM to compute the cost of equity is calculated using the firm’s current market debt to 
equity ratio (D/E) and the bottom-up unlevered beta (𝛽𝑈), computed as shown in Table 2.1, 
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depending on the expected evolution of debt dollar level and on the risk attributed to the tax 
shields. 
 
Table 2.1 – Levered Beta. (Koller et al. 2015) 
In particular, the bottom-up unlevered beta is the weighted average of unlevered betas of the 
businesses which the company operates in. Its calculation requires the identification of 
comparable firms operating in the same businesses of the company being valued and the 
computation of the respective levered regression betas. Since comparable firms present 
different capital structures from the company being valued, their levered betas have to be 
transformed into unlevered beta by reverse engineering the formulas contained in Table 2.1. 
The bottom up unlevered beta is then calculated as the weighted average of comparable 
companies unlevered betas, where the weights are based on the contribution of each business 
to the generation of value, and used to estimate the levered beta of the firm being valued. 
Since distressed firms are characterized by high debt to equity ratio and frequently generate 
negative operating incomes that prevent to exploit the debt tax advantages, levered beta may 
be higher than regression beta. The tax rate (t) and the debt to equity ratio, in addition, have to 
be re-assessed whenever expectations about the firm’s future change.  
It is worth noting, however, that even if supposing the debt as risk-free for the computation of 
levered and unlevered beta (as in the last column of Table 2.1) is a commonly used simplified 
practice, this assumption (i.e. 𝛽𝐷 = 0) might actually not be realistic, in particular for 
distressed firms. As summarized by Ang (2017), indeed, several studies report debt betas 
different from zero for different rating class: Cornell and Green (1991), for instance, reported 
debt beta of 0.25 for high-grade bonds and of 0.29 for low grade bonds, while Groh and 
Gottschalg (2011) measured beta debt of 0.296 and 0.410, respectively. In addition, according 
to these findings and as demonstrated by Klein and Steller (2014), the systematic risk of 
corporate debt, expressed by 𝛽𝐷, is expected to be higher the longer the time to maturity and 
the lower the credit quality. 𝛽𝐷 for a distressed firm, therefore, might be different from 0, 
given its higher risk of default. Estimating this measure of systematic risk, however, is quite 
complex. Regression betas, indeed, can be computed only for a limited number of firms, since 
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many companies’ bonds are not listed in the financial market and, anyway, as for equity 
regression betas, being based on historical returns, they can reflect past situations which were 
healthier than the current one. A commonly used solution to this estimation issue consists on 
estimating 𝛽𝐷 on the basis of the firm’s rating class or, in case of not rated debt, synthetic 
rating class.  
The second approach for the estimation of the cost of equity (distress factor model) proposed 
by Damodaran (2009), instead, involves the use of the average beta computed from 
comparable healthy firms in combination with an extra premium reflecting the distressed 
situation.  
𝑘𝑒 =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 ∗ (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚) + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
According to Damodaran (2009), the distress premium can be obtained on the basis of the 
historical returns earned by investing in the equity of firm in distress or as the difference 
between the distressed firm’s higher pre-tax cost of debt and the industry average cost of debt.  
In particular, the idea of an extra premium over CAPM was firstly modelled by Fama and 
French (1992), who described stocks return by adding to the market risk factors a size factor 
(based on market capitalization) and a value factor (based on book-to-market equity ratio), in 
the attempt to justify the outperformance tendency reported by small-cap and value stocks in 
respect to high-cap and growth stocks12. Specifically, according to Fama and French (1992), 
distress risk plays a key role in justifying the observed value premium and size premium. First 
of all, indeed, as argued by Chan and Chen (1991), the size premium resulted to be primarily 
driven by “marginal firms”, i.e. firms with high leverage and cash flows problems that have 
lost market value because of their poor performance, which result to be more sensitive to 
adverse economic fluctuations. Secondly, high ratios of book-to-market equity signal that 
poor firm’s future prospects are expected by the market and, therefore, higher expected stock 
returns are demanded by investors to compensate for the firm’s risk of distress. 
The conjecture at the basis of this model, according to which investors require positive 
premium for holding stocks of firms that face high default probability, however, was not 
confirmed in the subsequent empirical researches. In particular, Dichev (1998), using Altman 
Z-score (1968) and Ohlson O-score (1980) to proxy for the probability of default, found an 
inverse relation between the likelihood of default and stock returns. This result was further 
corroborated by Griffin and Lemmon’s research (2002), which pointed out the absence of 
                                                          
12 Differently from CAPM, however, the Fama and French model is not theoretically based, but empirically 
driven. Therefore, while CAPM is rooted on solid theory about risk and return, the Fama and French model is 
based purely on empirical evidences. Since, as suggested by Koller et al. (2015) it takes a better theory to kill an 
existing theory, it was decided, in this dissertation, to continue to rely on the CAPM model. 
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evidence about positively priced default risk in stocks return. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Campbell et al. (2008) as well, who, by combining a comprehensive set of 
accounting and market measures in a dynamic logit model, found anomalously low returns for 
stocks with high risk of default, confirming the existence of a strongly negative relation 
between default risk and stock returns. Therefore, these empirical evidences, which are 
supported by the large part of the literature on the distress risk issue, differently from what 
expected, indicate that returns are lower for companies with greater distress intensities, giving 
rise to the so-called “distress risk puzzle”. A first interpretation, however, attributes this 
distress anomaly to market mispricing, according to which investors make valuation errors, 
failing to fully assessing the prospects of companies with high probability of default and, 
therefore, to ask a sufficient premium to compensate for the distress risk. Another possible 
explanation, instead, according to Campbell et al. (2008), lies in the features of distress 
stocks, such as increased opportunities to extract private benefits of control or positive 
skewness of returns, that can appeal to certain investors.  
On the other hand, however, some empirical researches in the literature came to different 
results, supporting the theoretical intuitions about the relation between distress risk and stocks 
return. In particular, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) observed that the distressed stocks’ 
underperformance documented by Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemon (2002), and Campbell et 
al. (2008) was specific to the 1980s and it disappeared when this decade was eliminated from 
the sample. Vassalou and Xing (2004), instead, found that, for small value stocks, distressed 
stocks with low distance to default do report higher returns. Similarly, Friewald et al. (2014) 
showed a stock returns increase with company’s credit risk premia, while Duff&Phelps 
(2016) reported the existence of a premium over CAPM for high-financial risk of 5,31% and 
7,53% for manufacturing firms, and of 12,78% and 17,77% for service firms, depending on 
whether the company stays in a grey zone or distress zone as defined by the Altman’s Z-score 
model.  
According to Garlappi et al. (2008), however, these contrasting results can be justified by the 
key role played by shareholder advantage in determining the link between stock returns and 
default probability. Their empirical findings, indeed, showed that returns decrease in expected 
default frequency for firms with large asset size, low R&D expenditure and high asset 
specificity. In particular, large asset base, by making shareholders more powerful in 
renegotiation, and low R&D expenditures, by reducing, ceteris paribus, the probability of 
liquidity shortage, can be considered as a proxy of shareholders’ high bargaining power, while 
high asset specificity (in terms of low assets tangibility or high industry-specificity), as a 
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measure of liquidation costs, by giving creditors stronger incentives toward renegotiation, 
represents a proxy for high shareholder bargaining surplus. The relation between default 
probabilities and stock returns, therefore, resulted to be negative in presence of higher 
shareholder bargaining power and higher efficiency gained through bargaining, which define 
a strong shareholder advantage. As stated by Garlappi et al. (2008, p. 2715), indeed, “the 
ability of shareholders with a stronger advantage to extract more value from renegotiation 
leads to lower risk for equity—relative to the risk of the assets—and hence lower expected 
returns, as the probability of default increases.” On the other hand, for firms whose equity 
holders have a weak advantage, the original conjecture that distress risk should be 
compensated by a positive return premium is proved by the resulting positive relationship 
between default probability and equity returns.  
Cost of debt 
The cost of debt is the cost of borrowing funds, currently bore by the firm, to finance projects 
(Damodaran 1994) and it is multiplied by (1-Tm) in the WACC formula in order to compute 
the after-tax cost of debt, which is determined by three components: 
1. the interest rates current level, whose increase brings an increase in the cost of debt for 
firms; 
2. the firm’s default risk: higher the default risk, higher the cost of borrowing; 
3. the debt tax advantage: as the tax rate increases, the tax benefit deriving from paying 
interest will also increase leading to an after-tax cost of debt lower than pre-tax cost of 
debt. 
The last two components, in particular, should be carefully examined when dealing with 
distressed firms, in order to appropriately reflects the effects of distress on the cost of debt. 
For investment grade companies, the yield to maturity of company’s long term option free 
bonds is generally used to estimate the cost of debt. Even if it is a promised, and not expected, 
rate of return on company’s debt, in fact, the yield to maturity is a good proxy of the cost of 
debt since for investment grade firms the probability of default is negligible (Koller et al. 
2015). For below investment grade debt, instead, this approximation leads to erroneous 
results, since the promised yield to maturity overestimates the true cost of debt by the default 
risk premium (Arzac 2005). The lower cash flows received by the debt holders in case of 
default in respect to promised payments, indeed, cause the expected yield to maturity to be 
lower than the promised one.  
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Thus, for distressed firms, a more suitable alternative to the use of promised yield to maturity 
may be calculating the cost of debt by adopting standard asset pricing models as the CAPM. 
Even if the application of such model to risky debt is expected to result into a yield lower than 
the promised one, it requires to estimate the beta debt, that, as already explained, is a quite 
difficult task when the debt is not traded and, therefore, regression beta cannot be computed.  
A second possible solution consists, instead, on computing the cost of debt as the sum of a 
risk-free rate and a default spread, as suggested by Damodaran (2009): 
𝑘𝑑 =  𝑟𝑓 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
where the default spread is based upon the firm’s bond rating or, for not rated debt, synthetic 
rating determined using financial ratios such as the interest coverage ratio. When the 
probability of default is significant, even this calculation will result in a cost of debt that is 
still high but lower than the promised yield to maturity of debt issued by the firm. Being 
based solely on historical data about default spread, however, this method is not forward-
looking and, therefore, it can give rise to misleading estimates when the future economic and 
market conditions are likely to significantly differ from those in the past. 
A third alternative approach for the computation of the cost of risky debt, finally, is provided 
by Cooper and Davydenko (2007) and is rooted in the Merton’s model (1974) for the pricing 
of corporate securities. As stated by the authors, the expected yield on risky debt is 
somewhere between the promised yield and the riskless interest rate. In particular, the spread 
between this two boundary rates13 (the promised yield spread) is composed of two parts: the 
first part captures the expected default losses while the second part is due to the expected 
return premium, which compensate debtholders for the undiversifiable risk of the debt. 
Since the expected losses from default are not part of the expected return, the cost of debt turn 
to be equal to the promised yield adjusted for the expected default losses: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 –  𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 
According to Cooper and Davydenko (2007), this second determinant of the cost of debt can 
be easily derived from the Merton’s model (1974)14. Being based on the latter, however, the 
Cooper and Davydenko’s approach suffers from the limitations underlying the Merton’s 
model that, as empirically tested by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996, 2000), cause the 
implied yield spreads to underestimate the ones observed in the market. 
                                                          
13 Assuming that risky debt and riskless debt have the same maturity, liquidity and tax characteristics. 
14 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = – (1/𝑇)𝑙𝑛[𝑒(𝜋−𝑠)𝑇𝑁(– 𝑑1 –  𝜋𝐸  √ 𝑇 /𝜎𝐸)/ 𝑝𝐷  +  𝑁 (𝑑2  +
 𝜋𝐸  √ 𝑇 /𝜎𝐸)]  where 𝑇 is the debt maturity, 𝜋 the risk premia on assets, s the promised yield spread,  𝜋𝐸  the 
risk premia on equity, 𝜎𝐸  the equity volatility,  𝑝𝐷  the firm’s leverage. See Cooper and Davydenko (2007) for 
detailed computations.  
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Regardless the method adopted to compute the expected cost of debt, however, the use of an 
expected yield will result into an overestimation of the firm’s enterprise value if it is not 
combined with cash flow projections that attribute appropriate weights to the downside 
realizations (Arzac 2005). In addition, Arzac (2005) highlights that the adoption of expected 
yield, that is lower than the promised yield as the probability of default of distressed firm 
increases, assumes a proportional reduction in the tax shield. Actually, the tax shield may be 
different when the probability of tax shield utilization (𝑝) multiplied for the promised yield 
(𝑟𝑃) is not equal to the tax shield of the expected yield (𝑟𝐸). So, the expected after-tax cost of 
debt, that is 𝑟𝐸 − 𝑝 ∗ 𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑃 equals (1 − 𝑡) 𝑟𝐸 only if 𝑝𝑟𝑃 =  𝑟𝐸. These difficulties, in addition 
to the fact that operating losses may prevent or reduce the tax benefit of debt, make the use of 
WACC for discounting free cash flows less suitable when the probability of default is 
significant. In this case, the adoption of the Adjusted Present Value method which relies on 
the unlevered cost of equity and separately manages the tax shields value, can result more 
appropriate (see paragraph 2.4.2). 
 
Debt to equity ratio 
The last determinant of the WACC formula is the firm capital structure, which is reflected in 
the debt to enterprise value and equity to enterprise value weights. In common practice, these 
weights are determined on market value basis and refer to the firm target capital structure. 
Using target debt to equity ratio for the entire valuation period, however, can lead to 
misleading estimates when the firm is financially distressed, since debt write-off or 
rescheduling, undertaken in the attempt to overcome the crisis, can alter the market value of 
debt and equity year by year. Damodaran (2009), therefore, suggests to start from the current 
market debt to capital ratio, which might be very high for firms in distress, and adjust it 
toward more reasonable levels on the basis of the restructuring plan implementation, and 
consequent profitability improvements, forecasted in future years. This suggestion is in 
accordance with the recommendation of Koller et al (2015) to use a different WACC each 
year, reflecting the capital structure at that time, when the firm is not expected to move 
toward its target capital structure over a short period of time. Even in this case, however, the 
analyst faces the difficulty of estimating the market value of debt, which is a very challenging 
task, considering also that this value is a typical valuation result rather than an input.  
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Modified WACC 
In alternative to the incorporation of the distress effects in each determinant of the WACC, 
some models suggest to take into account the firm’s default risk directly in the WACC 
formula.  
In particular, Koziol (2014) identified two new components, the default probability (1 − 𝑝) 
and the bankruptcy costs (𝛼), that need to be included in the WACC formula as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐸
𝑉
∗ 𝑘𝑒 + 
𝐷
𝑉
∗ 𝑘𝑑 − 𝑝 ∗ 𝜏 ∗
𝐷
𝑉
∗ 𝑐 + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝛼 
According to Koziol (2014), indeed, the pre-tax WACC has to be incremented for the 
bankruptcy costs, which are higher as the default probability increases, and to be reduced for 
the tax shields (𝜏 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ 𝑐, where 𝑐 is the nominal interest rate), which, however, decrease or 
disappear as the firm faces incremental default probability.  
Saha and Malkiel (2015), instead,  suggest adjusting the traditional discount rate (WACC) in 
the DCF model for the probability that cash flows stream completely ceases in the future 
(cessation probability, 𝑑), which is assumed finite and constant in each period. Starting from 
the Gordon model, Saha and Malkiel (2015) finally derive a modified discount rate, computed 
as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶∗ =  
𝑑 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
1 − 𝑑
 
This formula, then, can be further adjusted to account for the probability 𝑑 that future cash 
flows are reduced of a fraction 𝑓: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶∗ =  
𝑑𝑓 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
1 − 𝑑𝑓
 
Cash flows cessation, therefore, is implied when 𝑓=1 
Despite their simplicity, however, these models present several limitations. First of all, they 
require to estimate the bankruptcy costs and the probability of default, that, as discussed in 
paragraph 2.2.2 and paragraph 2.2.3, is not so straightforward in practice. Secondly, most of 
the times, they hardly work in real cases, since their underlying assumptions are not so 
reliable. As pointed out by Lahmann and Schwetzler (2014), for instance, Koziol’s proposed 
adjustment to WACC (2014) implicitly relies on the assumptions that current and next period 
company value without default and including default are equal to each other. But if this is true 
and, therefore, firm’s value is not affected by potential default, no adjustments are necessary. 
Thirdly, these models still required to estimate the target debt to equity ratio. As already 
explained, however, assuming a target capital structure in line with the industry average will 
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lead to overvalue the firm when it is highly leverage in respect to competitors. On the other 
hand, using the current debt to equity ratio, which is generally very high for distressed 
company, will cause the appraiser to underestimate the firm value, since the company 
financial structure is expected to adjust toward more reasonable levels as the restructuring 
process will be implemented. In both cases, however, assuming the debt to equity ratio 
constant over the entire valuation period will lead to misleading valuation when the company, 
in the attempt to exit the crisis, undertakes a restructuring at both strategic and financial level, 
which is expected to significantly affect the market value of equity and debt year by year.   
In presence of changing capital structure, therefore, it can result easier to compute the firm’s 
value by discounting the operating cash flows at the unlevered cost of capital, rather than at 
the WACC, and by isolating the effect of debt from the value generated by firm’s assets: this 
consists on applying the APV model. Before describing more in details such valuation 
method, however, other two reworked versions of the traditional DCF model are analyzed. 
These solutions, that are alternative to the previously described Modified DCF valuation and 
proposed by Damodaran (2009) in the attempt to provide a more precise estimate of distressed 
firm value, are known as: 
 DCF model with Monte Carlo Simulation 
 Going concern DCF adjusted for probability of default 
2.4.1.3 DCF model with Monte Carlo Simulation 
A possible solution to deal with the uncertainty underlying the main inputs of the DCF model, 
which is particularly significant in case of distress, consists on the application of Monte Carlo 
simulation to the DCF method. While scenario analysis generally considers a limited number 
of combinations of variables to which predefined values are assigned and, therefore, it is more 
appropriate when the underlying risk is discrete, simulations represent a useful tool when 
dealing with continuous risk (Damodaran 2002). By replacing deterministic values with 
probabilistic values, simulations examine the effects of all possible combinations of variables 
and their realizations, overcoming, in this way, the limitations of scenario analysis (Clark 
2010). 
The use of probabilistic distribution for each factor affecting cash flows enables simulation 
techniques, and in particular Monte Carlo simulation, to accurately reflect the uncertainty 
underlying cash flows forecasts, that strongly characterizes distress situation, on the firm 
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enterprise value. The latter, as a consequence, will result in a distribution of possible 
outcomes, rather than in a single discrete value (Kelliher and Mahoney 2000). 
The combination of Monte Carlo simulation with the DCF model for the valuation of 
distressed firm involves five steps (Damodaran 2006, Brealey 2011):   
1. Analyze the past performance as well as the current situation and the future prospects 
of the firm being valued and the industry in which it operates to identify the key value 
drivers whose expected value will be replaced by probabilistic distributions.   
2. Select a probability distribution for each critical variable. The selected probability 
distribution should adequately reflect the uncertainty associated with the considered 
factor and best fit the dynamic of the critical variable which emerges from the analysis 
of historical data.  
3. Estimate the parameters of each selected distribution. This task is generally performed 
starting from the historical sample, as suggested by Resti and Sironi (2007). At this 
step, in addition, it is also necessary to determine the circumstances that constitute 
distress and its consequences, in order to identify whether the simulations outputs 
reflect the firm’s distress sale or going concern value.  
4. Run the simulations. After having check for correlation across variables, it is 
necessary to pick a random outcome from each distribution, that is the value that the 
variable is assumed to take for that particular simulation. The randomly picked 
outcomes of the critical variables are then used to calculate the expected cash flows. If 
the previously defined distressed constrains are not triggered, the firm enterprise value 
is determined through traditional valuation methods under the going concern 
assumption, otherwise specific valuation methods for distressed firm, which involve 
the computation of the distress sale value, are adopted. This step should be repeated 
several times. The greater the number of critical inputs to which probability 
distributions are assigned, the diversity of the distributions selected and the potential 
range of outcomes on each variable, the larger will be the number of simulations to 
run.  
5. After repeated simulations, a distribution of the firm enterprise value is obtained from 
the going concern and distress sale values resulting from the performed simulations. 
The mean of the distribution is then computed and it represents the expected value of 
the output of the DCF model, that is the firm enterprise value. From the resulting 
distribution of the firm’s enterprise value, in addition, the default probability and the 
consequences of distress on firm value can be assessed.   
 75 
 
Even though Monte Carlo simulation allows to deal with uncertainty in DCF model in a more 
accurate and flexible way than scenario analysis, this technique presents several limitations. 
First of all, the simulations outputs strongly depend on the difficult task of selecting the 
distribution probability that best fit the dynamic of the critical inputs. Furthermore, the 
common practice of assigning probability distribution only to a reduced number of inputs and 
assuming independence across critical variables, in the attempt to simplify the implementation 
of the technique, can result into an underestimation of important aspects, originating 
misleading conclusions. In addition to these informational limitations, Monte Carlo 
simulations are also characterized by computational difficulties, since they are very time 
consuming and resource intensive. These constrains, however, have eased in recent years 
thanks to the development of dedicated statistical software. 
2.4.1.4 Going concern DCF adjusted for probability of default 
An alternative to the Modified DCF model that involves the performance of scenario analysis 
and the discount rate adjustments described, respectively, in paragraph 2.4.1.1 and paragraph 
2.4.1.2, consists on dealing with the effect of distress on the firm’s value by separating them 
from the going concern assumptions. As suggested by Damodaran (2009), by adopting this 
model, the firm’s enterprise value can be calculated as follows: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠  
where the cumulative probability of distress (𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) and the firm distress value are 
computed according to the techniques discussed, respectively, in paragraph 2.2.2 and 
paragraph 2.2.4. 
The going concern value, instead, can be derived through two different approaches 
(Damodaran 2009):  
1. the first approach consists on considering only the scenarios where the company is 
expected to survive and estimating the expected cash flows under those scenarios; 
2. the second approach involves to value the company as if it were a healthy firm at the 
valuation date. A solution to easily estimate the present value of cash flows that the 
company would have realized if it were a healthy firm, consists on using the industry 
average discount rate and the average operating margin reported by healthy firms 
operating in the same business of the company being valued.  
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The last approach, however, even if simpler to implement, is less precise and can result into 
an overestimation of the firm value by incorrectly assuming that the firm will return to be 
financially healthy quickly and without costs.  
The main advantage of the adoption of this particular variation of the DCF model to 
separately dealing with distress is that it takes into account the possibility that even distressed 
company can revert to financial health. Furthermore, it provides a more precise valuation of 
the traditional DCF models, even if the limited number of considered scenario makes the 
valuation results less accurate than the ones obtained through the Modified DCF or the DCF 
with Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, estimating the distress sale value and the 
probability of default still remains a challenging task.  
 
2.4.2 Adjusted Present Value method 
 
Despite the adjustments proposed, the DCF method, being based on the use of WACC as 
discount rate, still requires to define a target capital structure. As already discussed, this task 
is quite complicated for distressed firms. The latter, indeed, may undertake financial 
restructuring plan providing for debt write-off and rescheduling, which significantly impact 
the value of debt. In addition, when strategic turnaround plans are successfully implemented 
and result to be effective, higher cash flows will be available to repay debt, lowering the debt 
to value ratio. In the latter case, the adoption of a constant WACC would overstate the value 
of the tax shields deriving from interest payments (Koller et al. 2015), while the solution of 
yearly adjusting the WACC in order to reflect the changing capital structure is quite complex 
to implement, given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the debt to 
equity ratio. Given this limitation of the DCF model, therefore, when valuating companies 
whose capital structure is expected to or is planned to significantly change over the valuation 
period, it results more appropriate to adopt an alternative model, that is the Adjusted Present 
Value (APV) Model  
The APV model was first introduced by Myers (1974) in the context of studying the 
interactions between financing and investment decisions, starting from the contributions of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) that first attempted to isolate the tax benefit of debt in 
firm valuation. In a first version of Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958), the authors, 
assuming the absence of taxes, security issue costs and bankruptcy costs, stated that firm 
capital structure has no impact on its enterprise value, which depends only on the company’s 
earning power and the risk of its underlying assets. In 1963, however, the authors revised their 
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analysis by moving to a world where there are taxes, and concluded about the important 
contribution of debt tax shields in lowering the cost of debt and increasing the firm value, 
which can be calculated as follows: 
𝑉𝐿 =  𝑉𝑈 + 𝑡𝑐 ∗ 𝐷 
The formula suggests that the value of the levered firm (𝑉𝐿) can be obtained as the sum of the 
value generated by firm’s operations (𝑉𝑈) and the value created by financing through the 
fiscal deducibility of interests paid on debt, computed by multiplying the corporate marginal 
tax rate (𝑡𝑐) for the value of debt (𝐷) (assuming the debt as perpetual).  
In accordance with this formula, the APV method computes the firm’ value by separating the 
value generated by the firm as if it were all equity financed from the value of the tax shield 
deriving from debt financing (Koller et al. 2015, Altman & Hotchkiss 2006): 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  ∑
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
1 +  𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
 +  ∑
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
1 +  𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
 
When dealing with distressed firms, however, a complete estimation of the firm’s enterprise 
value through the APV technique, should capture also capital structure effects representing 
the other side of high leverage. On the one hand, indeed, the use of debt to fund firm’s 
operations generates tax benefits that increase the firm’s value, but on the other hand, the 
increasing leverage leads to higher bankruptcy risk and, consequently, to distress costs. A 
more completed APV formula, therefore, should explicitly take into account the decrease on 
firm’s value due to bankruptcy costs as well, as proposed by Damodaran (2002): 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 
= 𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑃𝑉(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠) − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  
According to this formula, the valuation process through the APV model can be split in 3 
steps, in each of which the analysis focuses on the estimation of one of the firm’s value 
determinants. 
The first step involves the computation of the firm’s value as if it had no debt, by discounting 
the expected cash flows at the unlevered cost of equity which can be computed: 
 according to Modigliani and Miller’s theorem, as suggested in the Table 2.2, on the 
basis of the expected evolution of debt dollar level and on the risk underlying the tax 
shields 
 according to the CAPM,  𝑘𝑢 =   𝑟𝑓  +  𝛽𝑈 (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
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Table 2.2 – Unlevered cost of equity. (Koller et al. 2015) 
 
When valuing distressed firms, however, both approaches still present the estimation issues 
related to the computation of betas and cost of debt and equity discussed in paragraph 
2.4.1.2.    
As regards the terminal value, instead, the unlevered cost of equity can be substituted by the 
WACC when discounting the value generated by firm’s operations beyond the explicit 
forecast period, combining, in this way, the APV technique, applied in the explicit projection 
period, with the DCF model, adopted in the computation of the terminal value. This particular 
version of the APV model is justified by the assumption that the debt ratio will reach its target 
value at the end of the explicit projection period, date in which the currently distressed firm is 
expected to return to normal operations, thanks to the successful implementation of the 
restructuring plan (Arzac 2005).  
The second step of the valuation process requires to estimate the expected tax benefit of 
borrowing, generated by the possibility to deduct interest expenses from taxable income. As 
suggested by Damodaran (2009a), the tax benefit is a function of the corporate tax rate and it 
is discounted at a rate reflecting the riskiness of these cash flows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  ∑
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 ∗  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑡=∞
𝑡=1
 
When tax rate and debt are viewed as constants and tax saving, therefore, results in a 
perpetuity, and the tax shields are assumed to have the same risk of debt, justifying the use of 
the cost of debt as discount rate, the previous formula can be simplified as follows:  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
= 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 =  𝑡𝑐 ∗ 𝐷 
The assumption of constant debt, however, is quite unrealistic in distress scenario, making 
necessary to perform a more detailed analysis of tax shields value which points out several 
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estimation issues. A first issue regards the discount rate that should be adopted to calculate the 
present value of the tax savings. While some authors, such as Myers (1974) and Cooper and 
Nyborg (2006), propose to use the cost of debt as discount rate, arguing that the tax savings 
have the same risk of debt, since they arise from the use of borrowings, other authors, such as 
Harris and Pringle (1985), Ruback (2002) and Kaplan and Ruback (1995), suggest to adopt 
the unlevered cost of equity assuming that the interest tax shields have the same systematic 
risk as the company’s underlying cash flows and operating income that make the tax benefits 
possible. Fernandez (2004, p. 163), instead, states that the term ‘‘discounted value of tax 
shields’’ is meaningless in itself since the tax savings should be computed as “the difference 
between the present value of the taxes of the unlevered company and the present value of the 
taxes of the levered company, which represent two separate cash flows each with their own 
risk”.  
In the corporate finance literature, therefore, there is a lack of consensus about which rate is 
theoretically correct for discounting the tax benefits of interests (Copeland et al. 2000). If the 
unlevered cost of equity, rather than the cost of debt, is chosen as discount rate, the tax shields 
value will result lower (and the APV method coincide with the CCF method). This difference, 
according to Guatri and Bini (2009), reflects the costs of distress that, therefore, are not 
required to be directly estimated when using the unlevered cost of equity (see the CCF 
method, paragraph 2.4.3). Several authors, in addition, argue that the choice of the discount 
rate to adopt should be made on the basis of the firm’s debt strategy. Ruback (2002) indicates 
that tax saving should be discounted at the cost of debt when the debt dollar level is assumed 
fixed and, therefore, independent from the firm’s value, while Miles and Ezzell (1980) 
suggest to use the cost of debt for the first year15 and the unlevered cost of equity for later 
years when the firm targets a constant debt to value ratio and adjusts to its target ratio once a 
year. When the company, instead, continuously adjusts to its target debt ratio, the unlevered 
cost of equity should be used, as suggested by Harris and Pringle (1995). 
In case of distressed companies, therefore, a reasonable choice could result in the adoption of 
the unlevered cost of equity as discount rate for tax savings, as proposed by Buttignon (2014) 
and Arzac (2005). In presence of high leverage, indeed, debt fluctuations are usually a 
function of uncertain cash flows, that, in turn, makes the tax shields less certain and 
predictable. Another estimation issue concerning the value of the tax benefits, consists, in 
fact, on the prediction of future tax shields. This task is particularly challenging for distressed 
                                                          
15 In the first year, in fact, the debt to value ratio is constant by definition and therefore, giving that there is no 
the requirement to rebalance the capital structure, the cost of debt can be used to discount the tax benefits 
generated in that year.  
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firms. While the capitalized tax benefit of interest deductions is about 10% of a typical firm 
value (Graham 2000, Kemsley & Nissim 2002), in troubled companies decreasing revenues 
and rigid cost structure can result into low or negative operating income which prevent to 
exploit the tax benefits deriving from the use of debt. In addition, highly leveraged firms 
might realize, in the future, lower tax shields than the ones estimated on the basis of the 
promised interest payments, because of their significant probability of default (Koller et al. 
2015). When valuing a distressed firm, therefore, the tax benefits should be carefully 
estimated, reducing the promised tax shields by the cumulative probability of default and also 
considering possible tax loss carry-forward, tax credits and other tax shield items.  
 
Lastly, the third step of the APV method involves the determination of the decrease in firm 
value caused by the expected bankruptcy costs which are computed as follows (Damodaran 
2002): 
𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  𝜋𝑎 ∗ 𝐵𝐶 
where 𝜋𝑎 is the probability of default, calculated according to the techniques proposed in 
paragraph 2.2.2, and 𝐵𝐶 the bankruptcy or distress costs. The latter, since difficult to 
estimate directly, can be derived looking at their magnitude in actual bankruptcies, which 
were investigated in the studies presented in paragraph 2.2.3 or, in a simpler way, as the 
difference between the firm value as a going concern and the distress sale value (Damodaran 
2009).  
 
Finally, the firm’s value is computed by summing up the amounts estimated in each steps of 
the valuation process. By decomposing the firm value in its main determinants, however, the 
APV method allows to isolate the effect of debt and to adopt different discount rates for each 
components. Differently from the traditional DCF model, which incorporates the tax benefit 
of debt in the after tax cost of debt and the bankruptcy costs in both the pretax cost of debt 
and the levered beta (Damodaran 2009a), the APV model forces the analysts to explicitly 
estimate the consequences of distress on value and represents an easier solution to the 
computation of different WACC for each year in case of changing capital structure. In 
addition, the APV model allows to assess the impact of debt on firm valuation in absolute 
terms that, as suggested by Damodaran (2009a), is easier and more precise than focusing on 
debt to value ratio, since firms generally state their target debt in dollar value term rather than 
as a proportion of market values. On the other hand, the adoption of the APV model still 
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requires the computation of firm’s probability of default and bankruptcy costs, that, as already 
mentioned, is quite complex.  
 
 
2.4.3 Capital Cash Flow method 
 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the tax benefit of borrowing can be discounted by 
either the cost of debt or the unlevered cost of equity, depending on the firm’s debt policy. 
While the original version of the APV method proposed by Myers (1974) relies on the 
adoption of the cost of debt as discount rate, a modified version of the model, developed by 
Ruback (2002) and known as Capital Cash Flow method (CCF) or compressed APV method 
(Arzac 2005), suggests the use of the unlevered cost of equity when calculating the present 
value of tax savings generated by interest payments. 
According to the CCF method, when a company actively balances its capital structure to 
maintain a fixed debt to value ratio, the interest tax shields have the same risk as the firm and, 
therefore, both interest tax shields (ITS) and free cash flow (FCF) should be discounted at the 
unlevered cost of equity (𝑘𝑢), according to the following formula (Altman and Hotchkiss 
2005, Koller et al 2015): 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =  ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 +  𝑘𝑢)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
+ ∑
𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡
(1 +  𝑘𝑢)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
=  ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 +  𝐼𝑇𝑆𝑡
(1 +  𝑘𝑢)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
= 
 =  ∑
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
(1 +  𝑘𝑢)𝑡
 
𝑡=1
𝑡=1
 
where capital cash flow measures the after-tax cash generated by the assets and available to 
all capital providers, including the interest tax shield. As suggested by Ruback (2002) and 
illustrated in Figure 2.2, CCFs can be computed starting from either net income (NI) or 
earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT). 
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Figure 2.2 – Capital Cash Flows calculation. (Ruback 2000) 
 
When estimating the firm’s value after the explicit forecast period, however, the assumption 
that the capital cash flows grow at a constant rate in perpetuity, starting from the last year of 
projections, can be uncorrected when dealing with distressed firms. In this regard, Gilson et 
al. (2000), analyzied 63 firms emerged from corporate restructuring and valuated them on the 
basis of the cash flows forecasted in the reorganization plan. They observed that 79% of the 
sample firms reported unused net operating loss carryforward (NOLs) at the end of the 
explicit forecast period and, therefore, they proposed to estimate the terminal value in two 
parts: 
 in the first part the explicit projections are extended and the use of NOLs by the firm is 
forecasted until the NOLs are used up or expire; 
 in the second part, a growing perpetuity formula is adopted to estimate the value 
generated by capital cash flows in the years following the extended projections period.  
 
As suggested by Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) and Gilson et al (2000), the CCF method can 
be very helpful when valuating distressed firms. Even though Ruback (2002) demonstrated 
that, when based on the same information and assumptions, DCF and CCF models give rise to 
equivalent results, the CCF method is easier to implement when the firm’s capital structure is 
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expected to change. While the unlevered cost of equity depends on the riskiness of the firm’s 
assets, and, therefore, is independent from capital structure variations, the WACC adopted in 
the DCF model would have to be recalculated each year. In addition, by allowing to explicitly 
model tax shields, the CCF method is better suited for dealing with complex tax situations 
that generally characterize firms subjected to restructuring or going into bankruptcy. By 
adding tax shields to the cash flows generated by the company in each year, however, the 
valuation of the firm’s operating performance over time and across competitors is less 
straightforward when using CCF model rather than DCF model (Koller et al. 2015). The 
latter, indeed, by keeping NOPLAT and FCF independent of leverage, allows to better 
understand whether the distress condition results from operating inefficiencies, overwhelming 
debt burden, or a combination of both.  
By comparing the CCF model with the first version of APV model, instead, it results that the 
choice of the more appropriate method depends on the firm’s debt policy (Ruback 2002).  The 
APV model, by discounting the interest tax shields at the cost of debt, assumes that the debt is 
fixed and independent from the firm’s value. Therefore, it should be adopted when the firm 
doesn’t plan to change the dollar value of debt in the future, e.g. given the presence of tax or 
regulatory restrictions on debt, and it will result into a higher firm’s value in respect to the 
output of the CCF models, since it treats the interest tax shields as less risky than firm’s 
assets. The capital cash flow method, instead, assumes that debt is proportional to value and, 
therefore, it is more appropriate when financial forecasts are made in term of target debt to 
value ratio. 
 
2.4.4 From Enterprise Value to Equity Value 
 
Once estimated the business enterprise value, that is the value generated by firm’s core 
operations, through one or more of the above mentioned methods, enterprise value can be 
calculated by adding to business enterprise value the value of non-operating assets. Debt, 
other non-equity claims and minority interests are then subtracted from the enterprise value in 
order to arrive to equity value.  
When estimating equity value starting from the computation of enterprise value, therefore, it 
becomes necessary, among other things, to determine the market value of debt. If the debt 
instrument is not traded or an observable market value is not readily available, the book value 
of debt can be considered as a reasonable approximation of market value, when no significant 
changes have occurred in default risk and in interest rate, since debt issuance (Koller et al. 
2015). When the company is financially distressed, however, default risk is significantly 
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higher than at the time in which debt was issued, and, thus, the debt trades or is valued at a 
discount to the book value. In case of companies in financial distress, therefore, other 
approaches should be used for estimating the market value of debt, which needs to be 
frequently updated, given that default risk can change substantially from period to period 
(Damodaran 2009). 
Unfortunately, however, as argued by Bohn (2000), empirical analysis in the field of risky 
debt valuation are few and far between, since most corporate finance studies have focused on 
the development of complex theoretical models with little practical applicability, as it will be 
described in paragraph 2.6.1. Even though building a simple, yet comprehensive, model for 
risky debt valuation remains, therefore, an open challenge and “an elusive and alluring 
venture” (Bohn 2000, p. 53), there are some practical solutions that can be adopted to estimate 
debt economic value in distressed firms. 
The first approach consists on applying a DCF model to cash flow to creditors (FCD), by 
discounting interest payments and principal repayments at a rate that reflects the riskiness of 
the debt (Arzac 2005, Koller et al. 2015). While cash flow to debt can be estimated on the 
basis of the debt reimbursement schedule forecasted in the restructuring plan, the 
quantification of the market cost of debt is more complex, since it may be different to the rate 
of return agreed with creditors in the plan. It is typical in financial maneuvers, indeed, to 
negotiate with creditors a favorable condition for the firm to foster its recovery as a going 
concern (Buttignon 2014). 
In order to solve this estimation issue, Buttignon (2014) suggests to adopt the following 
iterative process:  
1. Start from the operating income (EBIT) forecast in the reorganization plan 
2. Calculate the financial expense by multiplying the market cost of debt, which is 
computed in point 5, to the average debt amount, calculated as the average between 
the debt level at the beginning of the year and the debt level at the end of the year. 
3. Calculate the debt coverage ratio (EBIT/interest expenses). 
4. Forecast the debt rating class, on the basis of the previously computed debt coverage 
ratio, and the associated credit default spread. 
5. Estimate the market cost of debt by adding to previously found credit default spread 
the risk-free rate.  
6. Multiply the market cost of debt for the debt being restructured in order to compute 
the financial expenses.  
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Once estimated, the market cost of debt is then used to discount the FCD forecasted in the 
plan, obtaining, in this way, the economic value of debt. If the latter is lower than debt 
nominal value, the difference represents the sacrifice asked to creditors to foster business 
continuity and, at the same time, the benefit generated by debt restructuring plan for 
shareholders.  
An alternative approach relies, instead, on the option pricing model developed by Black and 
Scholes (1973). In this case, the equity is viewed as a call option on firm’s assets, or, from an 
alternative perspective, but with equal estimate results, the risky debt is conceived as the 
combination of default-free debt and a put option implicitly sold to shareholders by creditors16 
(Bohn 2000). Indeed, as better explained in paragraph 2.6, if at the debt maturity the 
enterprise value is lower than the face value of debt, the shareholders can leave the company 
in the creditors’ hands, which is equal to exercise a put option consisting on divesting assets 
at a strike price equal to the debt nominal value. In distressed firms, the conditions granted to 
shareholders by creditors in the restructuring plan can give rise to a value of this put option, 
that is positive for shareholders but negative for creditors (Buttignon 2014). Anyway, 
creditors are willing to bear this sacrifice when they recognize the firm’s continuation as a 
going concern as the solution, among other alternatives (as firm’s liquidation), giving rise to 
the highest debt value. 
By applying the Black and Scholes formula for pricing a call option (see paragraph 2.6), an 
estimate of the firm’s equity value is derived and then used to compute the market value of 
debt, by subtracting the equity value to the enterprise value. Or, equivalently, the market 
value of debt can be directly computed by adopting the pricing formula for a put option, and 
subtracting the put option value from the face value of debt.  
Also this approach, however, is not free from limitations and estimation issues, which are 
more in depth discussed in paragraph 2.6. Limitations, indeed, are inevitable when 
attempting to capture the often complex debt structure of distressed firms through simplified, 
but practical, valuation approaches. When option pricing model simplified assumptions are 
attempted to be overcome in more complex theoretical model (an overview of which is 
offered in paragraph 2.6.1), indeed, the tractability of the valuation technique results, finally, 
to be sacrificed at the altar of realism (Bohn 2000).  
 
Another difficult challenge that has to be faced when moving from enterprise value to equity 
value consists on the estimation of claims that are neither straight bonds nor common stocks.  
                                                          
16 Shareholders, indeed, pay the cost of the put option in the form of higher cost of debt due to the increase in 
default spread. 
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Creditors of distressed firms, involved in the negotiations for debt restructuring, indeed, can 
finally decide to favor the firm continuation as a going concern, by accepting, for instance, a 
write-off of their debts. In exchange of this concession, however, creditors usually obtain 
equity rights or quasi-equity rights such as convertible bonds and warrants, which contribute 
to make the firm’s capital structure even more complex, giving rise to further valuation issues.  
The valuation of hybrid securities, indeed, is not straightforward since they share some 
characteristics with equity and some with debt.  For convertible bonds, for instance, the above 
mentioned method of applying the DCF model to cash flows to creditors doesn’t give rise to a 
good proxy of convertible bonds value, since this method doesn’t capture the value of the 
option to convert them into common equity at a predetermined conversion ratio (Koller et al. 
2015). Alternative approaches can consist in assuming that all convertible bonds are 
immediately exchange for equity (conversion value approach) or in using the market value of 
such bonds (market value approach). While the first approach ignores the time value of the 
option, the second one is inapplicable when convertible bonds are not traded and 
inappropriate when, as happens in case of distressed firms, the company is expected to 
undertake operating change that will modify the firm’s enterprise value, on which the value of 
such securities depends. According to Koller et al. (2015), a recommended solution consists, 
instead, on disaggregate the value of convertible bond into a straight debt component and an 
option to convert which value is estimated through the Black and Scholes’ option pricing 
model.   
The latter is also usually adopted for the estimation of the value of warrants, which are 
securities giving to the holder the right to buy or sell firm’s shares at fixed price before 
expiration. Unlike standard options, even though they are like options on many aspects, 
warrants exercise dilutes the equity claims of existing stockholders. Their exercise, indeed, 
involves the issuance of new stocks by the firms, leading to an increase in the number of 
shares outstanding and a reduction of stock price. As a consequence, adjustments in the Black 
and Scholes formula are required in order to adequately reflect the dilution effect on the 
current value of the stock price due to the exercise of warrants. 
In conclusion, moving from enterprise value to equity value can be quite a tough task when 
valuing distressed firms, since the implementation of financial restructuring plan frequently 
results into a more complex debt structure and creates a gray line between debt and equity.  
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2.5 Market approach 
 
The third approach that can be used to value distressed firms is the market approach or 
relative valuation, which involves the computation of firm’s value (enterprise value or equity 
value) by comparing the analyzed company to the value assessed by the market for similar or 
comparable firms, through the use of multiples. The main assumptions underlying this 
valuation technique, as stated by Gabehart and Brinkley (2002, p. 39), is that companies 
considered similar in terms of factors such as revenues, cash flows and risk and operating in 
the same industry, “should react in the same way to market forces and enjoy a definite if not 
strong correlation in business value”. By measuring relative and not intrinsic value, therefore, 
valuation based on multiples is more likely to reflect the current mood of the market, in 
respect to the income approach. This characteristic explains the widespread use of this 
technique, alongside the increasing availability of information about market prices resulting 
from the rise in M&A transactions and the possibility to easily apply this valuation method 
also in context in which making forecasts is complicated, since it requires fewer assumptions 
than DCF method.  
Concerning its application. the multiple valuation method involves a three-steps process 
(Monti 2005, Ratner et al. 2009). 
1. Select the comparable firms.  
This is the most critical aspect of the analysis, given the impossibility to identify companies 
identical in terms of risk and growth to the firm being valued. For this reason, the 
comparability of firms forming the peer group has to be based on quantitative factors, such as 
ROIC, size, sales growth, assets composition, capital structure and financial risk, and 
qualitative factors, such as competitive position, business model, and stage in the firm’s 
lifecycle (Borsa Italiana 2004). In addition, comparable firms should operate in the same 
industry of the firm being valued and can be identified on the basis of the SIC codes. 
However, if the firms belonging to the industry are not comparable in term of the above 
mentioned factors, peers can also be identified in different sectors, as long as their risk-return 
profile is similar to the one of the firm being valued. This second solution is generally 
adopted for valuing a distressed firm when the firms operating in the same industry of the 
company being valued are healthy and growing. Troubled firms operating in different 
industries, however, can be in a different position, in terms of proceeds generated from a 
distressed sale, justifying, therefore, differences in their multiples (Damodaran 2009). In 
addition, regardless the industry to which the peer belongs to, whenever competitors are 
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classified as distressed or not distressed in order to identify a group of comparables, there is 
the risk to select firms at a different stage of the crisis path, without considering the 
differences in valuation implied by the different levels of crisis. Finally, distressed firm 
multiples often have an inappropriate sign and are subjected to sharp changes over short time 
periods, making them not reliable for valuation purpose (ABI, 1999). 
 
2. Select the most significant multiples and calculate them for comparable firms.  
The most meaningful multiples are the ones that best represent the company’s capacity to 
generate value. According to Guatri and Bini (2009), multiples can be grouped in:  
a) Equity side multiples, in which the numerator is the share price or the company’s 
market capitalization, such as P/E, P/S, P/B. 
b) Asset side multiples, in which the numerator is the firm’s enterprise value, such as 
EV/EBIT, EV/EBITDA, EV/S. 
Pros and cons can be identified in the adoption of each multiple. P/E, for example, is widely 
used because it is easy to calculate and it represents a good approximation of the company’s 
profitability. Furthermore, it can be computed with respect to the last twelve months earnings 
(trailing P/E) or to the earning forecasted for the next year (forward P/E). This multiple, 
however, is affected by the firm’s capital structure, accounting policies and non-operating 
items, making preferable to use the EV/EBITDA multiple which neutralizes the differences in 
terms of accounting, fiscal and financial policies across firms (Koller et al. 2015, Arzac 
2005).  
The negative earnings, margins and book value that generally characterize declining 
companies, however, make impossible and meaningless the use of such multiples for the 
computation of the distressed firm value. 
A first possible solution to this problem, may be the adoption of revenues multiples, since 
revenues cannot be negative. These multiples, however, ignore valuable information about 
firm’s operating efficiency, frequently leading to misleading valuation (Damodaran 1994). A 
second alternative to circumvent the problem of negative multiples could be the calculation of 
forward multiples or the application of multiples, based on healthy comparable firms’ current 
data, to future measures of the target company’s value, such as future earnings. As suggested 
by Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) indeed, in case of firm restructuring, it is more useful to 
apply the multiple to the firm measure of value at the first projected year that reflect 
normalized operations, then discounting the resulting firm’s value at the valuation date. This 
solution however, takes the success of the restructuring plan and the firm continuation as a 
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going concern for granted, assumption that shoud be deeply investigated when dealing with 
distressed companies.  
Regardless of the type of multiple chosen, however, the multiple has to be consistently 
defined, which means that both the numerator and the denominator should refer to the same 
claimholders in the company, and be uniformly estimated across comparable firms 
(Damodaran 2002). 
Once selected the most significant multiples, they need to be calculated for all the firms in the 
sample. 
 
3. Apply the multiple to the target firm.  
This step generally involves the calculation of the mean or median of the multiples computed 
for comparable firms in order to determine the multiple that is then applied to the key measure 
of the target firm to estimate its equity or enterprise value. This multiple is often obtained 
through a weighted average where higher weights are applied to the multiples of those 
companies judged more similar to the firm being valued (Monti 2005). When valuing a 
distressed firm, however, the higher value resulting from the multiples method in respect to 
the market capitalization may not be interpreted as a signal of the fact that distressed firm’s 
stock are undervalued by the market. Analysts, indeed, may conclude that the firm trades at a 
significant discount on the industry average because it has a higher default risk than the 
average firm (Damodaran 2009). A way to limit the subjectivity implied in valuation by this 
particular interpretation, consists, according to Damodaran (2009), on explicitly incorporating 
the possibility of distress by computing the firm value as follows:   
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠  
where going concern relative value is estimated by applying the average or median multiple 
calculated from healthy companies comparable to the distressed firm, while the probability of 
default and the distress sales value should be calculated according to the techniques proposed 
in paragraph 2.2.2 and paragraph 2.2.4, respectively.  
Finally, another commonly used relative valuation model is the comparable transaction 
approach, which is similar to the comparable company approach, but it derives the value of 
the firm from the prices paid in recent acquisitions of comparable companies. This approach, 
therefore, requires that comparable firm acquisitions have recently taken place under the same 
market conditions prevailing at the date of the company valuation. In addition, the acquisition 
price generally also reflects other elements than the stand alone value of the target firm, such 
as a control premium. No control premium, however, should be considered in distressed firm 
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valuation when the equity interests will be dispersed as a result of the restructuring plan 
implementation (Crystal & Mokal 2006). If included, indeed, control premium and other 
elements of the purchase price additional to the stand alone value, will lead to a higher 
estimate of firm value, while Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) suggest that the acquisition of 
bankrupted firms generally occurs at a discount in respect to the price paid for similar non-
bankrupted companies. 
 
To the limitations arising from the adoption of the market approach in a distress setting, 
however, it is necessary to add the shortcomings of the method itself. First of all, its ease of 
use can lead to applying the valuation technique in a superficial way, conducting to erroneous 
conclusions. Secondly, being a market based valuation, relative valuation can be inaccurate 
when the market is incorrectly pricing the comparable firms. Thirdly, subjectivity is involved 
in the selection of firms forming the peer group. Despite these limitations, however, Koller et 
al. (2015) suggest that relative valuation can be used to triangulate the DCF results, providing 
a useful market check on the forecasts at the basis of the DCF. 
 
2.6 Option pricing model 
 
When the face value of debt is higher than the firm’s enterprise value estimated through asset 
approach, income approach or market approach in a going concern or liquidation scenarios, 
someone may incorrectly suggest not only that the equity is worthless, but also that the 
shareholders should pay out of their pockets what the company still owes to creditors. This 
suggestion, first of all, is in contrast with the limited liability principle which provides that 
equity investors are liable only to the extent of capital that they have invested in the company, 
avoiding, therefore, that they lose more than their investment. Secondly, as suggested by 
Damodaran (2009), even when the firm’s value is lower than the debt value, the equity is not 
worthless since it is possible that the assets value increase above the debt value before 
payments become due. To capture the equity value in highly leveraged company, therefore, 
the only solution might consist on viewing the equity as a call option on the distressed firm. 
The limited liability principle and shareholders’ possibility to liquidate the firm’s assets and 
repay creditors at any time, indeed, gives to equity the features of a call option.  
A call option is a security giving its owner the right to buy the underlying asset at a given 
(exercise or strike) price on or before the expiration date (Merton 1973). If the asset value is 
 91 
 
higher than the strike price, the option is exercised and the buyer of the option earns a 
(gross17) profit equal to the difference between the asset value and the strike price. On the 
contrary, if the asset value is lower than the strike price, the contract expires worthless, since 
the option is not exercised, and the buyer of the option only loses the price paid for the call. 
Similarly, the call option dynamic applies to equity investment in case of firm’s liquidation. 
The overwhelming debt level and covenants, combined with the firm’s inability to eliminate 
or cut operating inefficiencies, indeed, can force the equity holders to liquidate the distressed 
firm’s assets. If the firm value (i.e. the value of the underlying asset) is higher than the face 
value of debt (i.e. the strike price), the equity holders receive the remaining cash, after all 
other claimholders have been satisfied, while, if the firm value is lower that the value of the 
outstanding debt, the equity investors payoff is zero, since they cannot lose more than the 
capital they have invested in the firm, given the limited liability principle. 
In case of liquidation, therefore, the payoff to equity can be schematized as follows 
(Damodaran 2009): 
 
and it replicates the payoff structure of a call option, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Payoff of equity as call option on firm value. (Personal elaboration from 
Damodaran 2009) 
 
                                                          
17 The gross profit has to be reduced of the price initially paid for the call in order to compute the net profit of 
the investment. 
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Equity, thus, can be viewed as a call option on the firm and its value can be computed by 
applying the pricing formula for a call option developed by Black and Scholes (1973): 
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑁(𝑑2) 
𝑑1 =  
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆
𝐾) +  (𝑟 +
𝜎2
2 ) 𝑡
𝜎√𝑡
 
𝑑2 =  𝑑1 −  𝜎√𝑡 
where 𝑁(𝑑1) and 𝑁(𝑑2) are probabilities estimated on the basis of a cumulative standardized 
normal distribution and the values of 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 obtained for an option. These probabilities, 
accordingly to Damodaran (2002), yield the likelihood that an option will generate positive 
cash flows for its holder when exercised, i.e. when S>K in the case of a call option. 
As captured by the Black and Scholes formula, the determinants of the call option value are 
(Damodaran 1994, Resti and Sironi 2007): 
 the current value of underlying asset (𝑆), that is equal to the value of the firm when 
valuing equity as an option. An increase in the value of the asset will rise the value of 
the call, since it gives the right to buy the asset at a fixed price; 
 the volatility (standard deviation) of the underlying asset value (𝜎). Higher the 
standard deviation, greater is the value of the option, since its owner can potentially 
earn significant return from large price fluctuations and cannot lose more than the 
price paid for the call; 
 the strike price of option (𝐾), which is equal to the face value of debt when the firm’s 
equity is viewed as an option. Higher the strike price, lower is the call option value; 
 the time to expiration of the option (𝑡), which coincides with the residual maturity of 
the debt when valuing firm’s equity as an option. The longer the time to expiration, 
the greater the value of the call option since as this period of time increases, more is 
the time for the underlying assets value to rise above the strike price; 
 the risk-free interest rate corresponding to the life of the option (𝑟). For the buyer of 
the option, the payment of the purchase price for the contract option involves an 
opportunity costs, which depends on the level of the risk-less interest rate. In 
particular, the higher the risk-free rate, the greater the value of the call option.  
The application of the Black and Scholes model to valuing firm’s equity, however, is based 
on the following assumptions (Damodaran 2009): 
1. there are only two groups of claimholders in the firm: shareholders and debtholders; 
2. there is only one issue of debt and it can be retired at face value; 
3. the debt is a zero coupon debt with no special features as convertibility or put clauses; 
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4. firm’s enterprise value and its volatility can be estimated. 
The main purpose of these assumptions is not only to simplify the valuation process, but also 
to make the determinants of equity value more in line with the features of a call option. On the 
one hand, assuming that the debt has a zero coupon and that no more than one debt issue is 
outstanding prevents the firm liquidation before the debt maturity date because of the firm’s 
inability to meet its earlier coupon obligations. In this way, these simplifying assumptions 
make possible to apply the Black and Scholes model when valuing the firm’s equity, since 
this model, in its original version, can be used only for European option, which can be 
exercised only at expiration. In addition, Arzac (2005) suggests that assuming that equity 
holders cannot default on their debt prior to the date at which they come due implies that the 
firm can refinance interim cash shortfalls. This is not unrealistic as long as “HLFs [high 
leverage firms] can tap credit lines or additional subordinated financing in order to cover 
temporary cash shortfalls” (Arzac 2005, p. 103).  
On the other hand, the first three assumptions reveal the inability of the model to deal with the 
complex capital structure that generally characterizes distressed firms. The restructuring plan 
implemented in order to overcome the crisis, indeed, frequently involves debt write-off in 
exchange of quasi-equity rights, such as convertible bonds or warrants, but also the creation 
of different debt layers.  
Some solutions, however, can be adopted in order to value the company’s equity through the 
Black and Scholes formula when the firm’s capital structure is more complex than the one 
designed by the simplifying assumptions surrounding the model. When the firm has multiple 
debt issues and much of the debt requires coupon payments, Damodaran (2009) suggests to 
calculate the residual maturity of the firm’s debt by computing the weighted average of the 
durations or maturities of each debt issue, using the debt issues face value as weights. In case 
of multiple issues, the face value of the debt, which represents the option strike price, instead, 
can be computed by adopting one of the following solutions (Damodaran 2009):   
1. Adding up the principal due on all of the firm’s debt.  
2. Summing interest and coupon payments with principal payments.  
3. Considering only the principal payments on debt, while the interest payments, 
expressed as percentage of the firm yield, take the place of the dividend yield in the 
option pricing formula. 
All these approaches, however, present some limitations. While the first approach doesn’t 
consider interest and coupon payments, underestimating the true value of debt, the second 
approach mixes cash flows arising at different point in time and the third approach requires to 
 94 
 
adopt a variation of the original Black and Scholes formula (1973) that considers dividend 
payments.  
An alternative solution which takes into account the timing of cash flows, even if in a 
simplified way, is proposed by Buttignon (2014) and involves: 
a) the calculation of the present value of the cash flows to creditors forecasted in the 
restructuring plan, by discounting them at the risk-free rate and assuming this as the 
debt’s initial value; 
b) the estimation of the weighted duration of debt; 
c) the calculation of the debt face value upon maturity by assuming it as equal to the 
initial debt (computed in point a) capitalized at the risk-free rate over a period equal to 
the duration of debt.  
Concerning the fourth simplifying assumption of the model, instead, Damodaran (2009) 
proposes different approaches to estimate both firm’s value and its variance.  
As regard the firm’s value, it can be computed through one of the following methods: 
1. Summing the market value of debt and equity. This approach, however, will lead, 
through the application of the option pricing model, to market values different from 
the initial ones, and therefore, it is internally inconsistent. 
2. Discounting expected cash flows at the cost of capital through the DCF model by 
considering only existing investments, since the firm value in an option pricing model 
should reflect the firm’s liquidation value. 
3. Applying a revenues multiple estimated for healthy firm in the same business to the 
firm’s revenues.  
4. Summing the value of firm’s assets. This approach can be adopted only when the 
assets are individually traded in the market.  
The variance in the firm’s value, instead, can be directly estimated if firm’s bonds and stocks 
are traded in the market, according to the following formula: 
𝜎𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
2 =  𝑤𝑒
2𝜎𝑒
2 + 𝑤𝑑
2𝜎𝑑
2 + 2𝑤𝑒𝑤𝑑𝜌𝑒𝑑𝜎𝑒𝜎𝑑 
where 𝑤𝑒 and 𝑤𝑑 are the market value weights of equity and debt, respectively, 𝜎𝑒
2 and 𝜎𝑑
2 are 
the variance in the stock and bond price, respectively and 𝜌𝑒𝑑 the correlation between the 
stock and bond price.  
When the firm’s bonds are not traded, the variance in the firm’s bonds and the correlation 
between the stock and bond prices can be estimated on the basis of similar rating bonds. 
When the firm is distressed, however, stock and bond prices become more volatile, leading to 
misleading results and making more appropriate to use the average variance in firm value for 
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other firms operating in the same industry or to estimate firm value volatility through the 
application of Monte Carlo simulation to DCF model (Buttignon 2014). 
Alongside its limitation, however, the adoption of the option pricing model to value corporate 
securities (Merton 1974) presents different strengths.  
First of all, the application of this model, produces a very interesting output that is the risk 
neutral probability of default: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 1 − 𝑁(𝑑2) 
where 𝑁(𝑑2) is the risk neutral probability that the firm’s assets value is higher than the face 
value of debt.  
Secondly, even though it is based on simplifying assumptions that require to make some 
compromises when dealing with distressed firms, valuing the equity as an option through the 
Black and Scholes model still remains a helpful valuation method when the face value of debt 
is higher than firm value, as it frequently happens for financially and economically distressed 
firms. The option pricing model, indeed, is able to capture the value generated by the time 
premium of equity. The firm value volatility and debt time to maturity, indeed, might lead the 
firm’s enterprise value to exceed the face value of debt in the future, giving rise to a positive 
equity value.  
Finally, by directly valuing the equity, the option pricing model doesn’t require to the analyst 
to estimate the market value of no traded debt, task that can be very challenging in particular 
in case of distressed firms, where the implementation of subsequent financial restructuring 
plans, as attempts to overcome the crisis, frequently results into complex debt structure.   
 
2.6.1 Incorporating strategic factors: further developments in the 
option pricing framework  
 
In the years following the publication of the Merton’s model (1974) for the valuation of 
corporate securities though the option pricing theory, several academics and researchers 
started to propose some revised versions of the original model with the aim of increasing its 
applicability to real-world cases, by releasing some of its underlying assumptions. 
The first important contribution in this field of the literature comes from Black and Cox 
(1976). These authors, being aware that “actual securities indentures have a variety of 
conditions that would bring new features and complications into the valuation process” (Black 
and Cox 1976, p. 351), first postulated that default can occur before debt maturity date, at the 
first time that the firm’s assets value fall below a specific time-dependent barrier. This 
happens when debt contract includes safety covenants giving to the bondholder the right to 
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liquidate the firm whenever it is performing poorly according to some standards. Such right, 
according to Black and Cox’s findings, positively impacts the bond’s price, since it provides a 
floor value for the bond which limits the stockholders’ gains deriving from somehow 
circumventing the other contractual restrictions. 
Black and Cox (1976), in addition, dealt with the presence of subordinated arrangements in 
debt valuation, by identifying junior debt special characteristics in respect to senior debt. First 
of all, differently from senior bonds, which are always a concave function of firm’s value, 
junior bonds become a concave function only for larger firm’s value (and it is convex before). 
In addition, higher volatility in firm value increases junior debtholders chances to get a higher 
reimbursement, since it is subordinated to senior claimants’ repayment. Furthermore, since 
junior debt may result to be worthless at the maturity, when such a development is imminent, 
it will be in the junior claimholders’ interest to try to extend the maturity date of the entire 
bond issue. Unlike senior bonds, therefore, junior bonds’ value is increasing on volatility and 
time to maturity. As a consequence, under some circumstances, whenever managers propose 
projects which are expected to affect the riskiness of firm’s investment policy, these different 
features of junior and senior bonds may give rise to conflicts of interest among bondholders.  
The results of Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) were then extended by Leland (1994) 
to include taxes and bankruptcy costs in the valuation of debt, which is instrumental for the 
determination of the optimal capital structure in Leland’s study. In particular, Leland (1994) 
came back to Black and Cox’s realistic assumption of possible firm default before debt 
maturity date, suggesting that bankruptcy can be triggered endogenously by managers, who 
are assumed to act in the shareholders’ interests, when they believed it is optimal for equity 
holders not to service debt anymore, on the basis of shareholders’ equity upside and expected 
recovery rate (if any) in case of default. As highlighted by Charitou and Trigeorgis (2004), 
indeed, default can have a voluntary or involuntary nature, and, in both cases, be triggered at 
an intermediate stage, before debt maturity. According to their model, developed in a 
compound option framework, equity holders can decide to voluntary/strategically default, just 
before the next payment is due, if their option value deriving from continuing as a going 
concern is not sufficient to cover the next interest and debt repayment. On the other hand, 
default may also be involuntary triggered at an intermediate stage because of the presence of 
liquidity issues, which is signaled, according to Charitou and Trigeorgis (2004), by lower than 
1 cash flow coverage ratio (CFC), computed as the ratio between cash flows from operations 
and the difference between debt to be serviced and available cash and cash equivalent.  
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The above mentioned models, however, even if they relaxed some of the Merton’s model 
simplified assumptions, share two main limitations affecting their applicability in the real 
cases. First of all, they explicitly model only the behavior of managers/shareholders, without 
any choice left to other players, and, secondly, they assume liquidation as the only 
consequence of default, even if a renegotiation of claims often occurs in distress setting.    
These limitations were firstly overcome by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), which studied 
debt contracts valuation and design in an extensive form game framework. According to the 
game, at any given time the debtor chooses the amount of debt service, which can assume 
values from 0 to the amount of cash flows available at that time. If the chosen debt service 
level is equal or higher than the contracted debt payment, the game moves forward to the next 
step. Otherwise, the creditor can decide whether to reject the debt service and initiate a legal 
action, thus obtaining the liquidation value less the liquidation costs, or to accept the debt 
service and let the game continue to the next date. Differently from the previous approaches, 
therefore, default does not necessarily imply liquidation and the creditors can decide to 
renegotiate the debt contract in an out-of-court workout. In particular, as found by Anderson 
and Sundaresan (1996), the equilibrium value of this game frequently results into claims 
renegotiation with a deviation from absolute priority rule in favor of equity holders. The 
costliness of liquidation, indeed, often induces creditors to accept deviation from promised 
payments and, therefore, provides greater scope for opportunistic debt service.   
Similar results were achieved also by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) which extended the 
Anderson and Sundaresan’s model (1996) into a continuous time framework. Their study 
shows that when equity holders are able to make debt holders take-it-or-leave-it offers of 
coupon payments, strategic debt service will persist until the firm either is liquidated or 
recovers sufficiently to force shareholders to repay the full promised interests and debt 
installments (otherwise the liquidation value will be so high that creditors will surely wish to 
cease firm’s operations if given the opportunity). Their analysis, in addition, stressed the key 
role played by bankruptcy costs and scrapping values in favoring equity holders’ strategic 
behavior in debt service. When bankruptcy costs are substantial and assets liquidation values 
low, indeed, equity holders can extract concessions from debt holders even in time in which 
the firm is making significant profits. This insight was further corroborated by the study of 
Fan and Sundaresan’s (2000), who provided a framework of debt renegotiation which allows 
to take into account variation in equity holders and debt holders bargaining power. Their 
findings, indeed, point out that higher bankruptcy costs, as well as higher equity holders’ 
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bargaining power, provide an incentive for the company to reorganize early and with greater 
deviations from absolute priority rule. 
A third consequence of default, alternative to the liquidation and private workout solutions 
analyzed in the models of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin 
(1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), then, consists on filing for court-supervised 
restructuring. This solution differs from liquidation and out-of-court reorganization in several 
dimensions, among which the treatment of claimholders in default, that affects equity holders’ 
incentive to default and, therefore, corporate securities values. In particular, in-court 
reorganization was firstly analyzed in a contingent claim framework by Francois and 
Morellec (2004), whose model accounts for the possibility that default can lead to either 
immediate liquidation or debt renegotiation under court protection according to Chapter 11. 
As pointed out by the authors, Chapter 11 filings lie in between liquidation, under which no 
renegotiation takes place and firm’s assets are liquidated, and private workout, which allows 
for claims renegotiation without any time constraints. Under Chapter 11, indeed, claimholders 
can renegotiate their claims but for a limited period of time (observation or exclusivity period) 
granted by the court. During this time period, the court guarantees the firm’s continuation as a 
going concern, also thanks to the automatic stay of assets that prevents creditors from 
enforcing legal actions on firm’s assets. Then, after having valued the feasibility and validity 
of the reorganization plan proposed by the debtor, also by verifying whether the firm has 
shown signals of recovery during the observation period, the court, at the end of this period, 
will decide whether to liquidate the firm or let it continue to operate. In particular, Francois 
and Morellec (2004)’s study pointed out that the length of the observation period affects the 
endogenously determined default threshold and, therefore, the corporate securities value. 
Indeed, the default threshold associated with Chapter 11 filing results to be greater, i.e. it 
occurs early in time, than the default threshold associated with liquidation, but lower than the 
default threshold associated with private workout. If the default is followed by immediate 
liquidation, in fact, the decision to default is irreversible and, therefore, it will represent the 
optimal solution only when equity is worthless. Claim restructuring, instead, allows the firm 
to continue to operate and, at the same time, to extract concession from creditors, 
incentivizing, in this way, shareholders to default earlier. Particularly, since the Francois and 
Morellec’s model presumed excursions of firm’s assets value below the default boundary as 
associated with implicit forgiving of contractual obligations, the authors found that longer 
observation period decreases the probability of firm’s liquidation at the end of the period and, 
therefore, drives up equity holders’ incentive to default early to extract more surplus from 
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creditors. This will result in a maximization of firm’s equity, which, however, is no longer 
consistent with the maximization of firm’s total value, as suggested by Broadie et al. (2007). 
Even if debt renegotiation may be also in the interest of the creditors and the firm as a whole 
by making possible to avoid costly liquidation, firm value maximization generally requires to 
file for Chapter 11 later in respect to equity value maximization, since this prolongs the period 
in which complete contractual payments are performed by the debtor. Specifically, Broadie et 
al. (2007) stated that this issue can be solved by giving to creditors the right to choose the 
length of the observation period, after having shown that strategies aimed at debt 
maximization are qualitatively very similar to the first best strategy, i.e. the strategy that 
maximizes firm total value subject to the limited liability of equity and debt.  
In conclusion, several studies in the literature were dedicated to the development of 
theoretical models that, starting from Merton’s model (1974) insights and shortcomings, 
attempt to incorporate the strategic interaction between equity holders and debt holders in the 
valuation of corporate securities. These works, however, are only a small part of the 
consistent literature arising with the purpose to overcome Merton’s model limitations in real 
world cases. Other lines of research in this field of the corporate finance literature, for 
instance, focus on incorporating interest rate risk (Brennan & Schwartz 1978, Longstaff & 
Schwartz 1995) or multiple creditors renegotiation (Hege & Mella-Barral 2005, Dumitrescu 
2007) in the pricing of corporates securities, overcoming other simplistic assumptions 
underlying the first version of the option pricing model. 
The main drawback common to all these models rooted in the BSM approach, however, still 
remains their complexity and scarce applicability in practice, as indicated by the few 
empirical results. Among the latter, Anderson and Sundaresan’s empirical study (2000) seems 
to suggest that models incorporating endogenous default barriers are somewhat superior to 
Merton’s model, since they provide default probabilities and yield spreads more in line with 
the historical experience reported by Moody’s than Merton’s model does. Nonetheless, the 
limited amount of empirical researches testing in real world cases the different approaches 
developed starting from Merton’s model underlying intuitions and limitations, still make 
judging their reliability, as well as choosing the best model among them, a very difficult task.  
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Summing up, different techniques are available to estimate the enterprise value and equity 
value of a distressed firm. The selection of the most appropriate method, in term of accuracy 
of the resulting estimate, will depend on the information available, as well as on the 
characteristics and degree of severity of the firm’s crisis. When there is a light at the end of 
the tunnel, and, therefore a real chance that the firm will survive the crisis period, approaches 
based on cash flows analysis (DCF, APV and CCF models), with the related precautions and 
adjustments, are better suited to combine potential positive outcomes of firm’s restructuring 
with its potential inefficiency in ensuring firm’s continuation as a going concern. When the 
distress, instead, is mainly attributed to external causes and it is severe enough to be terminal, 
the firm value should be determined under a liquidation scenario adopting an asset approach. 
If the liquidation value, however, is lower than the value of debt, the only approach left to 
value distressed firm’s equity is the option pricing model, which, by capturing the possibility 
that the highly volatile assets value may increase above the face value of debt before the 
maturity date, can lead to positive equity value also in highly distressed situations.  
Since each of these methods presents some limitations, due to the attempt to capture the 
complexity of real cases into simple and practical solutions, the use of different techniques 
and the comparison of the resulting estimates is encouraged in order to assess the accuracy of 
models’ outputs and underlying assumptions. In this context, also the easiest valuation 
approach, that is the market approach, by reflecting the current mood of the market, provide a 
useful check on intrinsic valuation results.  
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CHAPTER 3: The case of Zucchi Group 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
After having investigated the definition of company in distress and its peculiarities, as well as 
having explored the valuation techniques applicable to this type of firm, the focus of the 
dissertation shifts now from theory to practice and involves the analysis of a real case: the 
case of Zucchi Group.  
Zucchi Group is an Italian group operating in the household linen industry, that in the early 
2000s started to reveal the first signals of decline. The absence of a prompt reaction to the 
increasing industry competitiveness, indeed, led to a progressive deterioration of group 
economic performance from 2004, then exacerbated in 2008 by the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis. The lacking recovery from economic distress, in turn, ultimately brought the 
group to a severe financial distress, despite the several restructuring actions undertaken at 
both the strategic and financial level since 2006. 
This chapter starts with the presentation of Zucchi Group and a brief description of the 
historical milestones of its expansion process undertaken from 1920 to 2006 (paragraph 3.2). 
Starting from 2006, instead, the description of the major events characterizing the group 
history is combined with an in-depth analysis of the group economic and financial results and 
ratios, involving also the comparison with the performance of three companies considered as 
Zucchi Group’s peers (paragraph 3.3). This analysis allows the study of the evolution of the 
group crisis and to recognize its main signals, as well as to identify the causes of distress and 
assess the effects of the restructuring actions undertaken on group performance. In paragraph 
3.4, then, the focus shifts from past to Zucchi Group current situation through a description of 
the economic and financial results achieved in 2016 (the last available financial statement is 
the one contained in the 2016 Annual Report) by the group as a consequence of the current 
attempt to exit the crisis articulated in the 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan. The main guidelines 
of the new strategic plan and elements of the connected financial maneuver are then combined 
with the analysis of the household linen industry performed in paragraph 3.5, in order to 
identify the group’s current strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and risks that can drive 
and affect the future performance and, therefore, the current intrinsic value of Zucchi Group.  
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3.2 Zucchi Group: structure and history  
 
Zucchi Group is a medium size Italian company operating in the manufacturing and 
distribution of household linen products. Its product range includes: 
 Bedroom products (such as sheets, duvet covers, bedspreads) 
 Bathroom products (such as towels, bathrobes, bath mats) 
 Living room products (such as sofa covers, table and kitchen products) 
 Outdoor products (such as travel robes, travel sheets and beach towels) 
 Cotton yarns and unbleached woven fabrics  
In addition, it provides dyeing and print works services on behalf of third parties.  
The group outsources the main part of the production function, by relying on a wide network 
of national and international suppliers, and sells its products in domestic and international 
markets (mainly in European countries), through 2.500 commercial clients operating in the 
retail and mass distribution channels, 140 shops (both directly managed or by franchisers, 
among which 100 located in Italy, 8 in Germany and 5 in Switzerland) and 300 shops in shops 
or located inside department stores. The entire supply chain and in particular the production 
and logistics steps, however, are directly managed and supervised by the group, granting, in 
this way, that the offered products and services meet the high quality standards characterizing 
the group value proposition. The group mission, indeed, is “To produce, distribute and 
promoting good quality household linen products, with high interior design contents, in order 
to allow western women (but not only), to decorate their houses in a creative and comfortable 
way, by investing reasonable financial resources.” 
Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a, whose ownership structure is represented in Figure 3.1, is the parent 
company of the group, that is constituted by 9 firms (Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.1- Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a’s ownership structure. (Source: Capital IQ) 
88,88%
7,00%
0,71% 0,62% 2,79%
Astrance Capital SAS
Gianluca Buffon
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A
UniCredit S.p.a
Free Float
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Figure 3.2 – The structure of Zucchi Group. (Source: 2016 Consolidated Financial 
Statement) 
In particular, the group activity is carried out through two Strategic Business Units:  
 “Zucchi and subsidiaries” Business Unit, which deals with the commercialization of 
household linen products through the two owned-brand Zucchi (premium segment) 
and Bassetti (medium-high segment), and a number of licensed brands such as 
Lacoste, Laura Ashley, Diesel and Tommy Hilfiger. The products are distributed 
mainly through retailers, mono-brand shops (both directly managed or by franchisers) 
and mass distribution channels.  
 “Hospitality” Business Unit, which handles the sale and marketing of articles for 
hotels and communities, through Mascioni USA Inc, a company operating in the 
American market. 
Basitalia S.r.l., instead, manages the network of leased and proprietary shops, mainly on 
behalf of the parent company, while Intesa S.r.l produces fabrics for apparel and household 
linen industry. 
The current group structure is the result of Zucchi Group strategy of growing through 
acquisitions, pursued in Italy from ‘60s and abroad in ‘90s, and of the downsizing and 
restructuring process to which the group has been subjected since 2005, given the evident 
signals of decline, then evolved into economic and financial distress, appeared in the early 
2000s.  
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In particular, the origins of Zucchi Group date back to 1920, when Vincenzo Zucchi and a 
business partner established their first company for the production of linen and cotton linen 
sheets and tablecloths. Some years later, Vincenzo Zucchi acquired the Casorezzo facility and 
parted with his business partners, creating in 1953 the company Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A. In 
the ‘60s, the firm started an expansion process by acquiring and merging with companies 
operating at different stages of the production cycle, with the purpose of increasing Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.A’s degree of vertical integration and entering into new markets. In particular, 
among acquired companies there are B.C.A F.lli Tosi and Manspugna, both specialized in the 
sponge industry, Bera, firm active in the production of bed linen and Mascioni (55% 
ownership), worldwide leader in the printing and finishing of wide fabrics. In 1982 Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a was listed in the Milan Stock Exchange and four years later it acquired 100% of 
Bassetti, its direct competitor and market leader in Italy. In the ‘90s, the group started to 
expand toward foreign markets, by acquiring the French companies Jalla, Descamps (famous 
in Europe for its single brand stores) and Dorma France (thus acquiring the license on the 
Laura Ashley brand). In 2000 Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a created a joint venture with an Indian 
company (Welspun) for the production of sponge bathrobes and in 2002 it entered into license 
agreements with Armani, Ferrari, Philippe Starck, while in 2006 Bassetti and Standardtela 
(which produced standard fabrics for bed sheets) were merged into the parent company 
Vincenzo Zucchi. 
The main pillars of Zucchi Group history from 1920 to the early 2000s are summarized in 
Figure 3.3. The crisis path and the restructuring actions implemented from 2006 to 2015, 
instead, are in-depth analyzed in the following paragraph. 
 
  
1920
• A new company is established by Vincenzo Zucchi and a business partner and 
some years later it acquires the Casorezzo facility.
1942
• Vincenzo Zucchi parts with the business partners and creates the Vincenzo Zucchi 
company (individual enterprise).
1953
• Vincenzo Zucchi company becomes S.p.A.
1962
• Everwear-Zucchi is established following the agreement with the English brand 
Vantona for the production of chenille bedcovers. 
1965
• Zucchi enters the sponge industry by  acquiring B.C.A. F.lli Tosi.
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2000
• Joint-venture with the Indian group Wellspun for the production of sponge
bathrobes.
2001
• Zucchi buys 100% of Doma France thus acquiring the license on the Laura Ashley brand. 
• Bassetti is incorporated into Zucchi and delisted.
2002
• Zucchi enters into license agreements with Armani, Ferrari, Philippe Starck.
2006
• Bassetti and Standardtela are merged into the parent company Vincenzo Zucchi 
S.p.A.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Milestones of Zucchi Group expansion.   
3.3 The crisis path 
 
The origins of the crisis are rooted in the strategy implemented by Zucchi Group in the ‘90s 
that consisted in growing through acquisitions by maintaining unchanged the production and 
organizational structure of each acquired company. The consequent lack of integration 
1967
• Acquisition of the production site located in Urago (BS) for the installation of the 
Everwear-Zucchi (100% owned) production function.
1970
• Acquisition of Manspugna, company specialized in the production of hydrophilic 
sponge.
1972
• Standartela is established with the competitors Bassetti and Eliolona for the 
production of standard fabrics for bed sheets. 
1982
• Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A is listed in the Milan Stock Exchange.
1986
• Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A. acquires 100% of Bassetti from Marzotto family that, in 
turn, acquires 25% of Zucchi through a capital increase
1988
•Acquisition of the French company Bera, active in the production of bed linen sold through department
stores, and 55% stake in Mascioni, wordwilde leader in the printing and finishing wide fabrics. 
•Acquisition of the Antique Handblocks collection, the most important collection of blocks for fabric
handprinting, which soon becomes a Museum. 
1989
• Bassetti is listed in the Milan Stock Exchange
1990
• Acquisition of the French company Jalla SA, famous brand in the sponge industry. 
1992
• Acquisition of Eliolona. Standartdela, therefore, is totally owned by Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.A.
1997
• Acquisition of the French company Descamps, famous in Europe for its single-
brand stores. 
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between the group and the target firms, indeed, not only didn’t allow the full value realization 
of potential synergies, but also resulted into an inefficient and rigid group corporate and 
production structure. In particular, at the beginning of 2000, the group production structure 
was articulated in 15 industrial plants located in Italy and France and its industrial logic 
consisted in supporting and implementing the business of its own brands as well as an 
intensive production of yarns and fabrics for third parties. When in the early 2000s 
competitors started to delocalize their production sites in low wage countries, however, 
Zucchi Group business model entered into crisis. The rigid cost structure, indeed, couldn’t 
allow the group to remain competitive while continuing to earn attractive margins. In the 
absence of prompt reactions of company’s management to the new competitive threat, 
therefore, the first signals of crisis started to come to light. The increase of imports in textile 
products from low wage countries, such as Pakistan, India and China, and the weak dollar, 
which negatively affected the competitiveness of exports toward the U.S. market, caused in 
2003 a decline in consolidated sales (-4.15%), determining the beginning of a negative trend 
in revenues that has characterized Zucchi Group performance until today. In addition to these 
events, the unexpected decrease in consumption experienced in Italy brought to an even worse 
sales reduction in 2004 (-8.65%) and strongly contributed to the significant loss of about 17 
million suffered by the group in that year. The signals of the crisis became even more 
alarming in 2005, when the declining sales were just enough to cover operating costs and the 
loss in the income statement reached about 51 million. In the attempt to break the downward 
trend, Zucchi Group undertook the first restructuring actions in 2005. These interventions 
aimed to adapt the group structure to the changes occurred in the household linen industry 
(the intense competitiveness of imports from low wage countries) and, therefore, entailed the 
disposal and the closure of some production plants, dedicated to spinning and weaving, in 
Italy and in France, in favor of an increasing production outsourcing. The restructuring 
process, then, became more intense in the following years through the continuation of the 
production structure transformation, which started to reveal its effects in 2006, accompanied 
by important changes in both commercial area and group structure.   
The evolution of the crisis and the connected restructuring actions are analyzed in the next 
paragraphs by articulating the major events that have characterized the group history from 
2006 to 2015 in two different phases: 
 Crisis and downsizing (2006-2010). During this phase Zucchi Group concluded its 
industrial transformation, that entailed the outsourcing of large part of the production 
function. Despite the restructuring actions undertaken, however, Zucchi Group signals 
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of crisis became more and more evident, aggravated in 2008 by the outbreak of the 
global financial-economic crisis. In 2010, instead, the first signals of recovery seemed 
to appear at the operating level. 
 Relaunch and international development (2011-2015). This phase is characterized by 
two attempts to exit the crisis by boosting revenues, reducing operating costs and 
making the debt burden less overwhelming: the 2011-2015 Restructuring Plan and the 
2013-2017 Restructuring Plan. Despite the latter entailed more radical restructuring 
actions, that consisted on a debt reduction through a debt-equity swap and on the 
adoption of a new business model involving, among other things, a group expansion in 
international markets, the group operating performance continued to deteriorate and 
financial distress became more and more severe.  
For each phase, the group operating and financial performance is analyzed by comparing 
Zucchi Group results with key ratios of peer companies (calculated in Appendix 2), in order to 
capture the signals of the crisis, to better identify its causes and to assess whether they had an 
internal or external nature. The companies selected as comparables are: 
 Caleffi, an Italian based company operating in the household linen industry and the 
only Italian listed competitor of Zucchi Group. Similarly to Zucchi, Caleffi is 
positioned in the Home fashion segment and distributes its products in Italy and 
abroad through its own brands, such as Caleffi and Scaldotto, as well under licensed 
brand names.  
 Gabel, an Italian industrial group operating in the textile industry and specialized in 
the production of household linen products. As Zucchi Group, Gabel manages and 
controls the entire supply chain, but, differently from Zucchi Group, the production 
function is not outsourced and maintained in Italy.  
 Springs Global, a Brazil-based company engaged in the textile industry and founded 
in 2006 as the result of the merger between Companhia de Tecidos Norte de Minas, 
with operations in South America, and Springs Industries, with operations in North 
America. The company focuses on spinning, weaving, finishing, manufacturing and 
commercialization of home textile products, mainly bed and bath textile articles and it 
offers its products under various brand names, targeting customers of different 
socioeconomic profiles. It distributes, as well as in others, in Argentina and Canada, 
but also in Brazil and United States, countries involved in Zucchi Group international 
development projects. By considering this company as Zucchi Group comparable, 
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despite its larger size, it is possible to better take into consideration in the analysis the 
dynamic of foreign markets targeted by Zucchi Group. 
3.3.1 Downsizing phase 
3.3.1.1 Major events 
The first phase of the crisis path is characterized by a worsening of the decline situation and 
the implementation of a group downsizing process. This phase can be further divided into two 
periods: 
 From 2006 to 2007, during which the restructuring actions undertaken started giving 
rise to an improvement in Zucchi Group operating performance;  
 From 2008 to 2010, during which the difficult macroeconomic context exacerbated the 
group crisis situation, requiring the implementation of new restructuring actions. 
As just mentioned, during the first period of the downsizing phase, the restructuring actions 
undertaken by the group in response to the decline signals started to produce positive effects 
on the group’s operating margin and net financial position. These interventions were mainly 
focused on the reduction of structural costs, objective pursued through: 
 the rationalization and simplification of the group structure, in particular by means of 
the merger of Standartela and Bassetti, entities already under the control of Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a, in Zucchi, concluded in 2006. This merger significantly contributed not 
only to improve the control over group activities, but also to reduce the administrative 
costs; 
 the reorganization of the management structure in order to make it more reactive and 
flexible; 
 the strengthening of the management accounting system. 
These actions were carried out together with a downsizing of the workforce, the disposal of 
non-strategic assets and a deep transformation of the commercial area achieved through:  
 the rationalization and repositioning of Zucchi Group’s shops network, through the 
elimination of shops (both direct and in franchising) with negative margins and 
without growth potential (new shops with revised format, instead, would be opened 
from 2008); 
 a selective reduction in the private label business; 
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 the rationalization of the license portfolio, by eliminating those with low growth 
potential and focusing on the development of the more strategic ones.  
 the drastic reduction of industrial sales (yarns and fabrics). 
During this period, in addition, the group laid the foundation for the relaunch and 
strengthening of the main brands (Zucchi, Bassetti, Descamps and Jalla) through a revision of 
the product offering and positioning. 
Thanks to the restructuring actions implemented, the group reached in 2006 and 2007 
operating results in line with the 2006-2008 Strategic Plan, according to which a return to 
positive net income was expected in 2008. The outbreak of global economic-financial crisis in 
2008, however, made this objective impossible to achieve. Zucchi Group, which operates in 
one of the industry that most suffered the consequences of the difficult macroeconomic 
scenario, was hit by the crisis during a delicate period of transaction. This made the effects of 
the global crisis even more heavy. The deterioration of the group performance in 2008-2009, 
indeed, was larger than the one experienced by main competitors in the same years (as better 
discussed in paragraph 3.3.1.2), suggesting that the causes of the crisis are more internal than 
external. Surely, external events as the increasing competition and the global financial-
economic crisis played an important role in determining the economic results of companies 
operating in the textile industry, but they cannot be considered the primary causes of the 
Zucchi Group crisis. These environmental changes simply made more evident and amplified 
the effects of company’s internal inefficiencies and rigid cost structure, which were not 
recognized in a timely manner by managers. The restructuring actions, indeed, started to be 
implemented only in 2005, while evident signals of decline, such as decrease in revenues and 
operating margin, had already appeared in 2003. The continuing worsening performance 
suffered by the group during 2008 and 2009, therefore, pointed out that further restructuring 
actions were required to made the organization more flexible and reactive to changing market 
conditions, at least as much as its competitors. As a consequence, a new Strategic Plan was 
developed for the 2009-2013 period aimed at further reducing the breakeven point and 
rationalizing the group’s organization and processes, as well as strengthening the commercial 
area and distribution network. Restructuring actions focused, first of all, on the supply chain 
with the purpose of reducing the response time and align it with the best worldwide practice 
in the textile industry, granting, in this way, an increase in the group’s flexibility and 
competitiveness. In order to achieve this objective, Zucchi Group believed it was fundamental 
to increase its stake in Mascioni, a company specialized in the finishing treatment of textile 
products and qualifying component of the group’s supply chain, from 55% to 65.57% in 2008 
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and from 65.57% to 71.65% in 2009 paying a total price of 11.9 million. In addition, 
particular attention was devoted to the logistic area, which represented a key factor not only 
for the internalization process that the group forecasted to undertake during its development 
phase, but also for the selection of new suppliers of final products. The high competitiveness 
of imports from low wage countries, as well as the rise of raw material costs, indeed, forced 
the group to revise its “make or buy” decisions in favor of an increasing volume of final 
products purchased from third parties. The increasing production outsourcing entailed the 
cessation of the production line of some plants, among which was the factory situated in 
Notaresco, dedicated to the spinning and weaving of basic undyed fabrics. 
Furthermore, in the second period (from 2008 to 2010) of the “downsizing phase”, the group 
restructuring continued to entail the disposal of non-strategic assets and the reduction of the 
workforce, in particular in the production, logistic and administrative functions, as well as a 
revision and reinforcement of the group governance and organization, through the hiring of a 
new general manager. 
Regarding the commercial area, instead, the 2009-2013 Strategic Plan aimed to recover sales 
volume through the following actions: 
 the strengthening of international distribution, in particular in new markets such as 
USA, South America, Asia and North Europe, also by adopting new distribution 
channels (such as the company website for Zucchi and Bassetti brands and 
commercial promoters for Descamps and Jalla brands);  
 the strengthening of the direct channels of distribution through the development of a 
franchising network and by looking for potential partnerships;  
 the completion of the relaunch and repositioning process of the proprietary brands 
initiated in 2006.  
The restructuring actions started to show their positive effects on company operating results in 
2010. During this year, in addition, the business unit Descamps was classified as a 
Discontinued Operation. In particular, given its inability to repay the accumulated fiscal and 
social security debts, on 29th June 2010 Descamps was admitted to a reorganization and 
restructuring procedure (Rédressement Judiciaire) by the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris. 
Furthermore, the relevant losses suffered by this business unit, equal to 23 million in 2009 
and to 21 million in 2010, encouraged the parent company Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.A to accept, 
on 17th September 2010, the offer received by Astrance Capital S.A.S, a French private equity 
fund, which, in February 2011, acquired 80% of the parent company’s stake in Descamps at a 
price of 2 million.  
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During the 2010, moreover, a new company, Hospitality.it S.r.l., was established in 
Rescaldina, whose business consisted on the production, sale, rent, import and export of 
fabrics, textile products and furniture for hotels, restaurants, catering, shipping companies and 
communities. On January 2010, Hospitality.it S.r.l acquired from Mascioni S.p.a its stakes of 
Mascioni Hospitality Inc., together with the brand “Hotel Collection”. Both stakes and brand 
were then sold to the parent company Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a.  
The group restructuring, then, continued with the liquidation of the no longer strategic 
subsidiary Mascioni USA Ltd, an American company providing commercial services and post 
sales assistance to North American clients on behalf of its parent company Mascioni S.p.a., 
and the establishment of a new firm, Zucchi S.A., in Belgium, dedicated to the 
commercialization of the group products.  
 
3.3.1.2 Financial analysis 
In order to better understand the causes of the corporate crisis and capture the effects of the 
restructuring actions undertaken during the downsizing phase on Zucchi Group performance, 
the evolution of Zucchi Group’s key financial measures and ratios are now analyzed and 
compared with peer companies’ results. 
The starting point for the analysis of the group performance is the evolution of sales. Figure 
3.4 shows that, after years of positive growth, from 2003, Zucchi Group consolidated sales 
started to decrease. 
 
Figure 3.4 – 2000-2010 Consolidated sales.  
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In particular, the negative growth rates experienced from 2003 to 2006 can be partially 
explained by the substantial reduction in the sales of semi-finished products. In 2005, indeed, 
after the already mentioned disposal of some plants located in France and the closure of some 
factories located in Italy, all dedicated to the weaving activity, the group substantially exited 
the business of semi-finished products, whose price didn’t allow the company to gain positive 
margins. The drop in the final consumers’ spending power, and the consequent decrease in the 
consumption level, caused by the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008, instead, 
strongly contributed to the huge sales reduction suffered by the group in 2009, equal to -
14.24%. In particular, the drop in sales was significant for Descamps, because of the severe 
crisis scenario faced in Spain and United Kingdom, countries in which a large percentage of 
the business unit sales were realized, and for Mascioni, for which the negative effects of the 
global crisis on the textile industry were amplified by the weak dollar. As regards the sales 
segmentation according to distribution channels, all the distribution channels, and in 
particular the private label segment, suffered the consequences of the difficult macroeconomic 
scenario. Indeed, even if the restructuring actions implemented in the commercial area and 
aimed at the relaunch of Zucchi Group main brands, produced in 2008 positive results in 
terms of an increase in the volume sold through direct distribution channels, they were 
insufficient to halt the drop in consolidated sales.  
In 2010, the group started to report the first signs of recovery. Even if the Figure 3.4 shows an 
extremely negative growth rate also in 2010, indeed, actually in 2010 sales grew at a rate of 
9%, if compared with 2009 re-determined revenues computed considering Descamps as 
discontinued operation. 
By analyzing sales growth rates experienced by top comparables (Caleffi and Gabel) in the 
same years (Figure 3.5), instead, a high volatility emerges probably as a consequence of the 
radical changes occurred in the industry and companies’ attempts to face them through 
immediate actions that often produce only short term effects. As for Zucchi Group, also for 
Caleffi the crisis significantly affected sales growth rate in 2009, during which Caleffi 
reported a negative growth of -5.01%. Gabel instead, after having suffered a slightly negative 
sales variation in 2008 (-0.69%), was able to achieve a positive growth rate in 2009 (5.37%). 
Probably, its positioning on a lower price segment represented a competitive advantage in 
respect to Caleffi and Zucchi during a period of decreasing final consumer budget. Despite the 
changing macroeconomic and industrial environment, however, both Caleffi and Gabel sales, 
different from Zucchi Group, never fell below the 2006 level, as shown in Figure 3.6, 
pointing to a greater competitors’ ability and promptness on adapting their value proposition 
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to the change in customer needs. The global economic crisis, finally, significantly affected 
also Springs Global revenues18, delaying the achievement of soft synergies expected from the 
merger.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Sales growth rates comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Sales evolution comparison. 
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18 For Springs Global, the growth rate between 2005 and 2006 cannot be calculated, since the company born as 
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decreased to 4.8 million in 2005 and reached negative levels in 2008 and 2009 (-7.5 million 
and -1.9 million, respectively). As shown in Figure 3.7, the restructuring actions implemented 
according to the 2006-2008 Strategic Plan and aimed at the reduction of structural costs, as 
well as the increasing recourse to production outsourcing, revealed their effectiveness in 2006 
and 2007, allowing a recovery of EBITDA and EBITDA margin. These results encouraged 
Zucchi Group, in 2008, to go forward with the implementation of the strategic plan, which 
entailed the opening of new shops as part of the restructuring actions aimed at the recovery of 
sales volume through the strengthening of the direct channels of distribution. The consequent 
increase in operating costs, in particular distribution and structural costs, however, was 
amplified by the unexpected further drop on sales caused by the worsening of the 
macroeconomic scenario. The implied higher incidence of fixed costs on sales resulted in 
negative EBITDA margins equal to -2.90% in 2008 and -0.85% in 2009. These results are 
particularly negative when compared with EBITDA margins of peers (Figure 3.8). The drop 
in this operating measure suffered by Caleffi (in 2008) and Gabel (in 2008 and 2009), indeed, 
is more limited than the one experienced by Zucchi Group, pointing out the higher flexibility 
of top comparables’ cost structure. In 2010, however, Zucchi Group’s operating performance 
indicator appears in line with the peer average. The restructuring actions implemented 
according to the new 2009-2013 Strategic Plan, indeed, produced positive effects on both 
revenues side, in terms of sales volume and mix, and costs side, leading to a positive EBITDA 
margin of 6.26%. This result, as come to light from the analysis of the 2011-2015 period 
discussed in paragraph 3.3.2, however, was only temporary and not a sign of actual recovery.  
 
Figure 3.7 – 2000-2010 EBITDA and EBITDA margin.  
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Figure 3.8 – EBITDA margin comparison. 
 
Further signals of Zucchi Group operating difficulties, then, emerge from revenues per 
employee and EBITDA per employee ratios, which, as shown in Figure 3.9, are generally 
lower than top comparables ratios (in particular Caleffi’s ratios), despite the significant 
workforce reduction experienced during the downsizing phase, pointing out Zucchi Group 
lower productivity and higher inefficiency in using its human resources to generate revenues 
and operating profit.  
 
Figure 3.9 – Revenues per employee and EBITDA per employee: comparison with top 
comparables 
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Zucchi Group net margin in 2008, 2009 and 2010 is well below peer average, even if the latter 
is close to zero, signaling difficulties in converting revenues into profits common to all the 
firms operating in the textile industry. Figure 3.11 better shows the negative trend in terms of 
net income and net margin experienced by Zucchi Group starting from 2004. The poor 
operating results, indeed, were worsened by restructuring costs, largely constituted by 
expenses connected with the management of excess personnel, and impairment losses of the 
production plants subjected to disposal or closure during the restructuring period. These 
extraordinary items reached the highest levels in 2005 (32.2 million), the year that had already 
recorded the effects, in terms of impairment losses and expenses connected with workforce 
reduction, of the closure of some production sites concluded in 2006 according to 2006-2008 
Restructuring Plan, and in 2009 (8.2 million), during which new restructuring actions were 
required in order to face the difficult macroeconomic scenario. Alongside these extraordinary 
items, the operating results were further deteriorated by interest expenses, that reported a 
considerable increase from 2006 to 2008, moving from 4.2 million in 2005 to 10.6 million in 
2008, mainly due to an interest rate (Euribor) increase and the higher spread applied by the 
banking system. Starting from 2009, instead, the interest rate decrease and slightly positive 
exchange rate differences led to a net financial expenses reduction. Nevertheless, the 2009 
and 2010 group net income resulted significantly negative (-48.8 million in 2009 and -20.2 
million in 2010), strongly affected by the poor performance of the business unit Descamps, 
which reported losses for 23.1 million in 2009 and 20.8 million in 2010. 
 
Figure 3.10 – Net margin comparison. 
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Figure 3.11 – 2000-2010 Group net result and net margin.  
Shifting the analysis of the restructuring effects from income statement to balance sheet items, 
it is possible to observe a progressive reduction in invested capital during the downsizing 
phase (Figure 3.12). This trend, completely opposite to the one experienced by Zucchi Group 
between 2000 and 2005, as well as the evolution of the invested capital on sales ratio, can be 
better examined by splitting the invested capital in its main components: the operating fixed 
capital and the net working capital.  
 
Figure 3.12 – 2000-2010 Invested capital. 
 
As shown by Figure 3.13, operating fixed capital remained quite stable from 2000 to 200419 
and started to experience a progressive decrease from 2006. This is attributable to the 
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downsizing effects of the restructuring plan that entailed the disposal of assets became no 
longer strategic (33 million of assets are intended for sale in 2007), in particular following the 
increasing production outsourcing, as well as to assets depreciation not counterbalanced by 
new investments. During the downsizing phase, indeed, investments were limited to plants 
and machinery renewal and shops set up, and approximately amounted to less than half of the 
asset value reduction recorded each year as a consequence of depreciation. Despite the 
restructuring actions undertaken, however, the group structure was still very rigid, in 
particular in respect to comparable companies (Figure 3.14). The incidence of operating fixed 
capital on sales for Zucchi Group, equal on average to 37.46%, is higher than the competitors 
average, equal to 21.99%. In particular, Caleffi presented the most flexible structure, having 
been able to maintain the operating fixed capital on sales ratio close to 5% despite the sales 
fluctuation experienced, while Springs Global larger size was extremely penalized by the 
huge decrease in revenues suffered during the global financial crisis.  
 
Figure 3.13 – 2000-2010 Operating fixed capital. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 – Operating fixed capital on sales comparison. 
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Zucchi Group net working capital follows a path similar to the evolution of operating fixed 
capital, reporting a progressive reduction from 208.6 million in 2004 to 92.8 in 2010 (Figure 
3.15). The drop in revenues experienced by Zucchi Group, indeed, caused a decrease in trade 
receivables and inventories (combined with the closure and disposal of some production sites) 
but only a slight reduction of trade payables, given the increasing amount of past due 
payables. The group, in addition, suffered an extension of the commercial cycle in respect to 
the pre-crisis situation, reporting an increase on both trade payables days in revenues (from 57 
in 2000 to 99 in 2010) and trade receivables days in revenues (from 119 in 2000 to 148 in 
2010). The latter points to the loss of bargaining power toward clients typically experienced 
by declining companies. Further evidence of Zucchi Group inefficient working capital 
management emerges from Figure 3.17, which shows that while competitors net working 
capital turnover ratio is on average close to 3.45, the group is able to generate (on average) 
only 1.78 euro of sales for each euro invested in its net working capital.  
 
Figure 3.15 – 2000-2010 Net working capital. 
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Figure 3.17 – Net working capital turnover comparison.  
 
The inverse of net working capital turnover ratio, that is the net working capital to sales ratio 
(Figure 3.16), provides then a useful insight on another dimension strongly impacted by the 
corporate crisis: liquidity. An average working capital to sales ratio of 56%, means that 56% 
of Zucchi Group turnover was frozen in inventory and trade receivables, signaling that the 
group could have had greater difficulties in meeting current obligations in respect to 
competitors, whose net working capital on sales ratio was on average equal to 30%.  
This evidence is confirmed by the analysis of the evolution of current ratio and quick ratio in 
respect to comparable companies, shown in Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.19, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.18 – Current ratio comparison. 
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Figure 3.19 – Quick ratio comparison.  
Figure 3.18 points to an increasing disequilibrium between Zucchi Group current assets and 
current liabilities, in particular in respect to comparable companies, captured by the 
progressive decrease in the group current ratio until reaching a level below 1 in 2009. Figure 
3.19 instead, not only provides evidence about a decreasing and below peer average trend also 
in Zucchi Group quick ratio, but reveals also the significant role played by inventories when 
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liabilities The short term liquidity problems suffered by Zucchi Group, lastly, clearly emerge 
also from the analysis of the operating cash flows on current liabilities ratio (Figure 3.20). 
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Figure 3.20 – 2006-2010 Operating cash flow on current liabilities ratio.  
 
Focusing only on financial debts, instead, Figure 3.21 and Figure 3.22 further prove that 
Zucchi Group experienced greater difficulties than comparables in meeting its financial 
obligations, both in terms of interest expenses and debt payments. 
Zucchi Group EBITDA/Interest expenses, indeed, is negative in 2008 (-0.71) and in 2009 (-
0.29) and, in any case, lower than its top comparable ratio20 during all the 2016-2010 period, 
pointing out Zucchi Group poorer abilities to cover interest expense through EBITDA (Figure 
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pay back its debt on the basis of its operating profit before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization. The group ratio in 2006 (9.82) and in 2007 (5.61) assumes positive level, that, 
despite the NFP reduction and EBITDA increase experienced in 2007, are still higher than 
NFP/EBITDA ratio for top comparable companies (Figure 3.22). Springs Global ratio 
instead, reports considerable fluctuations from 2006 to 2008, because of the combination of a 
high NFP and decreasing, if not negative, operating profit, but it aligns to top comparables 
ratio in the following years, thanks to the recovery of profitability and the halving of the debt 
burden. In 2008, Zucchi Group NFP/EBITDA ratio reaches a negative level (-19.59), which 
becomes even worse in 2009 (-84.10), due to the combined effect of a NFP increase and a 
EBITDA reduction. In 2010, instead, the positive operating profit achieved by the group 
brings back the group ratio to a positive level (11.91), that is still higher than the competitors 
average (4.69). From Figure 3.22, however, emerges that both Caleffi and Gabel have 
                                                          
20 For Gabel and Springs Global it is not possible to calculate this ratio. The net financial result is not separated 
by income/expense from investment in the available financial statements (downloaded by AIDA and EIKON 
database, given that Gabel is not listed and therefore its financial statements are not publicly available, while 
the English version of Springs Global annual report is available on its website only from 2010). 
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experienced an increase in their ratios from 2006 to 2010 (from 2.61 to 4.59 for Caleffi and 
from 4.28 to 7.24 for Gabel), pointing out that the global financial-economic crisis and its 
impact on company operating profitability significantly affected the ability to repay debt 
obligations through operating cash flows (approximately measured by EBITDA) for all 
companies operating in the household linen industry. 
 
Figure 3.21 – EBITDA/Interest expenses comparison. 
 
 
Figure 3.22 – NFP/EBITDA comparison.  
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agreement. The agreement provided the consolidation and rescheduling in biannual payments, 
in part linked with the disposal of no more strategic assets, of medium-long term debt for a 
total amount of 64 million (expiring in 2012), as well as the re-financing of short term debt 
for 87 million to fund net working capital needs until 31st December 2009. The agreement 
was subjected to financial covenants breached at the end of 2008 because of the extremely 
negative results reported by Zucchi Group, hit in that year by the global economic crisis. 
Given that the missing fulfillment of financial covenants could trigger the early repayment of 
the credit lines, Zucchi Group immediately contacted banks in order to renegotiate the debt 
and to make it more aligned with the financial needs of the restructuring process. On 18th 
September 2009 Zucchi Group and a pool of six banks signed a new debt rescheduling 
agreement, which involved:  
• Short term debt: the maximum amounts of the self-liquidating loan and of the cash 
facility were increased, leaving the total available amount unchanged at 87 million. 
• Long term debt: the 46 million mortgage repayment was rescheduled as 8 half-yearly 
postponed payments starting from 30th June 2010 (the 19.5 million bullet 
reimbursement due by 30th June 2009 was eliminated). The company was bound to 
repay the debt with 60% of the cash-in obtained from the disposal of real estate assets. 
The credit facilities had been negotiated until 2013 and loans were not secured by any 
collateral.  
During the 2010, however, the group was not able to pay the debt instalments (scheduled in 
June and December), as well as to fulfill the financial covenants regulated in the debt 
rescheduling agreement.  This forced the group to submit to the banks requests of waiver in 
the application of the obligations concerning the loans, and to sign several moratorium 
agreements during the 2010.  
As shown by Figure 3.23 and Figure 3.24, indeed, the group presented a highly leveraged 
capital structure, with a NFP/Equity ratio (6.32 in 2010) highly above the peer average (0.55 
in 2010), which cannot be sustained by the cash flow generated from operations.   
As observable in Figure 3.23, the 2010 capital structure is the result of a transformation 
process characterized by a progressive decrease in group equity and an increasing weight of 
debt. In particular, the group equity had dropped from 210 million in 2000 to 22 million in 
2010, mainly eroded by the income statement losses that in 2009 determined the existence of 
the preconditions of art. 2446 of Italian Civil Code regulating capital reduction for losses. 
The NFP, instead, had been progressively increasing from 2000 to 2005. The negative 
operating cash flows generated by the group in that period (except for 2002), indeed, point out 
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that additional external financing were required to maintain and grow Zucchi Group 
operations. The adoption of a new industrial approach, based on cutting in-sourced 
production, and the consequent disposal of no more strategic assets, instead, strongly 
contributed in 2006 and 2007, to a NFP reduction. In 2008 and 2009, instead, the NFP went 
back to growing because of the financial resources absorbed by the restructuring process, 
which, among other things, entailed the payment of severance indemnities to exiting workers 
for 50 million from 2005 to 2010, and the acquisition of further stakes in Mascioni (for a total 
price of 11.9 million). 
 
 
Figure 3.23 – 2000-2010 Group capital structure.  
 
 
Figure 3.24 – NFP/Equity comparison.  
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Summing up, the restructuring process undertaken in the 2006-2010 period, whose main 
actions are recapped in Figure 3.25, led to radical changes in Zucchi Group industrial 
organization and commercial and corporate structure. Despite the restructuring actions 
implemented seemed to have aligned Zucchi Group operating profitability, in terms of 
EBITDA margin, to the average performance of comparable companies, showing an apparent 
initial recovery from economic distress, in 2010 the group still presented severe financial 
difficulties. The group debt burden, indeed, was characterized not only by past due payments 
(10 million), but also by debt installments that would come due in the near future (6 million 
on 30th June 2011 and 6 million on 31st December 2011) and that could not be fulfilled by the 
cash flows expected to be generated from operations according to the 2009-2013 Strategic 
Plan. 
 
Figure 3.25 – Main restructuring actions of the downsizing phase (2006-2010). (Personal 
elaboration from Zucchi Group Small Cap Conference) 
 
3.3.2 Relaunch and international development phase 
3.3.2.1 Major events 
Once downsized, the group started to undertake restructuring actions aimed to boost revenues, 
reduce operating costs, rebalance the capital structure and, therefore, bring back Zucchi Group 
performance to the pre-crisis level. A first attempt to relaunch the group was proposed by 
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managers in 2011, through a new Restructuring Plan to be implemented in the 2011-2015 
period and providing for interventions both at the operating/strategic and financial level.   
In particular, the 2011-2015 Strategic Plan forecasted the achievement of positive revenues 
growth rates (1.85% CAGR 2010-2015) as result of: 
 the strengthening of Zucchi and Bassetti brands, realized through a product restyling 
and new marketing campaigns (focused on TV spots and trade shows); 
 the increase in products price (equal to 16% in 2011), price policy expected to be 
undertaken by all competitors in response to the higher price of raw materials; 
 a distribution strategy which continued to focus on direct channels through a new 
retail format. 
These interventions on the commercial area, in combination with operating costs reduction to 
be achieved through the optimization of the outsourcing process, the simplification of product 
portfolio and the continuous monitoring of structural costs, were expected to result in a 
positive and increasing EBITDA in all the 2011-2015 period. 
The strategic plan, in addition, forecasted a working capital reduction as a result of the 
adoption of new commercial policies. The rationalization of the product portfolio and the 
improvement in purchase planning, in particular, were expected to lead to an inventory 
decrease, while a more restrictive selection and closer monitoring of clients should have 
resulted into a reduction of days in trade receivables.  
Even though the actions on revenues, costs and working capital were expected to bring to 
positive cash flows, however, the latter would not have been sufficient to meet the scheduled 
debt payments and to repay the past due trade receivables. Financial measures, therefore, were 
required to bring back the group indebtedness to a sustainable level and to guarantee to 
Zucchi Group the adequate degree of flexibility required to face cash need peaks (generally 
observed between May and September) caused by the business seasonality. These objectives 
should have been achieved, according to the financial plan, through the following actions: 
1. the disposal of non-strategic assets, generating proceeds for a total amount of about 
48.8 million;  
2. the recapitalization of Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a through a capital increase and the 
issuance of warrants; 
3. the negotiation of a debt restructuring agreements (art. 182 bis l.f.) with the pool of 
banks. 
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According to the financial plan, therefore, the financial maneuver was supported, first of all, 
through the disposal of non-strategic assets, which were subjected, starting from 2010, to a 
value enhancement process. In order to facilitate the disposal of plants and buildings located 
in Casorezzo (Milan), for instance, this industrial area was transformed and partially 
designated to commercial use, with the support and approval of the municipal administration 
of Casorezzo. In 2011, the sales of plants and buildings located in Casorezzo, Viggiù (VA) 
and in the industrial area of Isca Pantanelle gave raise to proceeds for a total amount of about 
3.5 million.   
As regards the interventions on shareholders’ equity, instead, on 24th January 2011, given the 
existence of the conditions expressed by art. 2446 Civil Code, the extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting decided to reduce the share capital of the group from 27.804 million to 7.215 million 
and to cancel the nominal value of ordinary shares and saving shares. On the same date, a 
capital increase was approved, articulated into: 
 a capital increase for a maximum amount of 15,014,268 through the issuance of 
150,142.680 new shares offered on pre-emptive basis to Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a’s 
shareholders at a price of 0.10, according to the ratio of 27 new shares every 5 owned 
old ordinary or saving shares. The new shares were subscribed for the total 
(maximum) amount of 15,014,268 by the 31st December 2011. 
 a capital increase of 15,014,268 connected to the issuance of 150,142,680 warrants 
distributed to shareholders acquiring the new shares (one warrant for each share 
bought). Warrants gave to shareholders the right to buy, within 31st December 2014, 
one ordinary share every 2 warrants at a price of 0.20.  
In addition, the shareholder Gianluigi Buffon and the members of Zucchi’s family, on 9th May 
2011 signed a recapitalization agreement (accordo di ricapitalizzazione) in order to guarantee 
the subscription of a portion of the capital increase equal to 7 million, of which 5.510 million 
were anticipated to the parent company in the form of debt financing. The latter, as well as the 
total capital increase, generated financial resources mainly used by the group to repay past 
due trade payables. Only a residual part, instead, was addressed to support the restructuring 
actions undertaken on commercial area, while no resources were used to reduce the group net 
financial position.  
Finally, the last component of the financial maneuver planned in the 2011-2015 Restructuring 
Plan, consists on a debt restructuring agreement (art 182 bis l.f.), signed on 13th June 2011 by 
Zucchi Group parent company and the pool of banks and providing for: 
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 the consolidation of long term debt, for a total amount of 44.312 million, and its 
rescheduling in line with the evolution of cash flow forecasted in the Restructuring 
Plan; 
 the performance of mandatory early repayments of long term debt through the 
proceeds deriving from the planned disposal of non-strategic assets; 
 the renewal of short term credit line (expiring on 31st December 2011) until 31st 
December 2015, for a maximum available amount of 87 million; 
 the revision of interest rates; 
 the fulfillment of some financial covenants, represented by the adjusted 
NFP21/EBITDA ratio, by both Zucchi Group and the parent company Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a.  
As well as the capital increase, the debt restructuring agreement aimed at supporting the 
realization of the Restructuring Plan and, therefore, the continuation of Zucchi Group as a 
going concern.  
Alongside the approval of the 2011-2015 Restructuring Plan, other important 2011 events 
include the acquisition of 80% of Vincenzo Zucchi’s stakes in Descamps by Astrance Capital, 
through Astinvest. The sale and purchase agreement, in particular, regulated: 
 a put option and a call option exercisable respectively by Astinvest on the residual 
20% of Zucchi’s stakes in Descamps and by Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a on the Astinvest’s 
just acquired stakes in Descamps, 
 a capital increase in Descamps performed by Astinvest for the amount of 4 million and 
by Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a for the amount of 1 million.  
The liquidity resulting from the capital increase and the 1 million interest-bearing financing 
issued by the parent company in Descamps, will be used to support the restructuring of the 
company in the context of the Rédressement Judiciaire procedure.  
In addition, on 14th January 2011, following a new contractual agreement with Polo Ralph 
Lauren, a new subsidiary of Mascioni S.p.a, Mascioni America Inc., was established in New 
York, in order to strengthen the group presence in the American market.  
Despite the restructuring actions undertaken, however, the group economic and financial 
performance in 2011 and 2012, which was strongly affected by the drop in consumption 
registered in Italy in that years, in particular in the household linen industry, didn’t reach the 
                                                          
21 Calculated by subtracting from the net financial positon reported in the financial statement the portion of 
long term debt that would have been reimbursed though the planned assets disposal. 
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levels forecasted in the 2011-2015 Strategic Plan. This determined, on 30th June 2012, the 
breach of the financial covenants regulated by the 2011 debt restructuring agreement and the 
consequent request of a moratorium period, sent by Zucchi Group to banks in order to avoid 
the early dissolution of the debt restructuring agreement and, therefore. the early debt 
reimbursement.   
The lack of success of the 2011-2015 Restructuring Plan in aligning the Zucchi Group capital 
structure to the cash flows generated from operations, can be attributed to several factors. 
First of all, the Strategic Plan didn’t take into account the effects of the economic crisis, 
already in place in 2011, on group performance, incoherently forecasting positive and 
increasing revenues growth rates in a stagnant domestic market. The turnover increase, in 
addition, was expected to derive mainly from sales to Italian costumers while an expansion 
and strengthening of group international presence in growing markets, such as China, Brazil 
and USA, might have partially counterbalanced the effects on group performance of the drop 
in consumption suffered in Italy. Investments for support the growth in foreign markets, 
indeed, were not forecasted in the 2011-2015 Strategic Plan, according to which the financial 
resources raised through the financial maneuver, and in particular through the capital increase, 
had to be mainly used to repay past due trade receivables, and, for a residual part, to fund 
maintenance capital expenditure.   
Furthermore, another element that could explain the deviation of Zucchi Group performance 
from the 2011-2015 Strategic Plan targets, consisted of the failed relaunch and development 
of direct channels of distribution, which presented higher potential than indirect channels in 
term of profitability and improvement in the working capital management. Despite the actions 
undertaken, indeed, the group distribution strategy continued to highly rely on retail and 
wholesale channels, which were particularly affected by the negative economic scenario. 
Lastly, the Zucchi Group product offering, whose price positioning was often not aligned with 
the market needs and perceptions, further corroborated the inadequacy of Zucchi Group 
business model to the changes occurred in the reference market.  
Starting from the limitations and flaws of Zucchi Group business model and 2011-2015 
Strategic Plan, the new CEO Riccardo Carradori, (appointed in May 2012), proposed in 2012 
a new business model aimed to transform Zucchi Group from “industrial producer of 
traditional household linen, operating mainly in the domestic market” to “international player 
in the market of medium-high quality household products” in both business to business and 
business to consumer channels. 
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In particular, central elements of the new business model, then declined in the 2013-2017 
Strategic Plan, were the following:  
1. Product portfolio. Brand restyling and price repositioning were believed necessary to 
differentiate the main brands in terms of image, style, products and clients. The 
rationalization of product portfolio, which entailed the elimination of sub-brands and 
the focus on top seller, instead, were expected to improve the inventory management. 
2. Distribution strategy. New retail format, new factory store model and new franchising 
strategy were adopted in order to favor the relaunch and development of direct 
channels of distribution and they were combined with a more accurate and restrictive 
selection of wholesale and retail clients, in order to reduce the reliance on channels 
with lower potential. 
3. Supply chain. A reduction in production overcapacity and seasonality were pursued 
through the rationalization of production line and an increasing focus on product and 
process innovation. 
4. Internalization. The new business model, lastly, aimed to realize 50% of Zucchi Group 
turnover outside Italy in 2017, by promoting the unquestioned value of Italian lifestyle 
in foreign markets.  In particular, the internationalization process should have involved 
markets such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland, in the attempt to generate more 
value from markets in which the group already successfully distributed its products, 
and markets with high growth potential in the household linen industry such as China, 
Brazil and USA.    
The relaunch of Zucchi Group and its international development, involved all the three 
Strategic Business Unit on which Zucchi Group business model was based, as showed in 
Figure 3.26.  
 132 
 
 
Figure 3.26 – The new business model at the strategic business unit level. (Personal 
elaboration from Zucchi Group 2012 presentation “New business model and strategic 
guidelines”) 
The 2013-2017 Strategic Plan, approved in December 2012 by the board of directors, 
represented an integral part of the debt restructuring agreement (art 182 bis l.f.) negotiated 
with a pool of banks, which, despite the group inability to fulfill the covenants regulated by 
the 2011 debt restructuring agreement, still believed the continuation of Zucchi Group as a 
going concern as the solution granting the higher return for creditors. The debt restructuring 
agreement was signed on 21st March 2013 and it provided for: 
 a capital increase to be subscribe for the total amount of 20 million, through the 
issuance of ordinary shares offered on pre-emptive basis to all shareholders; 
 the confirmation of short term credit line (self-liquidating loan and cash facility), with 
the possibility to use in 2013 and 2014 a higher amount of cash facility within the total 
amount of 87 million; 
 the reduction of medium-long term debt (which amounted to 42.6 million) for about 
15 million through a debt-equity swap and the repayment of the residual debt (27.6 
million) by means of proceeds deriving from assets disposal (Figure 3.27);  
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 the fulfillment of some financial covenants by the parent company Vincenzo Zucchi 
S.p.a expressed in term of sales, EBITDA, NFP and adjusted equity22. 
 
Figure 3.27 – Debt write-off/conversion and reimbursement schedule according to the 2013-
2017 Financial Plan. (Source: Attachment H of 2013 debt restructuring agreement)  
In accordance to the debt restructuring agreement negotiated with banks, which would expire 
on 31st December 2017, on 28th June 2013 the Board of Directors, after having reduced share 
capital (for the amount of 21,684,405.51 euro) and reserves (for the amount of 244,401.08 
euro) to cover the cumulated losses, ratified a capital increase articulated in two different 
tranches: 
 tranche A, reserved to shareholders. The 26.1% of the new issued shares (which 
totally amounted to 284,740,112) was subscribed by new shareholders (0.79%) and by 
existing shareholders (25.31%), which received 8 new shares every 5 old shares 
owned, at a share price of 0.072.  In accordance with the recapitalization agreement 
signed on 21st March 2013, then, the shareholder Gianluigi Buffon bought further 
203,460,482 shares (providing capital for 6,698,568.65 euro to be deposited by 31st 
December 2014), in order to allow the full subscription of the capital increase for a 
total amount of 20 million.  
 tranche B, reserved to banks. The capital increase entailed the issuance of 67,486,109 
shares to be offered to banks at a price of 0.216 (0.072 recorded as share capital and 
0.144 as extraordinary financial income). The resulting capital increase of 4,859,000 
euro were realized through debt offsetting for 14,577,000 euro.  
                                                          
22 Equity adjusted is calculated as the group equity net of capital gains realized from assets disposal and 
possible accounting adjustments. 
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According to the 2013-2017 Restructuring Plan, the financial maneuver would provide the 
financial resources required to implement the group strategic transformation entailed by the 
adoption of the new business model, contributing at the same time to reduce the group debt 
burden. 
First preparatory actions to the implementation of the new business model were undertaken in 
2012. In this year, indeed, Zucchi Group reviewed its product portfolio and brands style, 
developed a new retail format and implemented actions aimed to reduce the breakeven point. 
In order to incentivize managers to increase the group value by pursuing long term growth 
objectives, then, a stock option plan was approved on 2nd August 2012 by the ordinary 
shareholder’s meeting which assigned 6,600,000 option rights (strike price 0.076 euro) to the 
new CEO Riccardo Carradori. In the same year, in addition, a new subsidiary Zucchi France 
S.a.r.l was established in order to recover sales volume in France, that had significantly 
decreased since 2010 as a consequence of the divestment of Descamps, concluded in 2012 
with the acquisition of the residual 20% of Zucchi’s stakes in Descamps by Astinvest. The 
internationalization process, instead, started in 2013 with the incorporation of a new 
subsidiary in Brazil, Zucchi do Brasil Comércio e Importaçao Ltda, and the renewal of the 
distribution agreement with the Chinese company Luolai Home Textile, according to which 
further 132 Zucchi and Bassetti branded shops will be opened in China by the end of 2018.  
The group, in addition, signed an important licensing agreement with Pantone LLC, the global 
authority on color, which allowed Zucchi Group to produce and distribute home linens and 
furnishings, in Italy, Germany and Austria, with the Pantone Universe TM brand with a sector 
exclusive. The brand image and philosophy are aligned to the characteristics of the brand 
Bassetti Home Innovation, that, being based on values such as creativity and imagination, 
uses colors to attract and engage new and existing customers. 
Despite the restructuring actions undertaken, however, Zucchi Group wasn’t able to reach the 
2013 and 2014 performance targets forecasted in the 2013-2017 Strategic Plan. The group, 
indeed, reported more and more negative net income (-9.4 million in 2013 and -13.8 million 
in 2014) and confirmed its inability to restore operating profitability. Even if the group 
continued to be the leader in the Italian household linen industry, indeed, the still too rigid 
cost structure created great difficulties in dealing with the shrinking domestic market. On the 
other hand, the turnover realized in foreign markets, even if increasing, still didn’t represent a 
significant percentage able to compensate the decline in sales caused by the negative 
macroeconomic context and the reduction of Italian consumer spending power. 
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The negative economic results reported in 2013 and in the first semester of 2014, made clear 
that the group would not have been able to fulfill some financial covenants regulated by the 
2013 debt restructuring agreement and to repay the debt installment due on 31st December 
2014. Zucchi Group, therefore, in order to avoid the early termination of the agreement with 
banks, on 30th October 2014, asked to its creditors a standstill. In particular, banks agreed to 
grant a moratorium period, confirming the credit lines regulated in the debt restructuring 
agreement and committing not to enforce any termination clause. Once again, in addition, 
banks decided to support Zucchi Group continuation as a going concern by being open to 
negotiate with the group a new debt restructuring agreement, finally signed on 23rd December 
2015. The latter is part of the current attempt of Zucchi Group to exit the crisis through a new 
2015-2020 Restructuring Plan. As better explained in paragraph 3.4, a new financial 
maneuver is combined with a new Strategic Plan which focuses on the group development 
into international markets only after a reorganization of group structure has taken place.  
In particular, actions aimed to cutting costs and inefficiencies through group restructuring had 
already started to be undertaken in 2014. In this year, indeed, Hospitality.it S.r.l and Zucchi 
France S.a.r.l went into liquidation, while a local distributor was entrusted for the 
commercialization of group products in the French market. The closure of shops opened 
through Zucchi do Brasil Ltda, instead, was concluded in 2015, given the losses reported by 
the subsidiary (whose revenues were negatively affected by the economic and political crisis 
erupted in Brazil in 2014) and the absence of growth prospective. In 2014, in addition, 
Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a divested its stakes in Welspun Zucchi Textile Limited and, in 2015, 
transferred controlling interest on Mascioni S.p.a (at a total price of 150,000 euro, of which 
100,000 euros were granted to advisor as success fee), alongside the brand Mascioni Hotel 
Collection (purchase price of 200,000 euros), to a fund managed by PHI Asset Management 
Partners and specialized in the acquisition of troubled company. In particular, PHI committed 
to support Mascioni S.p.a composition with creditors (art 161 l. fall.), to which the company 
was admitted in 2015, given that the continuous losses suffered in previous years had 
determined the firm’s inability to meet its debt obligation.  
The group restructuring, furthermore, involved, once again, a workforce reduction. In 
particular, in 2014 and 2015, as provided in the agreement negotiated in 2013 with the labor 
union, Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a resorted to the use of government social support scheme (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria) to lessen the impact of the restructuring process on 
employees’ life condition. In the same years, in addition, the group was subjected also to 
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management changes, with the appointment of a new Board of Directors and a new CEO, 
Giovani Battista Vacchi, following the resignation of Riccardo Carradori for personal reasons.  
As regards the group capital structure, instead, a first attempt to increase financial structure 
flexibility to operating cash flows dynamic, which is significantly affected by business 
seasonality and by the business cycle, is represented by the “GEM Contract”, signed by 
Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a, Gianluca Buffon (and GB Holding s.r.l.u) and GEM Global Yield 
Fund Limited, a private equity firm, on 11th April 2014. According to the GEM Contract, 
GEM committed to subscribe a capital increase in the form of equity line of credit for a 
maximum amount of 15 million, within 5 years, whenever asked by Vincenzo Zucchi S,p.a. 
In compliance with the GEM contract and art 2446 of Italian Civil Code, therefore, on 12th 
June 2014, the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting approved: 
 a share capital reduction for 17,862,545.05 euro to cover 2013 losses and the further 
losses reported on 31st March 2014; 
 a capital increase reserved to GEM, for a maximum amount of 15 million; 
 the issuance of maximum 46 warrants to be attributed to GEM, giving to GEM the 
right to subscribe 46 million new shares at the conditions regulated in the GEM 
contract. 
The capital increase approved in 2013, as part of the 2013-2017 Restructuring Plan, instead, 
brought in 2015 financial resources for 5 million, following the enforcement of the guarantee 
provided by Gianluca Buffon which had not performed the payment of the amount due for the 
subscription of new shares within the term of 31st December 2014, as regulated by the 
recapitalization agreement.  
During 2015, in addition, Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. continued the debt negotiation with banks 
started in 2014. In order to create the conditions for the formalization of a new debt 
restructuring agreement, on 23rd April 2015 the parent company filed a petition for 
composition with creditors (art 161 l.f). On 24th April 2015, the Busto Arsizio Court set a 
term of 120 days, then delayed of further 60 days, to file a petition for debt restructuring 
agreement (art 182 bis l.f.) or the proposal to creditors, the plan and the other supporting 
documents required by art 161 l. f. During this period of time, art. 2447 and art. 2484 of 
Italian Civil Code, regulating, respectively, capital reduction and company winding-up when 
the share capital falls below the minimum required by law, are inapplicable. Since the 
company failed to file the documentation within the agreed term, however, on 27th October 
2015 the Busto Arsizio Court declared the recourse to composition with creditors as 
inadmissible. As a consequence, on 22nd December 2015, the public prosecutor notified to 
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Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. a bankruptcy petition, since its confirmed inability to meet financial 
obligations as they become due determined the insolvency status.  
 
3.3.2.2 Financial analysis 
The failed recovery of Zucchi Group profitability and financial equilibrium, despite the 
restructuring actions undertaken during the 2011-2015 period and aimed at the relaunch of the 
group, is now more in depth investigated, also for this phase of the crisis path, through the 
analysis of the evolution of Zucchi Group key ratios and its comparison with its main 
competitors.  
As already mentioned, the performance of Zucchi Group during the 2011-2015 period was 
significantly influenced by the negative macroeconomic scenario and the drop of Italian 
consumer spending power. The potential effects of the several restructuring actions 
undertaken in the commercial area and aimed at a turnover recovery, indeed, were nullified by 
the continuing shrinkage of the domestic market. The latter was not appropriately taken into 
account in the 2011-2015 Strategic Plan, which, also given the positive growth rate achieved 
in 2010, forecasted a constant increase of Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. revenues. The 2013-2017 
Strategic Plan, instead, predicted that the adoption of the new business model would allow the 
parent company to gain additional market shares and to record positive revenues growth rates. 
The reduction of household income, however, significantly modified the buying behavior of 
consumers, that, despite they confirmed their preference toward branded products in respect 
to unbranded or private label products, were more and more oriented toward convenience. In 
this context, the repositioning of Zucchi Group brands entailed by the new business model, 
allowed the group to confirm its leadership in Italy, but not also to increase its market share. 
Keeping constant the market share (18% in 2012, 18.5% in 2013) in a shrinking market 
inevitably led to decreasing revenues, and, therefore, to the missing achievement of the 2011-
2015 and 2013-2017 Strategic Plan targets23 in terms of sales (Figure 3.28). 
                                                          
23 2011-2015 Strategic Plan and 2013-2017 Strategic Plan are contained in the 2011 Debt Restructuring 
Agreement and 2013 Debt Restructuring Agreement, respectively. Both documents were downloaded from 
www.registroimprese.it   
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Figure 3.28 – Comparison between actual sales and revenues forecasted for the parent 
company in the 2011-2015 period.  
 
Revenues from foreign markets, instead, reached in 2013 the 39% of consolidated revenues. 
As already mentioned, however, this percentage was too low to compensate for the decline in 
revenues experienced in the domestic market and it decreased in the following year when the 
group reorganization proposed in the new 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan entailed the closure 
of shops in Brazil and the divestment of no more strategic subsidiaries located abroad.  
During all the relaunch and internalization phase, therefore, as shown by Figure 3.29, Zucchi 
Group recorded negative sales growth rates24 (-15.8% CAGR 2011-2015). As Zucchi Group, 
however, also Italian comparable companies suffered the effects of the shrinking domestic 
market. In particular, Gabel was not able to halt the revenues decline during all the 2011-2015 
period (-5.94% CAGR 2011-2015), while Caleffi sales growth rates swung between positive 
and negative levels (-0.01% CAGR 2011-2015), showing that the actions implemented by the 
company in the attempt to recover the turnover had short term effects at best. Springs Global, 
instead, after the huge drop in revenues suffered in 2011 (-39%) as a consequence of the 
decline of both domestic demand and exports (because of Real continuing appreciation), had 
implemented several actions which successfully allowed the group to recover positive growth 
rates in 2012 (20%) and to maintain positive rates in the following years despite of the 
shrinking Brasilian market and the slowdown of American economy. Springs Global brands 
and products, indeed, are strategically positioned in different market segments and, therefore, 
                                                          
24 The 2014 negative peak is due to the classification of Mascioni Business Unit as discontinued operation. If 
compared with 2013 re-determined revenues computed considering Mascioni Business Unit as discontinued 
operation, the group suffered in 2014 a negative sales growth rate equal to -13.76% 
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they target customers of different socioeconomic profiles, lessening, in this way, the effects of 
sudden changes in consumer buying behavior on consolidated sales.  
 
 
Figure 3.29 – 2010-2015 Consolidated sales. 
 
 
Figure 3.30 – Sales growth rates comparison.  
The unexpected drop in revenues, strongly affected Zucchi Group ability to generate positive 
operating result before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), that instead seemed to be 
recovered in 2010, making impossible for the parent company to reach the EBITDA level 
forecasted in the 2011-2015 and 2013-2017 Strategic Plan (Figure 3.31).  
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Figure 3.31 - Comparison between actual EBITDA and EBITDA forecasts for the 2011-2015 
period.  
 
 
Figure 3.32 – 2011-2015 EBITDA and EBITDA margin.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.32, indeed, in 2011, Zucchi Group came back to a negative EBITDA (-
2.4 million) and EBITDA margin (-1.30%), as a consequence of the combination of declining 
revenues and increasing operating costs. The less favorable sales mix, the expansion of the 
B2B activity of Mascioni S.p.a to new clients operating in the American fashion industry, 
through its subsidiary Mascioni America Inc., and the implementation of new marketing 
campaigns, caused, respectively, an increase in cost of goods sold, sales and distribution costs 
and marketing costs. These negative effects on EBITDA were amplified by the absence of 
actions aimed to a consistent reduction of structural costs. In 2012, instead, the actions 
undertaken according to the new business model, such as the review of product portfolio and 
the more accurate selection of suppliers, produces a slight positive effects on EBITDA (+0,3 
million in respect to 2011), maintaining the EBITDA margin close to the 2011 level despite 
the decline experienced in sales. The internationalization process started in 2013, however, 
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alongside a less favorable sales mix and a production mix different from the one forecasted in 
the strategic plan (and characterized by increasing volume of internally produced goods and 
declining volume of final products bought from third parties), caused in that year a slight 
increase in operating costs (in particular on sales and distribution costs), leading, in 
combination with declining revenues, to a huge drop of EBITDA (-11.6 million in 2013) and 
EBITDA margin (-7.65%). Given the negative operating result achieved in 2013, Zucchi 
Group decided in 2014 to slow down the internationalization process in favor of a greater 
focus on internal inefficiencies. Starting from 2014 and according to the new 2015-2020 
Strategic Plan, indeed, new restructuring actions aimed at the reduction of operating costs, in 
particular structural costs, were implemented, allowing the group to reach less negative 
EBITDA levels (-10.5 million in 2014 and -5.1 million in 2015), despite the continuous 
decline in revenues. Nevertheless, Zucchi Group still presented greater difficulties than main 
competitors in managing the effects of sales drop on operating performance, as shown in 
Figure 3.33. The lower flexibility of Zucchi Group cost structure, indeed, caused Zucchi 
Group to report EBITDA margin below the peer average and the EBITDA margin of Gabel 
(except in 2012), despite the fact that the latter had started to show signals of economic 
distress since 2012. 
 
Figure 3.33 – EBITDA margin comparison. 
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limited to plants and machinery renewal and shops set up. An important role in explaining the 
difference between EBITDA and Net income, instead, is played, in particular in 2011, 2014 
and 2015, by income statement items connected with the restructuring process. The disposal 
of no more strategic assets, that was realized according to the 2011-2015 Restructuring Plan, 
generated capital gain for 0.4 million in 2011 and 0.1 million in 2012, while the closure of 
shops located in Italy and Brazil, carried out according to the new 2015-2020 Restructuring 
Plan, which aimed to reduce costs and internal inefficiencies, determined impairment losses 
for 2.8 million in 2014 and 1.5 million in 2015. The financial restructuring, on the other hand, 
generated costs connected to the debt negotiations with banks but also positive effects on net 
interest expenses. As shown in Appendix 1, indeed, interest expenses have decreased during 
all 2011-2015 period thanks to the combination of a progressive NFP reduction and lower 
Euribor. In particular, the debt-equity swap (involving debts for 15 million) and the waiver 
granted by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (0.424 million), regulated by the 2013 debt 
restructuring agreement, not only positively impacted Zucchi Group NFP, but also it gave rise 
in 2013 to interest income for 10.1 million (8.0 million net interest income). In 2015 instead, 
the interest rate decreased mainly because of the suspension of self-liquidating loan decided 
by banks following the petition art 161 l.f. filed by the parent company in 2015.  
All this items contributed to worsening the already negative EBITDA and led the income 
statement loss to reach the highest levels in 2014 (-39.4 million, of which -18.7 million 
attributable to discontinued operations) and 2015 (-19.5 million). 
 
Figure 3.34 – 2011-2015 Consolidated EBITDA, EBIT and Group net income (data in € 
million). 
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was compensated, in 2011, by a decrease in trade receivables, caused by a turnover decline, 
finally leading to a 2011 NWC (92.4 million) approximately stable at the 2010 level (92.8 
million). Since 2012, instead, restructuring actions undertaken according to the new business 
model and the 2013-2017 Strategic Plan started to reveal their effects. The rationalization of 
product offering, the disposal of lower turnover stocks (no moving and slow moving stocks) 
and a more careful monitoring of clients, indeed, finally resulted into a decrease of both trade 
receivables days in revenues (from 120 in 2011 to 90 in 2015) and inventories days in 
revenues (from 140 in 2011 to 84 in 2015). Trade payables days in revenues, instead, had 
increased since 2012, until reaching in 2015 the 2010 level (99 in 2010 and 98 in 2015), 
pointing out that past due trade payables had become so significant that, as happened in 2011 
through the capital increase, new financial resources were required to repaid them.  
As shown in Figure 3.35, net working capital has progressively decreased during the relaunch 
phase, as a consequence not only of the sales decline suffered in that years, but also of the 
restructuring actions implemented. In 2015 indeed, Zucchi Group experienced a reduction in 
NWC (-65%) more than proportional to the sales decrease suffered in that year (-7%), 
reaching a NWC/Sales level (30.05%) in line with competitors average (30.4%) (Figure 
3.36).  
 
Figure 3.35 – 2011-2015 Net working capital. 
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Figure 3.36 – Net working capital on sales comparison.  
 
Lastly, the corporate restructuring process undertaken by Zucchi Group during the 2011-2015 
period was accompanied by two financial maneuvers aimed to strength the group capital 
structure through share capital increases and debt rescheduling and reduction. In particular, as 
shown by Figure 3.37, the group NFP and debt equivalents decreased from 138.8 million in 
2011 to 84.6 million in 2015, mainly as a consequence of: 
 the improved management of NWC; 
 the debt-equity swap negotiated with banks in 2013, which gave rise to a NFP 
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 the suspension of self-liquidating loan decided in 2015 by banks following the 
petition art 161 l.f. filed by the parent company in that year; 
 the decrease in provision for employee benefits, due to the payment of severance 
indemnity to exiting employees.  
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exacerbated by a trend in equity completely opposite to the one expected in the 2013-2017 
Financial Plan which forecasted the achievement of positive net results and the progressive 
decrease of debt-to-equity ratio until reaching, in 2017, 0.71. On the contrary, as shown in 
Figure 3.39, the group NFP/Equity ratio continued to report the increasing trend observable 
since 2006, and reached in 2012 the highest level (12.02). In 2013 instead, the combined 
effects of equity net increase (2 million) and NFP decrease, reduced the ratio to 9.52, a still 
extremely high level, in particular if compared with the NFP/Equity ratio of top comparables, 
equal on average to 0.77. In addition, it is noteworthy that Gabel, despite the economic 
distress suffered in those years, differently from Zucchi Group, was able to maintain its debt 
to equity ratio close to 0.50, that is the level reported by the company before the economic 
distress had resulted into negative EBITDA. This level is below the NFP/Equity ratio reported 
by Zucchi Group in 2003 (0.75) and 2004 (1.09), when the first signals of decline appeared 
through downward trends in revenues and EBITDA, pointing out the importance of firm debt 
capacity as powerful resource to delay the financial distress.  
The group NFP/equity ratio, then, resulted in 2014 and 2015 into negative levels because of 
the negative amount reached by group equity, which has been progressively corroborated by 
the losses suffered by the group since 2004.  
 
Figure 3.37 – 2010-2015 Group capital structure evolution.  
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Figure 3.38 – Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. NFP and Equity: Actual VS Forecasted.  
 
 
Figure 3.39 – NFP/Equity comparison. 
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margin. The group’s inability to face the unexpected shrinkage in domestic market, indeed, 
was exacerbated by costly commercial projects in Brazil, which finally resulted into a failure.  
The trend of NOPLAT clearly captured the renewed group difficulties at the operating level. 
As shown by Figure 3.40, NOPLAT remained negative during all the relaunch and 
development phase, signaling that core operations were consuming, rather than generating, 
resources. The high volatility of operating cash flows, then, suggests that the restructuring 
actions implemented in the attempt to exit the crisis have only short term effects at best.  
 
Figure 3.40 – 2010-2015 NOPLAT and free cash flow evolution.  
 
The persisting economic distress, in addition, determines the group inability to meet its 
financial obligations and to fulfill the financial covenants regulated by the debt restructuring 
agreements. Even if the financial maneuvers undertaken in 2011 and 2013 brought new 
financial resources and made the debt burden less overwhelming, Zucchi Group financial 
distress reached a peak level in 2014. At the end of 2014, indeed Zucchi Group was insolvent 
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Plan, which combines a new financial maneuver with a new strategic plan, whose first 
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Zucchi Group stock performance observed in 2011, especially in correspondence with the sale 
of Descamps and the approval of the Restructuring Plan, seems to suggest that the market had 
positively interpreted the announcement of divestiture of the no longer profitable French 
business and of the refocusing strategy driving the restructuring actions, in accordance with 
the findings in the literature about market reaction to restructuring announcement discussed in 
paragraph 1.6.1. No particular price reaction, instead, is detected around the signature date 
(assuming it as an approximation of the announcement date) of the 2013 debt restructuring 
agreement, even though, according to the literature, a negative stock reaction to the debt-
equity swap announcement was expected25.  
In conclusion, Vincenzo Zucchi’s stock price trend, which, despite some slightly positive 
peaks, has been mainly negative since the early 2000s, when the first signals of decline 
appeared, clearly reflects the group’s prolonged poor economic and financial performance and 
further points out the ineffectiveness of restructuring attempts undertaken in 2011 and 2013 in 
steering Zucchi Group out of the financial and economic distress. 
 
Figure 3.41 – Evolution of Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a’s share price in the 2000-2015 period. 
(Source: Yahoo Finance) 
                                                          
25 A possible explanation is that at the announcement date, the stock price had already adjusted to 
restructuring rumors and, therefore, the announcement didn’t reveal more unfavorable information about 
company situation than the market had already realized. 
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Figure 3.42 – Areas of intervention of 2011-2015 Restructuring Plan. 
 
 
Figure 3.43 – Main guidelines of 2013-2017 Restructuring Plan. 
 
3.4 From past to today performance 
 
The first signals of recovery from the crisis appear in 2016, when the restructuring actions 
undertaken according to the 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan allow the group to reach positive 
EBITDA and net income. 
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As already anticipated, the 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan combines new strategic guidelines 
(2015-2020 Strategic Plan) with a financial maneuver involving new investors.  
In more details, the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan aims to recover profitability by adopting a 
“power of one” strategy which combines the strengths of group main brands by means of 
brands repositioning in a complementary perspective and shops conversion from mono-brand 
to double sign (“Zucchi Bassetti - Casa dal 1830”). The objective is to attract a wider range of 
clients by selling not only household linen products, but also examples of interior design 
which suggest to clients how to use and combine products to obtain suggestive atmospheres, 
providing, in this way, a new buying experience in line with the Zara Home model. In 
particular, Zucchi Collection of Antique HandBlocks, the most important collection of hand-
printing woodblocks in the world, can be opened to new license agreements outside the 
household linen industry (such as furnishing and fashion industry). On the other hand, the 
group will also attempt to strengthen its e-commerce channel, given the increasing weight of 
on-line sales on household linen industry turnover. 
In particular, the Restructuring Plan is articulated into two phases: 
 Turnaround phase (2015-2017), characterized by the simplification of product 
portfolio, the rationalization of shops (many of which reported negative results), the 
closure of Brazilian subsidiary (occurred in 2015) and restructuring actions aimed to a 
steady reduction of operating costs. 
 Development phase (2017-2020), during which the group will undertake actions 
aimed to strengthening brands complementarity, by eliminating price overlapping, and 
to repositioning Zucchi on premium-luxury segment of the household linen industry, 
by exiting the promotional channel. In particular, even if the brands will continue to 
target different customer segments, Zucchi and Bassetti products will be integrated 
into designated corners inside the double sign shops, in order to recreate living rooms, 
bathrooms and bedrooms expressing the art of Italian home décor. During this phase, 
in addition, the group aims to increase its turnover generated in foreign markets by 
means of new trade relationships with local distributors and license agreements. The 
objective is to strength the group presence in the European market (in particular in 
Spain, France and Switzerland) and to implement group development projects in the 
Chinese market, where the group is already present as best performer (Bertoletti 
2016), and in the American market, where the group actually operates though the 
subsidiary Mascioni USA Inc, which is active in the hospitality segment.  
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The 2015-2020 Strategic Plan, approved by the board of directors on 17th December 2015, 
therefore, in its first phase, provides for a slowdown of the internationalization process started 
in 2013, which revealed itself to be very costly and ineffective until that moment, in favor of 
actions aimed to eliminate inefficiencies (in particular in the commercial area) and to increase 
the flexibility of Zucchi Group cost structure. Only when the group restructuring will result in 
a higher group responsiveness to the possible evolution of uncertainties connected with the 
expansion in foreign markets, the focus will come back on the internalization process, which 
will be instrumental in order to strengthen Zucchi Group’s brands positioning and 
complementarity.  
Through these restructuring actions, the group is expected to recover profitability and, in 
combination with a new financial maneuver, to generate cash flows sufficient to meet its debt 
obligations. The financial maneuver, in particular, consists on a new debt restructuring 
agreement (art. 182 bis l.f.) negotiated with banks and supported by the intervention of the 
investor Astrance Capital SAS (“Astrance”), French private equity fund to which Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a sold its stakes in Descamps in 2010 and 2012. 
On 8th December 2015, indeed, Astrance signed an agreement with Gianluca Buffon (“GB”) 
and GB Holding S.r.l. (“GBH”), according to which Astrance will indirectly acquire the 
control of Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. In particular, the agreement provides for: 
 Astrance commitment to establish a new company (“NewCo”), regulated by Italian 
law and directly owned by Astrance; 
 GB commitment to sold its shares in Zucchi (equal to 22.28% of share capital) to 
Astrance (that will acquire the shares directly or through the Newco)26; 
 GBH commitment to sold its shares in Zucchi (equal to 33.98% of share capital) to 
Astrance, in exchange of 15% stake in NewCo; 
 a put option exercisable from 30th June 2020 to 31st December 2020 by GBH on the 
owned stake in NewCo; 
 a call option exercisable at any time by Astrance on the GBH’s stake in NewCo; 
 Astrance commitment to provide new financial resources to GBH, in the form of a 10 
million non-interest-bearing financing, in order to allow GBH to subscribe the capital 
increase in Zucchi regulated by the debt restructuring agreement.  
The execution of the agreement is subordinated to the validation of the debt restructuring 
agreement, occurred on 2nd March 2016. The latter aimed to significantly reduce the Zucchi 
                                                          
26 This provision was revised in May 2016 and the percentage of total share capital to be transferred from GB to 
Astrance was set equal to 16,11% (rather than 22,28%). 
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Group debt burden by ensuring, at the same time, a creditors’ return higher than their recovery 
in case of liquidation. This objective is pursued through the following actions and conditions:  
 the transfer of the business unit constituted by 30 million of Vincenzo Zucchi’s debt 
(“transferred debt”), the properties located in Isca Pantanelle, Notaresco, Casorezzo, 
Vimercate and Rescaldina and the contracts with 5 employees, to a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV). Or, alternatively, the transfer of the above mentioned properties to an 
alternative investment fund, whose profits are entitled to banks. The fund will assume 
all the obligations associated with the transferred debt; 
 a debt waiver granted by banks and concerning the portion of transferred debt not 
reimbursed through assets disposal; 
 a debt waiver granted by banks and concerning the residual debt, that includes the 
difference between Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a total debt at 30th September 2015 and the 
transferred debt, as well as the connected interests. The banks, however, will receive 
an earn-out payment computed on the basis of the IRR (Internal rate of return) earned 
by Astrance on its 10 million investment; 
 the confirmation or grant, depending on the cases, by banks of self-liquidating credit 
lines for a maximum amount of 17.538.000 euro, subordinated to the stipulation of 
insurance policies which guarantee that trade receivables are valid and collectables; 
 the issue of guarantees and declarations and the fulfillment of some financial 
covenants (in term of equity and net financial position) by Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a., 
starting from 31st December 2016;  
 a real estate earn-out payment equal to 75% of the proceeds deriving from the disposal 
of the properties and exceeding the transferred debt, paid by the SPV to banks; 
 the drafting of a rental agreement involving the plant located in Rescaldina, according 
to which an annual rent of 1 million has to be paid by Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a to the 
SPV;     
 a capital increase in Zucchi for cash consideration equal to 10 million, reserved to 
GBH and performed through the NewCo (since GBH shares in Zucchi are transferred 
in NewCo according to the agreement between Astrance, GB and GBH). 
The debt restructuring agreement, which will expire on 31st December 2020, was signed on 
23rd December 2015 by Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a and the pool of banks composed by Unicredit 
S.p.a., Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.a., Banca Popolare di Milano S.c.a.r.l., Banca popolare di 
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Bergamo S.p.a., as well as by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.a., Astrance Capital S.A.S., 
GB Holding S.r.l and Gianluca Buffon.  
After the validation by Busto Arsizio Court (2nd March 2016), the agreement comes into 
effects on 18th May 2016, making the petition for bankruptcy, notified by the public 
prosecutor on 23rd December 2015, impossible to pursue.  
According to the debt restructuring agreement, on 1st July 2016, the NewCo subscribed the 
capital increase of 10 million, providing new financial resources for 5 million on that date and 
for the residual 5 million by 15th September 2016, that is a later date than the one regulated by 
the agreement with banks. Since this delay could cause the early termination of the 
agreement, Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a asked to banks not to enforce the termination clause. The 
waiver request was accepted by banks on 26th June 2017. 
The financial resources collected through the capital increase were partially used to repay 
creditors not participating into the debt restructuring agreement. In particular, Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a negotiated with suppliers that claimed credits higher than 10 thousand, a write 
off equal at least to 20% of existing debts and a reimbursement schedule for the residual debt.  
A debt repayment in installments was also agreed with fiscal and social security entities, for 
the reimbursement of the respective debts. 
The payment of past due trade payables for about 14.5 million, only partially counterbalanced 
by a slight decrease in inventory and trade receivables, however, determined in 2016 a trade 
working capital increase of 12.6 million, which, in turn, caused operating free cash flow to be 
negative for the same amount.  
Alongside the capital increase financed by Astrance, Zucchi Group further attempted to 
strength its capital structure in 2016 by asking GEM to subscribe a first tranche of the capital 
increase approved in 2014, according to the Equity Line of Credit agreement signed with 
GEM on 11th April 2014. The request, which regarded 5,807,299 shares to be subscribed at a 
minimum share price of 0.0245, however, was suspended at a later date.  
As regards the effect of debt restructuring agreement on Zucchi Group net financial position, 
instead, it is necessary to notice that the 2016 financial statements still include as short term 
borrowings the debt subjected to write-off. In particular, properties for 26.5 million (book 
value) and debt for 30 million will be transferred to the SPV only after the group will have 
received the outcome of the Revenue Agency analysis (contacted on 12th June 2017) 
concerning the fiscal implications of the provisions regulated by the 2015 debt restructuring 
agreement. As a consequence, the 2016 NFP (without debt equivalent) is equal to 72.9 million 
and has still not benefited from the effects of debt restructuring agreement, even if, from a 
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legal point of view, the Group has the right not to pay the debt subjected to write-off since the 
agreement effective date (18th May 2016). The financial covenants check on 31st December 
2016, therefore, requires the creation of a pro-forma financial statement taking into account 
the above mentioned debt write-off, from which emerges the compliance of Vincenzo Zucchi 
S.p.a’s equity and NFP to the financial parameters regulated by the 2015 debt restructuring 
agreement. 
While the group capital structure still doesn’t reflect the effects of the financial maneuver at 
the basis of the 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan (except for the new financial resources deriving 
from the capital increase subscribed by GBH), the restructuring actions undertaken according 
to the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan continue to positively affect the group operating performance 
in 2016, leading to a positive EBITDA of 4.6 million, despite the sales decrease experienced 
in that year (-13.47%).  
In particular, consolidated revenues in 2016 amount to 80.4 million and they were mainly 
generated in Italy by the business unit “Vincenzo Zucchi and subsidiaries” (Figure 3.44). The 
decrease in consolidated sales, indeed, can be mainly attributed to the turnover reduction 
suffered by the parent company (-17.5%), which had adopted in 2015 a retail policy based on 
significant trade discounts that negatively affected sales to final consumer in 2016. The 
closure of no-more profitable shops and the deterioration of Zucchi Group reputation in front 
of B2B and B2C clients, as a consequence of the petition for composition with creditors filed 
by the group in April 2015, then, further contributed to Zucchi Group turnover decline.   
 
Figure 3.44 – 2016 Consolidated sales segmentation. 
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in 2014), led in 2016 to an operating cost cut (-22.3%) higher than the sales decline suffered 
by the group (-17.5%), allowing Zucchi Group to reach an EBITDA of 4.6 million after five 
years of negative operating profits. The cost cutting policy involved mainly marketing costs 
and structural costs, and resulted, once again, into a workforce reduction.  
As shown in Figure 3.45, indeed, the number of Zucchi Group employees has progressively 
decreased during all the restructuring period at a 2005-2016 CAGR of -13.44%, reaching in 
2016 613 units.  In 2016, however, in the attempt to break this negative trend, Vincenzo 
Zucchi S.p.a signs a job-sharing agreement with trade unions, expiring on 31st August 2018. 
Thanks to the transformation of full-time contracts into part-time contracts, the group 
expected to achieve a reduction on personnel costs avoiding further layoffs.  
 
Figure 3.45 –Number of employees in the 2005-2016 period. 
 
A positive result, then, is achieved in 2016 also at the net income level, that, after twelve 
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management achieved between 2011-2016. The operating margin, however, after some 
signals of recovery in 2007 and 2010, reported negative levels during all the group relaunch 
phase, reaching in 2014 the negative peak of -13.28%. The effects of declining sales on 
operating margin, in fact, were exacerbated by the costs connected with the 
internationalization process, and finally resulted in a negative ROIC of -14.07%. Zucchi 
Group, indeed, despite the negative ROIC reported in the previous years (-5.37% in 2011 and 
-5.45% in 2012), decided in 2013 to focus on growing into foreign markets before improving 
returns. This caused the growth to destroy value.   
The ROIC went back to positive level only in 2016, during the turnaround phase of the new 
2015-2020 Restructuring Plan, when the internationalization process was slowed down in 
favor of a greater focus on actions aimed to reduce internal inefficiencies and improve costs 
structure flexibility.  
The resulting ROIC recovery, then, is a fundamental premise for the creation of value through 
the expansion in foreign markets pursued by the group in the second phase of the 2015-2020 
Restructuring Plan. 
 
 
Figure 3.46 – Group (pre-tax) ROIC evolution.  
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Figure 3.47 –Evolution of ROIC’s drivers.  
 
As regards Zucchi Group profitability in terms of ROE, instead, the negative equity reported 
by the group in 2014, 2015 and 2016 makes this ratio meaningless. In the previous years, 
however, the ratio reached extremely negative levels in respect to industry average, despite all 
comparable companies (except for Caleffi in 2013) had experienced decreasing and/or 
negative ROE from 2011 to 2013 (Figure 3.48).  
The negative or close to zero ROE observable in 2015 and 2016 for peer companies, in 
addition, suggests that, also in more recent time, reaching good profitability level is quite 
challenging for companies operating in the household linen industry, as emerged from the 
industry analysis conducted in the next paragraph.  
 
Figure 3.48 – ROE comparison.  
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3.5 The household linen industry 
 
From the analysis of the crisis path performed in the previous paragraphs, it emerges that the 
causes of Zucchi Group crisis are mainly internal and connected to wrong management 
choices such as the lacking integration of companies acquired by the group during its 
expansion period (from 60’s to 90’s), which resulted in an over-rigid group corporate and 
production structure, and the Brazilian gamble, that finally revealed itself as an ineffective 
and expensive attempt to exit the crisis though the expansion in foreign markets. The resulting 
deterioration of the group performance, however, was accelerated and amplified by factors 
connected to the external environment, such as the 2008 financial crisis and its repercussions 
on real economy in the following years.  
As shown in Figure 3.49, indeed, the Italian textile industry suffered negative turnover 
growth rates in 2008 (-2.20%) and in 2009 (-15.40%), in correspondence with the outbreak of 
the financial crisis, and in 2012 (-3.18%) and in 2013 (-0.72%), because of the renewed 
macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainties. The resulting decrease in consumer spending 
power and increase in unemployment rate, in particular, caused in 2012-2013 a huge drop in 
the consumption levels of Italian households, which significantly cut, among other things, 
their average monthly expenditure in household articles both in absolute term (from 145€ in 
2006 to 93€ in 2013, as shown in Figure 3.50) and as percentage on total monthly average 
expenditure (from 5.9% in 2006 to 4.6% in 2013).    
 
Figure 3.49 – Evolution of textile industry turnover in 2007-2016 period. (Personal 
elaboration of data collected by Sistema Moda Italia - SMI) 
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Figure 3.50 – Consumption expenditure of Italian households in the 2006-2016 period. 
(Personal elaboration of data provided by ISTAT) 
 
Given the shrinking domestic market, therefore, different players in the textile industry started 
to looking for new customers in foreign markets able to appreciate the value of Italian textile 
products. The incidence of exports on total industry turnover, indeed, grew from 50% in 2007 
to 55.1% in 2015. While exports grew of about 3% in the 2007-2014 period, however, 
imports recorded a 13% increase. This resulted in an even more negative balance of trade in 
some sectors of the textile industry, among which the household linen sector (‐243,307 
thousand € in 2007 and ‐275,350 thousand € in 2015), signaling the high competitiveness of 
lower cost production of foreign players suffered by Italian companies.  
Focusing on more recent times, the few data freely available from SitaRicerca, point out that 
the household linen industry is a mature market with a value equal to 1.38 billion in 2016, 
substantially in line with the 2015 data (1.39 billion). The industry maturity and medium 
concentration (in 2016 the market share of the first three brands Zucchi-Bassetti, Caleffi and 
Ikea amount to 25.9%), in combination with the intermittent over capacity caused by demand 
seasonality and the absence of switching costs for customers, make the competitive rivalry in 
the household linen industry quite intense. Zucchi Group, indeed, has to compete with other 
brands specialized in its industry (as Gabel and Caleffi), department stores (such as Coin) and, 
to some extents, fast fashion giants that have expanded its product offering to household linen 
sector (such as Zara Home and H&M Home). In particular, the actual possibility that other 
fast fashion giants can opt for a brand extension similar to the one successfully adopted by 
Zara (as happened for H&M, that in 2009 launched H&M Home, whose first shop in Italy 
was opened in 2016), given the potential synergies achievable in the production and 
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distribution area and the absence of legal barriers, can significantly impact the profitability of 
companies currently operating in the household linen industry. Indeed, even if these brands 
don’t compete directly with Zucchi and Bassetti brands, that, by providing high-quality 
products, are positioned in the medium-high segment of the household linen industry, their 
value proposition (style at affordable price) was significantly appreciated by Italian 
consumers during the economic crisis, since they didn’t want to give up decorating their 
houses with style despite the reduction suffered in their income. While fast fashion products 
can represent a potential substitute of higher quality products, however, buyer’s propensity to 
switch to totally unbranded household linen is generally quite low, in particular in the Italian 
market. The threats of substitutes, therefore, exercise a medium pressure on industry 
profitability, as well as the bargaining power of buyers. On one hand, indeed, B2B clients are 
likely to negotiate on price, given the higher volume acquired and the low switching costs. On 
the other hand, however, for B2C clients, despite the null switching costs, the volume per 
buyer is very small and the number of customers is almost incalculable.  
Finally, a weak impact on industry’s profitability is exercised by the bargaining power of 
suppliers. The number of suppliers, indeed, is high (especially from low-wages countries), the 
input differentiation is crucial in limited circumstances and switching costs for companies are 
quite low.  
Summing up, from Porter’s Five Forces analysis, illustrated in Figure 3.51, it emerges that 
industry competitive forces exercise a medium/high pressure on industry profitability. 
Achieving a good level of profitability in the household linen industry, therefore, is 
challenging, in particular in the last years, which have been characterized by a severe 
economic crisis, and for companies as Zucchi Group, whose critical financial situation has 
exacerbated the crisis at the strategic/operating level by impeding a prompt reaction to the 
intensification of industry rivalry between existing firms and with potential new entrants.    
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Figure 3.51 – Porter’s Five Forces analysis applied to the household linen industry.  
 
To conclude the chapter, Zucchi Group specificities are now linked with the characteristics of 
the competitive environment in which it operates through the application of the SWOT 
analysis (Figure 3.52). This tool allows to identify the strengths that Zucchi Group should use 
as a basis for developing a competitive advantage and the opportunities for growth and profit, 
but also the weaknesses that the group should overcome and the threats that could cause 
further troubles for the business.  
First of all, Zucchi Group benefits from a strong brand awareness both in Italy and abroad. 
The brand image and consumer’s perception of products, however, is planned to be further 
enhanced in the future by exploiting the value of “being an Italian brand”, which is 
recognized at the international level as a synonymous of style and quality. In particular, even 
if Zucchi Group production is actually not totally “Made in Italy”, since it is largely 
outsourced to foreign suppliers, the group accurately selects and monitors its suppliers in 
order to ensure the compliance with the stringent quality and stylistic standards set by the 
group and expected by an Italian brand. This strength, in particular, will be further exploited 
by the group, according to the 2015-2020 strategic guidelines, by recreating in the shops 
living rooms, bathrooms and bedrooms that represent an expression of the Italian home décor 
art. By offering examples of Italian style in the field of interior design, indeed, the group aims 
to enhance the customer experience, attract new customers, and, therefore, recover its 
turnover. Other strengths of Zucchi Group are then its widespread distribution network and its 
strong know-how deriving from about two centuries of experience in the household linen 
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industry, which is acknowledged by several players in the fashion industry that have decided 
to rely on Zucchi Group for the development of their household linen segment. The 
continuation and renewal of these commercial relationships, however, is jeopardized by the 
persistent financial distress suffered by Zucchi Group, that negatively affected the group 
reputation in front of clients, suppliers and creditors. In particular, on 31st December 2016, the 
group still presents a highly leveraged capital structure, given that the debt write-off regulated 
by the 2015 debt restructuring agreement, even if effective, has still not occurred. In addition, 
the operating cash flows forecasted in the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan are not sufficient to repay 
the portion of debt subjected to write-off. This means that in the case of occurrence of 
termination events, such as the breach of financial covenants, creditors, that might not be 
willing to further negotiate the debt, are highly likely to force the company to liquidation.  
Focusing on the operational level, instead, another weakness of Zucchi Group is the 
continuous decline of consolidated revenues, which, if persistently experienced also in the 
future, could lead to a deterioration of the operating margin. Even if the restructuring actions 
undertaken showed a positive effect on the EBITDA in 2015 and in 2016, indeed, the 
resulting costs structure could reveal itself as not sufficiently flexible to absorb further huge 
drop in sales.  
In order to invert this negative trend in revenues, the group can exploit different opportunities 
offered by the external environment. First of all, it can undertake development projects in 
international markets, such as China, that has proven to have great potential in terms of 
demand, but it can also expand into new industries, through license agreement regulating the 
use of Zucchi Collection of Antique HandBlocks in the fashion or furnishing industries. Other 
opportunities for growth and profit consists in the strengthening of the e-commerce network, 
given the increasing popularity of online sales among consumers, and the consolidation on the 
premium segment of the household industry, that, if successfully implemented, will allow the 
group to earn higher margin.  
These opportunities are recognized by Zucchi Group and, indeed, their exploitation will drive 
the second phase (development phase) of the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan, according to the 
attempt currently undertaken by the group to exit the crisis through a new group restructuring 
at both the operating and financial level. The effectiveness of the 2015-2020 Restructuring 
Plan, however, will be strongly influenced by the possible occurrence and connected 
magnitude of events beyond the company control that have the potential to harm the business. 
The absence of legal barriers and the potential for synergies in the production and distribution 
area, as already mentioned, may encourage, for instance, players of the fashion industry, as 
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fast fashion giants, to enter the household linen markets, further increasing the already high 
level of competition in the industry. The household linen sector, in addition, is sensitive to the 
business cycle. Lower revenues, indeed, are generally realized in period of economic 
downturn and contraction, since consumers tend to prioritize expenses and cut out some that 
are believed less essential, as the expenses for household linen. The household linen industry, 
indeed, rises and falls according to the trend of macroeconomic factors such as unemployment 
rate, interest rate, exchange rates, raw material price and GDP. Prolonged economic 
downturn, in addition, may cause changes in consumers’ preferences toward low-cost branded 
products or unbranded products, making more and more complex for companies operating in 
the premium segment to maintain their market share. Lastly, the household linen industry 
experiences higher sales during cold seasons and lower sales during hot seasons. Thus, the 
possibility that above average winter temperature may cause a delay in winter sales, strongly 
affecting the turnover of the entire year, and, therefore, the company profitability, is another 
risk to which firms operating in this industry are exposed.   
 
Figure 3.52 – Zucchi Group’s SWOT analysis. 
 
In conclusion, in this chapter the causes of the corporate crisis, as well as the effects of past 
restructuring actions, have been identified through the analysis of Zucchi Group historical 
performance. In addition, company internal and external environment has been scanned to 
recognize strengths and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats, that can positively or 
negatively affect or drive Zucchi Group business in the future. All this information constitutes 
the starting point for building accurate forecasts about the effects of the 2015-2020 
Restructuring Plan on Zucchi Group main value drivers and, therefore, it represents a 
fundamental input for the valuation of Zucchi Group performed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: Zucchi Group valuation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Once revised Zucchi Group’s historical performance and potential future prospects, which 
could be more or less favorable depending on the internal and external environment evolution, 
the main goal of the analysis is now to provide an estimate of Zucchi Group economic value.  
First of all, as described in paragraph 4.2, a mixed version of the APV model was selected to 
perform the valuation. By computing the enterprise value as if the firm is totally equity-
financed and, therefore, discounting the free cash flows at the unlevered cost of capital, 
indeed, this technique overcomes the difficulties connected with the estimation of a dynamic 
WACC in the DCF model, which is required when the firm’s leverage is expected to change 
substantially from year to year, as it’s typical for distressed companies subjected to 
restructuring. In the long term, instead, the firm’s capital structure, also due to the significant 
debt write-off granted by creditors, is assumed to converge to a target level, in line with the 
competitors’ average, justifying the adoption of the WACC as discount rate at the end of the 
explicit projection period, when Zucchi Group’s operations are foreseen to achieve a steady 
state. 
Before applying the APV model to the case of Zucchi Group, however, 2016 pro-forma 
financial statements were built in paragraph 4.3, in order to capture the effects of the 2015 
debt restructuring agreement (art. 182 bis l.f.) on Zucchi Group 2016 financial statements if 
all its provisions were implemented at the agreement effective date (18th May 2016) and not 
partially postponed to the outcome of the Revenue Agency analysis about the fiscal treatment 
to be applied to the operation. Starting from the 2016 pro-forma financial statements, then, the 
uncertainty about the evolution of Zucchi Group’s key value drivers was managed through a 
scenario analysis (paragraph 4.4). After having depicted a base scenario following the 2015-
2020 Strategic Plan guidelines, a more optimistic and a more pessimistic scenario were 
developed supposing more or less favorable assumptions about the competitive dynamics and 
the success of the restructuring changes. Consolidated financial statements, therefore, were 
projected under each scenario and the present value of the free cash flows was computed 
using the unlevered cost of capital obtained in paragraph 4.5. Zucchi Group’s value beyond 
the explicit forecast period was then estimated, by applying the key value driver formula and 
using the WACC as discount rate, and the result checked with the outcome of the analysis 
based on market multiples. Once computed the unlevered value of operations (paragraph 
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4.7), the focus of the valuation shifted toward the tax benefits arising from the possibility to 
carry forward accumulated past losses, which can generate significant value for a distressed 
company subjected to restructuring, as Zucchi Group, given the prolonged negative net 
income suffered in the past and the reversal in this trend expected in the future years as a 
consequence of the restructuring (paragraph 4.8). Finally, Zucchi Group expected enterprise 
value was computed by summing up the unlevered value of operations, the tax benefits and 
the non-operating assets and by attributing different probability of realization to each scenario 
(paragraph 4.9). The value of NFP and debt equivalents was then subtracted from enterprise 
value to estimate Zucchi Group’s equity value. The latter resulted to be in line with 
company’s market capitalization and with the estimate that would have been obtained if the 
uncertainty about future prospects had been incorporated in the discount rate, through an 
additional risk premium, rather than managed through the scenario analysis.  
The second part of the chapter (paragraph 4.10), instead, is dedicated to the valuation of 
Zucchi Group consolidated debt, as if a debt rescheduling, rather than a debt write-off, had 
been granted by creditors in the 2015 debt restructuring agreement. Both the methods adopted 
to estimate the market value of Zucchi Group debt (the BSM model and the DCF model 
applied to free cash flows to debt) confirmed that the company would have never been able to 
meet its debt obligation, despite the cash flows improvements expected from the 
implementation of the strategic plan, justifying, therefore, the creditors decision in favor of a 
debt forgiveness. 
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4.2 Valuation premises 
 
The starting point for the valuation of Zucchi Group is the last available consolidated 
financial statements which capture the first positive effects of the 2015-2020 Restructuring 
Plan on 2016 group performance. 31st December 2016, therefore, is the valuation date. 2017, 
instead, was considered as the first year of explicit projection, given that 2017 complete 
consolidated financial statements are not currently available. Intermediate consolidated results 
presented by Zucchi Group on 30th June 2017 and 30th September 2017, however, have been 
taken into consideration to make assumptions about 2017 expected performance.  
The evolution of Zucchi Group key value drivers was explicitly forecasted from 2017 to 2021. 
According to the group managers, indeed, the restructuring process will end in 2020 and the 
group operations will reach a steady state in 2021. Over this period of explicit forecasts, 
Zucchi Group enterprise value was computed by adopting the Adjusted Present Value 
method, according to which: 
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
Recapping the main advantages of this method in respect to DCF model, which were analyzed 
in detail in Chapter 2, the APV technique, being based on the unlevered cost of capital, avoids 
the computation of the WACC, which is a very challenging task when valuing distressed 
firms. Assuming a target capital structure over the explicit projection period in line with 
competitors’ overage, as its typical for healthy firms, in fact, is not reasonable for a distressed 
company, since it is incompatible with its overleveraged current situation. Assuming a target 
debt to equity ratio in line with its overwhelming current leverage, instead, is not credible, 
since without restructuring the company will probably cease to exist and, therefore, expected 
cash flows will never be realized. On the other hand, the implementation of restructuring 
plans aimed to rebalance distressed company’s capital structure, generally causes continuous 
and significant fluctuations of debt to equity ratio, requiring the estimation of a different 
WACC for each year of projection. The changing debt to equity ratio, in addition, should be 
determined at market values, giving rise to circularity problems and estimation issues. The 
equity value, indeed, is at the same time an input of WACC calculation and an output of the 
DCF model, since its value depends on the Enterprise Value computed by discounting free 
cash flows at the WACC. Alongside model circularity, another critical issue consists on the 
estimation of the market value of debt when debt is not traded. While for healthy companies 
the nominal value of debt can be considered as a good proxy of its market value, this doesn’t 
hold for financially distressed firms as Zucchi Group. For the latter, indeed, the default risk is 
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significantly higher than at the time in which the debt was issued and, therefore, the market 
value of debt is valued at a discount to the book value.  
The APV method allows to get around all these problems by discounting operating free cash 
flows, as well as tax shield flows generated by debt and/or accumulated losses, at the 
unlevered cost of capital, which can be computed starting from market information of 
comparable companies.  
For the computation of the firm’s value beyond the explicit projection period, instead, the 
WACC was adopted as discount rate, assuming that in the long run Zucchi Group will reach a 
target capital structure in line with the industry average. According to Koller et al. (2015), 
indeed, companies operating in the same industry tend to converge to a common debt to 
equity ratio, since the choice of firm’s optimal capital structure and, therefore, the debt/equity 
trade off largely depend on industry related factors, such as growth, returns and asset 
specificity. 
To deal with the uncertainty typical of future projections, which is even greater for companies 
subjected to a restructuring process, since the latter creates discontinuities with past data, the 
components of firm’s enterprise value were estimated under three different scenarios to which 
different probabilities of realization were assigned. Despite the more pessimistic or optimistic 
nature of the assumptions underlying the different scenarios, all scenarios were elaborated by 
supposing Zucchi Group continuation as a going concern during and beyond the explicit 
forecast period.   
The going concern hypothesis underlying the valuation process is supported by five main 
arguments: 
1. First of all, Zucchi Group intended strategy seems to be in line with latest market 
trends and competitors’ KSFs. Zucchi Group, indeed, aims to exploit the opportunity 
deriving from the increasing popularity among consumers of online sales in the 
household linen sector, by strengthening its e-commerce network. On the other hand, 
the group intends to boost revenues by enhancing customer experience in shop, key 
building block of successful business models such as Zara Home’s one. These 
strategic elements, in combination with a steady reduction of operating costs, make the 
intended strategy to appear as going in the right direction to bring Zucchi Group future 
performance to healthy competitors’ level. 
2. The implementation of the strategic guidelines is supported by a financial restructuring 
which is deeper than in the past. The 2011 debt restructuring agreement, indeed, 
entailed mainly a banks’ loans consolidation and rescheduling, while the 2013 debt 
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restructuring agreement regulated the write-off of 35% of long term debt. According 
to the 2015 debt restructuring agreement, instead, 62% of Zucchi Group debt will be 
written off (49.6 million over a total debt of 80 million), as well as the portion of the 
30 million debt transferred to the SPV that will not be reimbursed though assets 
disposal. If this significant debt waiver had been accounted in 2016 financial 
statements, Zucchi debt on 31st December 2016 would have been equal to 0.4 million. 
By substantially eliminating Zucchi past debt, banks give to the company the 
opportunity to reborn. Cash flows deriving from the implementation of the new 
strategic plan, indeed, need to be sufficient to allow Zucchi Group to meet its new debt 
obligations (in the case in which new financing are required to fund investments 
supporting the group expansion abroad), and not also its overwhelming past debt 
burden, as it was regulated by previous debt restructuring agreements. This 
significantly reduces Zucchi Group probability of default.  
3. Zucchi Group 2016 financial statements and 2017 half-year financial statements show 
an improvement in operating results, despite the decline in revenues suffered by the 
group. This evidence supports the effectiveness of the restructuring actions undertaken 
by the group and aimed to reduce operating costs incidence on sales.  
4. As highlighted in KPMG’s audit report27 on 2016 consolidated financial statements, 
the cash flows that will be generated according to the 2015-2020 Strategic Plan are not 
sufficient to meet Zucchi Group debt obligations in case of an early termination of the 
2015 debt restructuring agreement, which determines the revocation of the debt write- 
off. On 31st December 2016, however, an early termination of the agreement with 
banks is quite unlikely. Financial covenants regulated by the agreements 
(shareholders’ equity must be higher than 5 million and net financial position lower 
than 12.5 million28) were satisfied on that date and resulted not to be breached also on 
31st December 2017 and 31st December 2018, according to the group forecasted 
performance, even in the worst scenario.  
5. The group continuation as a going concern is supported by a new investor, Astrance 
Capital, a French private equity fund specialized in corporate restructuring and 
turnaround. After having acquired the control over Zucchi Group, Astrance Capital 
appointed a new manager, Michel Lhoste, which took office on 1st November 2017. 
Michel Lhoste, differently from Zucchi Group previous managers, has experience in 
                                                          
27 Available on: http://www.gruppozucchi.it/  
28 Or 42.5 million, if the debt transferred to the SPV (30 million) is still accounted among Zucchi Group 
consolidated debt.  
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successful restructuring of companies operating in the fashion industry (he managed 
the turnaround of Belstaff and Sixty Group) and a twenty-years expertise on fashion 
brands management and international development. His acknowledged competences 
could play a key role in Zucchi Group’s relaunch and they represent one of the 
discriminant elements that, by distinguishing Zucchi Group current attempt to exit the 
crisis from the previous ones, could determine the success of the 2015-2020 
Restructuring Plan.  
Despite the valuation was conducted under the going concern hypothesis, however, the 
uncertainties and main risks connected with Zucchi Group restructuring process and external 
environment were taken into account in making assumptions about key value drivers 
evolution. In particular, the effects of the materialization of threats, such as the entrance of 
new competitors in the household linen industry, on Zucchi Group future results were 
captured by the assumptions at the basis of the worst scenario. 
 
4.3 The financial maneuver 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Zucchi Group 2016 consolidated financial statements still 
don’t completely reflect the effects of 2015 debt restructuring agreement on group capital 
structure. As agreed with banks, the debt write-off and the transfer of the business unit to the 
SPV will take place once received the outcome of Revenue Agency analysis about the fiscal 
treatment to be applied to the operation. Nonetheless, on 18th May 2016 the debt restructuring 
agreement came into effects and since that date Zucchi had the right not to pay the debt 
subjected to write-off. Given that the purpose of the valuation is to capture the effects of both 
financial and strategic restructuring (the latter indeed is not feasible without the former) on 
Zucchi Group enterprise value, the 2016 financial statements were subjected to some 
adjustments in order to simulate the impact of the complete execution of 2015 debt 
restructuring agreement on group’s financial results.  
The main provisions of 2015 debt restructuring agreement are summarized in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 – Main provisions of 2015 Debt Restructuring Agreement.  
In order to build the 2016 pro-forma financial statements, only the provisions listed on the left 
side of Figure 4.1 were considered. The agreement clauses identified as “other provisions” in 
Figure 4.1, instead, were not supposed to have a direct impact on Zucchi Group financial 
statements29. The payment of the Earn-out IRR, indeed, represents a commitment toward 
banks for Astrance Capital and not for Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a, and, therefore, it doesn’t give 
rise to any cost increase in the consolidated income statement. On the other hand, in a 
conservative perspective, the possibility that assets disposal generates total proceeds higher 
than 30 million was considered as a very optimistic scenario in a distress setting. The SPV 
(and eventually Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a, depending on whether the parent company control the 
SPV, according to the control definition provided by IFRS 10), therefore, is not expected to 
generate any extra profit from assets disposal. 
In order to capture the effects of 2015 debt restructuring agreement on 2016 consolidated 
results, the 2016 consolidated financial statements were subjected to the following 
adjustments: 
                                                          
29 This means that they do not directly determine any increase or decrease of financial statements items. The 
fulfillment of these provisions, however, is fundamental for the continuation of Zucchi Group as a going 
concern in the future, since covenants breach or missing earn-out payments will determine the early 
termination of debt restructuring agreement.  
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 ADJUSTMENT 1: Properties, plants and equipment were reduced for 26.5 million, 
which is the total book value of properties transferred to the SPV. It was assumed, 
indeed, that Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a opts for the creation of a SPV, rather than 
allocating assets to an alternative investment fund30. In addition, even if the decision 
to consolidate or not the SPV financial statements should be based on whether the 
parent company controls the SPV (according to IFRS 10), it was preferred to exclude 
SPV assets and liabilities from Zucchi Group consolidated financial statements. This 
avoided to make assumptions about the timing and amount of proceeds deriving from 
assets disposal, preventing to add further arbitrariness to the valuation. Moreover, the 
choice is justified by the fact that, in case of realized sales proceeds lower than 30 
million, the portion of debt not reimbursed though assets disposal will be subjected to 
write-off. Vincenzo Zucchi S.p.a. debt, therefore, is reduced for 30 million regardless 
the banks actual recovery from assets sales (ADJUSTMENT 6); 
 ADJUSTMENT 2: Cash and cash equivalents were decreased to 6.9 million, 
supposing that cash was used to pay the annual rent of 1 million for Rescaldina plant; 
 ADJUSTMENT 3: Equity for 49.6 million was assumed to arise as a consequence of 
the write-off of debt for the same amount. The share capital, instead, was maintained 
equal to the 2016 level, since it already accounts for the capital increase of 10 million 
performed by GB Holding (Astrance Capital), according to the 2015 debt restructuring 
agreement. 
 ADJUSTMENT 4: Current payables to banks were reduced for the amount of debt 
subjected to write-off (49.6 million) and the amount of debt transferred to the SPV (30 
million). Since 18th May 2016, indeed, Zucchi Group has had any obligation to repay 
such debt. 
 ADJUSTMENT 5: Operating costs were increased for the annual rent (1 million) paid 
for continuing to use the plant located in Rescaldina, which was transferred to the 
SPV31; 
 ADJUSTMENT 6: Restructuring income for 3.5 million was recorded in the profit and 
loss statement. In fact, by transferring to the SPV assets for 26.5 million (book value) 
and by entitling banks to proceeds deriving from assets disposal in exchange for a 
                                                          
30 This assumption has an arbitrary nature. The lack of details about the two alternative solutions, indeed, 
makes difficult to express a judge about the more convenient alternative from Zucchi Group’s point of view.   
31 Actually, the debt restructuring agreement provides also for the payment of the annual personnel expenses 
connected with the five employees transferred to the SPV. Zucchi, therefore, continues to bear the cost 
connected with these employees, despite their transfer to the SPV, leaving personnel expenses in the pro 
forma income statement unchanged at the 2016 financial statement amount.  
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write-off of debt for 30 million, it would be as if Zucchi Group sells properties to 
banks at a price of 30 million, realizing an extraordinary gain of 3.5 million, and it 
uses the sale proceeds to repay the banks loan.  
All these adjustments were included in the 2016 pro-forma financial statements, which 
represent the starting point for forecasting Zucchi Group future performance (Figure 4.2).  
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BALANCE SHEET 2016
2016 PRO 
FORMA
NON-CURRENT ASSETS
Property, plant, equipment and other equipment 32,9 6,4
Intangible assets 0,4 0,4
Shareholdings valued using the equity method 0,1 0,1
Other financial assets 0,4 0,4
Receivables and other non-current assets 1,0 1,0
Deferred tax assets 0,0 0,0
Discontinued operations 0,0 0,0
Total non-current asset 34,8 8,3
CURRENT ASSETS
Inventories 20,8 20,8
Trade receivables 22,7 22,7
Other receivables and current assets 4,6 4,6
Financial current assets and derivatives 0,0 0,0
Cash and cash equivalents 7,9 6,9
Total current asset 56,1 55,1
TOTAL ASSETS 90,9 63,4
GROUP EQUITY
Share capital 17,5 17,5
Other reserves (47,3) (47,3)
Equity from debt write-off 0,0 49,6
Profit (loss) for the year 4,5 7,0
Total group equity (25,3) 26,8
Total minority interest 0,0 0,0
Total equity (25,3) 26,8
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES
Non-current payables to banks 0,0 0,0
Other non-current financial payables 0,0 0,0
Other payables 0,7 0,7
Provisions 3,5 3,5
Provisions for employee benefits 5,9 5,9
Deferred tax liabilities 4,9 4,9
Discontinued operations 0,0 0,0
Total non-current liabilities 15,0 15,0
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Current payables to banks 80,0 0,4
Other current financial payables and derivatives 0,0 0,0
Trade payables and other current payables 17,9 17,9
Provisions 2,1 2,1
Provisions for employee benefits 1,1 1,1
Total current liabilities 101,2 21,6
Total liabilities 116,1 36,5
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 90,9 63,4
ADJUSTMENT 1 
ADJUSTMENT 2 
ADJUSTMENT 3 
ADJUSTMENT 4 
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Figure 4.2 – 2016 Pro-forma Financial Statements.  
 
4.4 Scenario analysis 
 
As already explained, a common solution to deal with the uncertainty of future projections, 
which is particularly high in a distress setting, consists on performing a scenario analysis. 
This technique allows to combine in the valuation more pessimistic and more optimistic 
assumptions about the evolution of company’s key value drivers by grouping the hypothesis 
about company future performance into different scenarios with different probabilities of 
realization. In order to value Zucchi Group, therefore, a reference scenario (base case) was 
first identified starting from the guidelines provided by managers in the 2015-2020 Strategic 
Plan. Then, a more optimistic scenario (best case) and a more pessimistic scenario (worst 
INCOME STATEMENT 2016
2016 PRO 
FORMA
Sales of goods and services 80,4 80,4
Operating costs (76,6) (77,6)
    Other revenues 4,6 4,6
    Other costs (1,0) (1,0)
Other reveues (costs) 3,6 3,6
    Depreciation and amortization (1,7) (1,7)
    Impairment losses (0,0) (0,0)
D&A and impairment losses (1,7) (1,7)
     Restructuring income 0,0 3,5
     Restructuring expenses 0,0 0,0
Restructuring income (expenses) 0,0 3,5
Non recurring and extraordinary income (expenses) 0,0 0,0
EBIT 5,7 8,2
    Interest income 0,2 0,2
    Interest expense (0,3) (0,3)
Net interest income (expense) (0,1) (0,1)
   Interest income from investments 0,0 0,0
    Interest expense from investments 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0
RESULT BEFORE TAXES 5,6 8,1
Taxes (1,1) (1,1)
RESULT FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS 4,5 7,0
Result from discontinued operations 0,0 0,0
RESULT BEFORE MINORITY INTERESTS 4,5 7,0
Minority interests 0,0 0,0
GROUP NET RESULT 4,5 7,0
ADJUSTMENT 5 
ADJUSTMENT 6 
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case) were defined on the basis of more or less favorable assumptions about the success of the 
restructuring process and the dynamics of the competitive environment.  
Unfortunately, however, only qualitative guidelines, and not also detailed quantitative data, 
are available about the evolution of Zucchi Group performance according to 2015-2020 
Strategic Plan. In order to build the base scenario, therefore, it was attempted to translate into 
numbers the plan’s strategic guidelines, which are summarized in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 – The 2015-2020 Strategic Plan. 
First of all, sales growth rate is expected to be negative in the first year of projection (Table 
4.1). According to the last available quarterly financial statements, in fact, 2017 revenues are 
still affected by the retail policy, based on significant trade discounts, adopted by the group in 
2015. In addition, during the year, as part of the turnaround strategy, further no more 
profitable shops will be closed, negatively affecting the total volume sold. These factors cause 
the sales growth rates to be negative and equal to -5.9% on September 2017. A slight recovery 
in revenues growth rate is then expected in the last months of the year, given the seasonality 
characterizing the underlying business, finally leading to a 2017 expected sales growth rate of 
-5.0%. From 2018, instead, Zucchi Group consolidated sales were assumed to follow a 
positive trend, as the one experienced in the turnover growth rate of the Italian textile 
industry, reported since 2014 and confirmed also by the 2017 preliminary data provided by 
SMI (Sistema Moda Italia). Zucchi Group revenues, therefore, are expected to progressively 
increase over the remaining period of explicit projections, mainly as a result of the group 
expansion in foreign markets and the new marketing campaign adopted to strengthen the 
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brands image and complementarity. The resulting 2017-2021 CAGR (2.05%) is, in any case, 
more conservative than the revenues CAGR (5.25%), forecasted in the previous Strategic Plan 
(2013-2017), which, as the ongoing plan, provided for the group expansion abroad, but whose 
revenues forecasts reveal to be overoptimistic in respect to realized sales growth rates. 
The incidence of operating costs on sales, instead, was assumed to only slightly improve in 
2017, 2018 and 2019. The positive effects on EBITDA expected from the restructuring 
actions aimed to structural costs reduction, in fact, will be offset, in large part, by an increase 
in marketing costs, distribution costs and expenses related to the management of the new 
shops. In 2020, however, the expected higher revenues increase will reduce the incidence of 
fixed costs on sales to a larger extent, finally leading to an operating cost on sales percentage 
of 91.3%. In particular, the evolution of this key value driver during the explicit forecast 
period (in the base scenario, as well as in the best and worst scenario), was designed by 
considering the incidence of personnel cost on sales constant at the 2016 level, in compliance 
with the job-sharing agreement signed with the trade unions. According to the latter, starting 
from 2016, in order to prevent further layoffs, working hours of each employee will be 
reduced to a part-time contract, and then progressively increased according to company’s 
turnover evolution and growth prospects, until restoring full-time working hours.  
Regarding balance sheet key value drives, investments in operating fixed capital are expected 
to reach the highest level in terms of incidence on sales in 2018 and 2019 (3.0%). The 
capitalized costs in which the group will incur starting from 2017 for the renovation of shops 
and their conversion from mono-brand into double-sign, indeed, will be accompanied, in 2018 
and 2019, by a further increase in capital expenditure connected with the opening of new 
shops in foreign countries, according to the group development projects.   
Trade working capital incidence on sales, instead, is expected to progressively decrease 
during the explicit projection period. In particular, trade receivables days in revenues are 
expected to slightly decrease from 2019, thanks to a more accurate selection of new clients 
(especially local distributors) in respect to the past, while the rationalization of product 
offering in combination with efficiency initiatives undertaken by the group with the purpose 
to improve the inventory management, were assumed to result into a progressive reduction in 
inventory days in revenues. Trade payables days in revenues, instead, were forecasted to 
remain constant at the 2016 level.  
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Table 4.1 -  Base scenario assumptions. 
 
In the best scenario (Table 4.2), more optimistic assumptions about Zucchi Group future 
performance were developed. The hypothesis underlying the best case, however, are only 
slightly more favorable than base case assumptions, given that restructuring plans have 
generally a limited upside, in particular for distressed firms. For troubled companies, in fact, 
the recovery of normal operations at the end of the explicit projected period thanks to the 
successful implementation of the restructuring plan already represents, to some extent, a quite 
optimistic assumption if compared with company’s historical results, since it entails a 
significant change of direction in company’s performance. 
Specifically, in the best scenario, sales were assumed to decrease at a lower rate in 2017, 
thanks to a higher recovery in sales growth rates experienced in the last months of the year, 
and to increase more quickly in the following years, also as a consequence of a greater 
success of e-commerce channel. This will result into a 2017-2020 revenues CAGR of 3.07% 
higher than the one assumed in the base scenario but, in any case, still lower than the one 
forecasted in the previous strategic plan.  
Operating costs incidence on sales is expected to improve at a faster rate, too. In particular, in 
the last year, the company was assumed not to pay the annual rent of € 1 million for the plant 
located in Rescaldina, since the disposal of the assets transferred to the SPV is expected to be 
concluded in 202032. This will determine a significant improvement in the EBITDA margin 
also in the last year of the explicit projection period, bringing this operating measure (12% in 
2021) back to the pre-crisis level (13% in 2000, 12% in 2001 and 2002). 
Assumptions on capital expenditure, instead, were supposed equal to the ones underlying the 
base scenario. Zucchi Group, therefore, is expected to reinvest back into operating assets 
                                                          
32 The 2015 debt restructuring agreement, in fact, specifies that assets sale will be completed, on a best effort 
basis, by the end of 2020.   
BASE CASE
2016 PRO 
FORMA
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Sales growth rates -13,5% -5,0% 1,0% 1,5% 2,7% 3,0%
Operating costs/Sales 96,2% 95,6% 94,7% 93,5% 91,3% 90,1%
EBITDA MARGIN 4,4% 5,1% 5,9% 7,1% 9,3% 10,4%
CAPEX/Sales 0,1% 0,3% 3,0% 3,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Working cash/Sales 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Trade receivables (days in revenues) 103 103 103 102 101 100
Inventory (days in revenues) 95 94 93 91 89 87
Trade payables (days in revenues) 52 52 52 52 52 52
TWC/Sales 40,9% 40,5% 40,3% 39,4% 38,6% 37,6%
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percentages of sales equal to the base scenario assumptions also in the best case, making 
investments in accordance with the company’s underlying growth prospects.  
Finally, a better management of trade working capital will result into a faster decrease in trade 
receivables and inventories days in revenues, while in 2021 the improved operating 
performance will allow the company to reduce trade payables days in revenues from 52 to 51, 
providing a first signal of recovery of Zucchi Group reputation in front of suppliers.  
 
Table 4.2 – Best scenario assumptions. 
The worst scenario (Table 4.3) gathers more pessimistic assumptions about group 
performance evolution, by supposing a slower recovery, if not a worsening, in Zucchi Group 
key value drivers. In particular, sales growth rate is expected to be more negative than in the 
base scenario in the first year of projections33, and to remain negative in 2018 as well, 
assuming the materialization of threats coming from the external environment such as the 
entrance of new competitors with very attractive value propositions. This will strongly 
undermine in 2018 the success of the marketing campaign undertaken by the group to 
promote brands image and complementary and will cause sales to grow at a lower path than 
base scenario in the following years, finally leading to a 2017-2021 CAGR of -0,19%.   
In addition, the positive effects on the EBITDA margin of the restructuring actions 
undertaken by the group and aimed at operating costs reduction will be minimal in 2017 and 
more than offset by the increase in fixed costs connected with the marketing campaign and the 
management of the new shops experienced by the group at the beginning of the development 
phase. As a consequence, EBITDA margin is expected to decrease in 2018 and, then, to 
slowly increase in the following years, as the slight recovery in sales will allow to slightly 
reduce the incidence of fixed costs. 
                                                          
33 Lower than expected winter sales will cause a reversal in the positive trend (in term of less negative rates) 
observable by comparing sales growth rates in June 2017 (-9.4%) to revenues growth rates in September 2017 
(-5,9%). 
BEST CASE
2016 PRO 
FORMA
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Sales growth rates -13,5% -3,0% 1,5% 2,8% 4,0% 4,0%
Operating costs/Sales 96,2% 95,4% 94,3% 92,3% 90,5% 88,6%
EBITDA MARGIN 4,4% 5,2% 6,3% 8,3% 10,1% 12,0%
CAPEX/Sales 0,1% 0,3% 3,0% 3,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Working cash/Sales 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Trade receivables (days in revenues) 103 103 102 100 98 96
Inventory (days in revenues) 95 94 92 90 87 84
Trade payables (days in revenues) 52 52 52 52 52 51
TWC/Sales 40,9% 40,7% 39,7% 38,6% 37,4% 36,0%
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Given the greater than expected difficulties experienced at the operating margin level, then, 
capital expenditures, which are required to implement Zucchi Group development projects, 
are expected to be lower (in terms of both absolute value and percentage on sales) than in the 
base scenario in 2018 and 2019, and, therefore, partially delayed to 2020. 
Regarding trade working capital, instead, the selection of B2B clients is assumed to result less 
accurate than expected in the other scenarios, finally resulting into an increase of trade 
receivables days in revenues. Slower than expected sales recovery, in addition, will determine 
an accumulation of final products in the warehouses, despite the actions undertaken to 
improve the management of inventory, and an increase in trade payables days in revenues. 
The latter partially counterbalances the increase in TWC/sales ratio, but at the same time it 
sends out a negative signal to suppliers, who can decide to ask more stringent terms and 
conditions in the near future. 
 
Table 4.3 – Worst scenario assumptions. 
Some assumptions common to all the scenarios were then adopted to conclude the projection 
of future financial statements. As regards income statements items (Table 4.4), depreciation of 
operating fixed capital on operating fixed capital was assumed to stay constant at the 2016 
level, as well as the amortization of intangibles similar to goodwill, given that the 2015-2020 
Restructuring Plan doesn’t point out any intentions of Zucchi Group to perform acquisitions 
and/or new investments in non-operating intangibles. 
Operating tax rate, instead, was set equal to 30%, while return on cash balance was fixed at 
0.01%, in line with the rate at which cash accounts were remunerated in the last historical 
financial statements.  Non-recurring and extraordinary items, then, were supposed to be equal 
to -0.2 million in 2017, assuming that, as happened in the past, capital losses will arise from 
the closure of some property shops planned for that year. In the following years, extraordinary 
items value was set equal to 0, since their extraordinary nature makes it impossible to predict 
their future evolution. 
WORST CASE
2016 PRO 
FORMA
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Sales growth rates -13,5% -9,0% -5,0% 1,0% 1,6% 1,8%
Operating costs/Sales 96,2% 96,1% 98,5% 98,1% 97,5% 96,6%
EBITDA MARGIN 4,4% 4,5% 2,2% 2,6% 3,2% 4,1%
CAPEX/Sales 0,1% 0,3% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 1,0%
Working cash/Sales 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
Trade receivables (days in revenues) 103 103 104 106 106 105
Inventory (days in revenues) 95 96 99 101 100 98
Trade payables (days in revenues) 52 52 52 52 53 53
TWC/Sales 40,9% 41,2% 42,3% 43,5% 42,9% 42,5%
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Table 4.4 – Income statements assumptions common to all scenarios. 
 
Instead, about balance sheet items (Table 4.5), among the current assets and liabilities, other 
than the ones forming part of trade working capital, overdue social security and operating tax 
payables were separately projected and forecasted to be repaid according to the 
reimbursement schedule negotiated in 2016 with social security entities and tax authorities. In 
2017, therefore, the group is expected to pay debt instalments for a total amount of 1.3 million 
(0.7 to social security entities and 0.6 million to tax authorities, as in 2016), while the residual 
part of overdue operating debt will be paid in 2018.  
Intangible assets similar to goodwill, instead, will result to be completely amortized in 2021, 
since new investments are not forecasted, while non-operating assets were assumed to remain 
constant at the 2016 level, as well as debt equivalents. A large part of the latter, indeed, 
consists on provisions for employee benefits, which are assumed stable at the 2016 level, 
given that the job sharing agreement signed with the trade unions is expected to prevent the 
layoff of further workers.  
Finally, no equity increases were forecasted to be subscribed in the future, despite the 
existence of the GEM Contract, signed in 2014 and according to which GEM will subscribe a 
capital increase, for a maximum amount of 15 million, whenever asked by Vincenzo Zucchi 
S.p.a, within 5 years. Astrance Capital, indeed, could be reluctant to accept a capital increase 
financed by GEM, since it will result into a dilution of Astrance Capital ownership.  
 
ASSUMPTIONS COMMON TO ALL SCENARIOS                          
(INCOME STATEMENT)
2016 PRO 
FORMA
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Depreciation of op. fixed capital/Op. fixed capital 4,4% 4,4% 4,4% 4,4% 4,4% 4,4%
Operating tax rate 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0% 30,0%
Amortization of goodwill and other similar intangibles (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
Return on cash 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Exchange rate (losses) gains (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04) (0,04)
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 6,4 (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Minority result (income) loss 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
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Table 4.5 – Balance sheet assumptions common to all scenarios. 
 
On the basis of all these assumptions, financial statements over the explicit forecast period 
were built (as shown in Appendix 3, Appendix 4 and Appendix 5) and FCFs calculated under 
each scenario, as summarized in Table 4.6, Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.6 – Free cash flows expected in the base scenario. 
 
 
Table 4.7 – Free cash flows expected in the best scenario. 
 
 
Table 4.8 – Free cash flows expected in the worst scenario. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS COMMON TO ALL SCENARIOS                     
(BALANCE SHEET)
2016 PRO 
FORMA
2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
     Social security payables (0,9) (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
     Operating tax payable (1,1) (0,5) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Overdue operating debts (2,0) (0,7) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Other "Other current assets and liabililities" 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
TOTAL OTHER CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES (1,3) 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Other non-current assets and liabilities (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0)
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0
Non-operating assets 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Debt equivalents 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6
Minority interest 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Equity increase (decrease) in cash 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
€ million 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
NOPLAT 2,53 3,01 3,65 4,92 5,73
Change in invested capital 0,62 (2,80) (1,80) (0,52) (0,44)
Free cash flow 3,14 0,21 1,85 4,40 5,29
BASE CASE
€ million 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
NOPLAT 2,66 3,31 4,47 5,65 7,07
Change in invested capital (0,17) (2,46) (2,06) (0,59) (0,41)
Free cash flow 2,49 0,85 2,41 5,06 6,65
BEST CASE
€ million 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
NOPLAT 2,13 0,88 1,05 1,33 1,77
Change in invested capital 1,42 (1,01) (2,18) (1,12) (0,52)
Free cash flow 3,54 (0,13) (1,13) 0,21 1,26
WORST CASE
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4.5 Unlevered cost of capital 
 
According to the APV method, then, FCFs require to be discounted at the unlevered cost of 
capital to calculate the unlevered value of operations.  
In order to calculate this discount rate, a modified version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
was adopted, which takes into account a premium associated with country risk and, therefore, 
computes the unlevered cost of equity as follows: 
𝑘𝑢 =  𝑟𝑓 +  𝛽𝑢 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑃 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 
where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑢 is the unlevered beta, 𝐸𝑅𝑃 is the equity risk premium and 
𝐶𝑅𝑃 is the country risk premium.  
First of all, the risk-free rate was set equal to 2.50%, in line with the rate used by Banca IMI 
to evaluate European companies’ stocks as of 31st December 2016 (2.00%-2.50%) and with 
the last 10 years average of 10 years EURIRS (2.56%). In recent times, indeed, massive 
central bank monetary interventions had resulted into abnormally and artificially low risk-free 
rates, which, in turn, determine lower cost of capital, just the contrary of what one would 
expect in periods of relative economic-wide distress and uncertainty (Duff&Phelps 2016). It is 
common practice for analysts, therefore, to use normalized risk-free rate in the valuation, 
computed, in the simplest way, as the average of historical rates observed over a period of 
time considered as a reasonable proxy for the future. In particular, according to Duff&Phelps 
(2016), when performing valuation as of 2016, the risk-free rate can reasonably be assumed to 
revert in the future to the last 10 years average rate. The computation of last 10 years average 
of 10 years EURIRS results into a rate close to 2.50% (2.56%), further justifying the selection 
of this percentage as risk-free rate.  
As regards the equity risk premium, instead, it was assumed equal to 6.25%, according to 
Damodaran’s estimate of risk premium for a mature equity market updated to 1st July 2016 
(this is the most updated available estimate at the 31st December 2016). As required by the 
CAPM, this premium was then multiplied by a measure of systematic risk, i.e. the beta.  
To calculate the unlevered beta, a bottom-up approach was adopted. This technique consists 
on computing the risk parameter as the average of comparable companies’ betas and it is 
generally considered a more reliable approach than de-levering the company’s regression 
beta, given the high standard error frequently associated with the latter. Actually, the bottom 
up beta presents a standard error as well, since it is obtained starting from the regression beta 
of comparable companies, then transformed in unlevered beta, but being estimated for a 
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sample of companies, rather than for a single firm, the standard error of the estimate results to 
be lower. In addition, for distressed companies, rumors about company restructuring or 
impeding bankruptcy can cause stock price to be volatile with no relation to the market. The 
regression beta, therefore, may actually decrease during periods of financial distress, since it 
reflects how a stock moves with the market (Damodaran 2009). 
In order to calculate Zucchi Group unlevered beta, according to the bottom-up approach, a 
group of comparable companies was first selected. The peer group includes, alongside the 
listed comparables used as benchmark to analyse Zucchi Group historical performance in 
Chapter 3, some firms engaged in the manufacturing and/or distribution of home linen both 
inside and outside Europe, as well as a company (i.e. Fieratex) which provides, as Zucchi 
Group, dyeing and finishing services on behalf of third parties. For each of these firms, the 
unlevered beta was calculated according to the following formula: 
𝛽𝑈 =  
𝛽𝐿 +  
𝐷
𝐸 ∗ 𝛽𝐷
1 +
𝐷
𝐸
 
where: 
 𝛽𝐿 is the levered beta computed by Reuters using monthly price close over a period of 
5 years; 
 
𝐷
𝐸
 is the debt to equity ratio, calculated as the average ratio between company’s NFP 
and market capitalization over the last 5 years, in order to eliminate temporary 
fluctuations in firm’s capital structure; 
 𝛽𝐷 is the beta debt computed on the basis of company’s synthetic rating class 
(Appendix 6) associated to each firm according to its interest coverage ratio34. This is a 
commonly used practice adopted when the corporate debt, as it is often the case, is not 
listed in the market (and not rated by rating agencies), making impossible to estimate a 
debt regression beta.  
The calculation of unlevered beta for each comparable company is shown in Table 4.9. 
                                                          
34 Interest coverage ratio was personally computed starting from comparable companies’ financial statements.  
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Table 4.9 – Unlevered beta calculation from comparable companies’ data. 
The average, adjusted average and median of the comparables’ unlevered beta was then 
calculated in the bottom of Table 4.9. Among these results, the unlevered beta computed as 
adjusted average (0.69) was selected in order to calculate the cost of capital. The adjusted 
average outcome, indeed, by removing the outliers from the sample, whose results largely 
impact on the mean of small populations, may provide a more reliable estimate of bottom-up 
unlevered beta. This result, in addition, is in line with the outcome of the median.   
Finally, a country risk premium was added to the cost of capital resulting from the application 
of the original version of the CAPM model. As emerged during the global financial crisis, 
indeed, correlation among markets has risen, making the country risk not completely 
diversifiable also for globally diversified investors (Damodaran 2009b) and justifying, 
therefore, its inclusion in the cost of capital computation. In particular, the country risk 
premium was assumed equal to 2.36% and it was computed as the weighted average of CRPs 
(estimated by Damodaran in June 2016) of the countries in which Zucchi operates, where 
weights are based on the portion of total sales realized by the group in that country in 2016 
(Table 4.10). 
 
Table 4.10 – Country risk premium calculation. 
Adding together all the components of the modified CAPM, the unlevered cost of capital 
results equal to 9,17%.  
Comparable Companies Country
β
Unlevered
D/E       
avg 5Y 
β Levered β Debt
Debt       
Rating
Interest 
coverage ratio
Caleffi Italy 0,22 70% -0,05 0,61 B+ 2,80
Springs Global Brazil 0,90 189% 0,95 0,88 CC 0,99
U10 SA France 0,48 43% 0,81 -0,29 AAA 15,71
Yoong Onn Corporation Berhad Malaysia 1,08 9% 1,2 -0,29 AAA 25,65
Marimekko OYJ Finland 0,37 7% 0,42 -0,29 AAA 26,25
Linz Textile Holding AG Austria 0,41 3% 0,43 -0,29 AAA 58,18
Fieratex Greece 1,42 30% 1,58 0,88 C 0,50
H&M Sweden 0,92 -3% 0,89 -0,29 AAA 110,29
AVERAGE 0,73 44% 0,78 0,12 BB+
ADJUSTED AVERAGE 0,69 27% 0,78 0,06 BBB
MEDIAN 0,69 20% 0,85 -0,29 AAA
Country Risk 
Premium (CRP)
2016 Sales (%)
CRP (weighted 
average)
Italy 2,13% 66% 1,41%
Other European Countries 3,34% 28% 0,93%
Extra European Countries 0,34% 6% 0,02%
GROUP (Total) 100% 2,36%
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𝑘𝑢 =  𝑟𝑓 +  𝛽𝑢 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑃 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 = 2.50% + 0.69 ∗ 6.25% + 2.36% = 9.17% 
 
4.6 Continuing value 
 
Once calculated the FCFs under each scenario and the unlevered cost of capital, the last 
element required to compute the unlevered value of Zucchi Group operations is the continuing 
value. As already mentioned, the value generated by the company over the explicit projection 
period was calculated by adopting the DCF model, and therefore, using the WACC. In the 
long run, indeed, the company was assumed to reach a target capital structure, in line with the 
industry average. This assumption appears not to be overoptimistic for Zucchi Group given 
the significant debt write-off granted by banks that positively affected its debt to equity ratio. 
Thanks to the debt forgiveness (for a total amount of 79.6 million), indeed, banks gave to 
Zucchi Group the chance to cancel large part of past debt obligations and to demonstrate its 
recovered ability to generate FCFs sufficient to meet the residual debt and the new debt 
eventually incurred to sustain the growth and not to repay past overdue loan. As a 
consequence, if in the long term the company is expected to grow at a rate more or less in line 
with the average company in the industry, its capital structure can reasonably be expected to 
converge to the industry average, given also the key role played by industry-specific factors 
(growth, returns, asset specificity) in debt/equity trade-off. 
Under this assumption, the continuing value was computed through the key value driver 
formula as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 ∗ (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶
)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
= 
=
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) − (𝐼𝐶𝑡 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) − 𝐼𝐶𝑡)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
where 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the company’s weighted average cost of capital, 𝑔 is the company’s long run 
growth rate, 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 is the expected rate of return on new invested capital35 after the explicit 
forecast period, 𝐼𝐶𝑡 the invested capital at time t, and 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1 are the free cash flows expected 
in the first year after the explicit forecast period. 
For what concerns the long run growth rate, its best estimate, according to Koller et al. 
(2015), is the expected long term rate of consumption growth for the industry’s products, plus 
                                                          
35 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶 = 𝑔/𝐼𝑅 where 𝐼𝑅 (investment rate) is equal to 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡/ 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇 
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inflation. However, since this data is not available for the household linen industry, g was 
estimated on the basis of the expected growth rate of nominal GDP in 2022 in countries where 
the group is expected to sell its products in the long run (in particular Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, Greece, Germany, China, USA). This variable was chosen since the household 
linen industry strongly depends on the economic cycle, whose dynamic is captured by GDP. 
Then, the expected growth rate in nominal GDP of each country, as estimated by the 
International Monetary Fund in 2016, was multiplied for the target percentage of revenues 
that the company plans to realize in the long run. In particular, in the best case, the group is 
expected to generate 50% of its revenues outside Italy, reaching a 2013-2017 Strategic Plan 
target not achieved in that occasion, and, therefore, to grow in the long term at a rate of 2.8%, 
obtained by rounding to one decimal the weighted average of 2.82% resulted from Table 4.11. 
In the base case, instead, the group is expected to grow at a lower rate (1.4%), while no 
growth was assumed in the worst scenario. 
 
Table 4.11 – Estimation of the long term growth rate expected in the best scenario. 
The second fundamental determinant of the continuing value is the weighted average cost of 
capital, which is computed as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑘𝑒 ∗  
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
+  𝑘𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
 
where 𝑘𝐸 is the cost of equity, 
𝐸
𝐷+𝐸
  and 
𝐷
𝐸+𝐷
 are the target level of equity and debt, 
respectively, to enterprise value, 𝑘𝐷 is the pre-tax cost of debt and 𝑡 is the corporate marginal 
tax rate. 
First of all, the pre-tax cost of debt was calculated by adding to the risk-free rate the 
company’s default spread, that is the premium over risk-free securities return required by 
creditors to compensate them for company’s risk of default: 
𝑘𝑑 =  𝑟𝑓 +  𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2.50% + 2.25% = 4.75% 
Country nominal 
GDP g in 2022
Expected sales 
in 2022 (%)
g (weighted 
average)
Italy 2,26% 50% 1,13%
Other European Countries 2,80% 40% 1,12%
Extra European Countries 5,76% 10% 0,58%
GROUP (Total) 100% 2,82%
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In particular, the default spread was identified according to the table in the Appendix 6 on the 
basis of the average rating class in the industry (previously identified in Table 4.9), which is 
BBB. Since Zucchi Group debt to equity ratio is expected to converge, in the long run, to the 
industry average capital structure, indeed, it was reasonably assumed that the company will 
also reach the industry average rating class.  
Moving forward in the WACC calculation, the target debt to equity ratio was set equal to 
27.20%. This is the (adjusted) average capital structure of the selected peers (computed in 
Table 4.9) and it appears quite in line with the average debt to equity ratio computed by 
Damodaran over a larger sample of firms operating in the apparel industry36 (23% at the 
European market level, 25% in the global market). Consequently, target equity to enterprise 
value ratio is equal to 78.62%, while target debt to enterprise value ratio is equal to 21.38%.   
Finally, the last input of WACC calculation is the cost of equity, computed according to the 
CAPM formula, as follows: 
𝑘𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 +  𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑃 = 2.50% + 2.43% + 0.86 ∗ 6.25% = 10.28% 
In particular: 
 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate which, as already explained, was assumed equal to 2.50%; 
 𝐸𝑅𝑃 is the equity risk premium set equal to 6.25% (source: Damodaran 2016); 
 𝐶𝑅𝑃 is the county risk premium, computed, as already shown above, as the weighted 
average of CRPs of the countries in which the company operates. In this case, 
however, the weights were determined on the basis of the percentage of total revenues 
that the company is expected to generate beyond the explicit forecast period in each 
country. As shown in Table 4.12, the CRP results to be equal to 2.43%, a little bit 
higher than the one used to compute the unlevered cost of equity in the explicit 
projection period (2.36%), given that, in the long run, the company is expected to 
increase its turnover in European countries, whose CRPs are higher than Italy’s CRP; 
 
                                                          
36 Large part of the previously identified Zucchi Group’s comparables are grouped in this industry by 
Damodaran. 
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Table 4.12 – Computation of country risk premium beyond the explicit projection period. 
 𝛽𝐿 is the levered beta and it was calculated starting from the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) formula and assuming that the tax shields have the same risk of operating 
assets and that the debt is not risk-free (𝛽𝐷 is different from 0): 
𝛽𝐿 =  𝛽𝑈 +  
𝐷
𝐸
(𝛽𝑈 −  𝛽𝐷) = 0.69 + 27.20% ∗ (0.69 − 0.08) =  0.86 
In particular, while 𝛽𝑈 and  
𝐷
𝐸
 have already been computed in Table 4.9, the 𝛽𝐷 was set 
equal to 0.08, as suggested in the Appendix 6 for companies with a credit rating of 
BBB, which is the average industry credit rating and the Zucchi Group target rating.  
Summing up all its component and assuming a marginal tax rate equal to 24%, the WACC 
results equal to 8.86%, as shown by the following calculation: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑘𝑒 ∗  
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
+  𝑘𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑡) ∗
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
= 
= 10.28% ∗ 78.62% + 4.75% ∗ (1 − 24%) ∗ 21.38% = 8.86% 
Once identified and estimated all its determinants, it is now possible to compute the 
continuing value of Zucchi Group operations under each scenario, as illustrated in Table 4.13. 
 
Table 4.13 – Continuing value calculation. 
It is worth noting that the ratio between the resulting CV and the 2022 EBITDA (9.6, as 
reported in Table 4.14), in the best case, is in line with the average EV/EBITDA multiple 
Country Risk 
Premium (CRP)
Expected sales 
in 2022 (%)
CRP (weighted 
average)
Italy 2,13% 50% 1,07%
Other European Countries 3,34% 40% 1,33%
Extra European Countries 0,34% 10% 0,03%
GROUP (Total) 100% 2,43%
2016A 2021E
Base for 
CV
2016A 2021E
Base for 
CV
2016A 2021E
Base for 
CV
g 1,40% 2,80% 0,00%
WACC 8,86% 8,86% 8,86%
NOPLAT 5,73 5,81 7,07 7,26 1,77 1,77
Invested capital 35,98 36,49 36,72 37,75 34,45 34,45
Change in Invested capital (0,50) (1,03) 0,00
FCF 5,31 6,24 1,77
Continuing value 71,16 102,96 20,04
Present value CV 45,89 66,39 12,92
BASE CASE BEST CASE WORST CASE
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computed for comparable companies (9.7). Less optimistic scenarios (base case and worst 
case), instead, put greater emphasis on the current differences between Zucchi Group and its 
peers, which are not assumed to be completely eliminated in the projection period. Even if 
significantly reduced, such differences are expected to partially affect the company also in the 
continuing value, in particular in the worst scenario.  
The method of multiples, therefore, assuming that the EV/EBITDA estimated by Reuters in 
2016 can be fairly applied at the end of the forecasting period, provides a positive check on 
the hypothesis underlying the APV and DCF models, suggesting that the assumptions at the 
basis of the scenario analysis and cost of capital computation appear not to be overoptimistic 
and quite in line with the market.  
 
Table 4.14 – Zucchi Group CV/EBITDA and competitors EV/EBITDA at comparison. 
 
4.7 Unlevered value of operations 
 
The unlevered value of operations under each scenario was finally obtained by discounting 
the operating free cash flows and the continuing value at the unlevered cost of capital, and 
summing up the results, as shown in Table 4.15, Table 4.16 and Table 4.17. 
Zucchi Group CV/EBITDA
Base case 8,1
Best case 9,6
Worst case 6,7
Comparable Companies EV/EBITDA
Caleffi 12,4
Springs Global 7,5
U10 SA 4,4
Yoong Onn Corporation Berhad 5,5
Marimekko OYJ 13,7
Linz Textile Holding AG 15,5
Fieratex 11,5
H&M 7,8
AVERAGE 9,8
ADJUSTED AVERAGE 9,7
MEDIAN 9,7
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Table 4.15 – The unlevered value of operations under the base scenario 
 
 
Table 4.16 – The unlevered value of operations under the best scenario. 
 
 
Table 4.17 – The unlevered value of operations under the worst scenario. 
€ million 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E Base for CV
NOPLAT 2,53 3,01 3,65 4,92 5,73 5,81
Change in invested capital 0,62 (2,80) (1,80) (0,52) (0,44) (0,50)
Free cash flow 3,14 0,21 1,85 4,40 5,29 5,31
Ku 9,17%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64
Present value of FCF 2,88 0,18 1,42 3,10 3,41
Present value of FCF2017-2021 10,99
Continuing Value 71,16
Present value CV 45,89
UNLEVERED VALUE OF OPERATIONS 56,88
BASE CASE
€ million 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E Base for CV
NOPLAT 2,66 3,31 4,47 5,65 7,07 7,26
Change in invested capital (0,17) (2,46) (2,06) (0,59) (0,41) (1,03)
Free cash flow 2,49 0,85 2,41 5,06 6,65 6,24
Ku 9,17%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64
Present value of FCF 2,28 0,72 1,86 3,56 4,29
Present value of FCF2017-2021 12,71
Continuing Value 102,96
Present value CV 66,39
UNLEVERED VALUE OF OPERATIONS 79,10
BEST CASE
€ million 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E Base for CV
NOPLAT 2,13 0,88 1,05 1,33 1,77 1,77
Change in invested capital 1,42 (1,01) (2,18) (1,12) (0,52) 0,00
Free cash flow 3,54 (0,13) (1,13) 0,21 1,26 1,77
Ku 9,17%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64
Present value of FCF 3,24 (0,11) (0,87) 0,15 0,81
Present value of FCF2017-2021 3,23
Continuing Value 20,04
Present value CV 12,92
UNLEVERED VALUE OF OPERATIONS 16,15
WORST CASE
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4.8 Value of tax benefits 
 
After having computed the unlevered value of operations, the APV method requires to 
estimate the value of tax benefits arising from interest expenses deducibility. This amount, 
however, results to be insignificant in the case of Zucchi Group, since its debt level is very 
low after the write-off (0.4 million in the 2016 pro-forma balance sheet) and will be 
progressively repaid in the explicit forecast period, while in the long run the tax benefits of 
debt are captured in the WACC formula.  
A significant source of value, instead, is represented by the group accumulated losses, which 
amounted to 66.9 million on 31st December 2016. According to the art. 84 Tuir, indeed, past 
losses generate a tax credit since they can be carried forward without any time limitation and 
applied by the taxpayer against profits in the following years, within the limit of 80% of the 
taxable income generated in each subsequent year. By reducing the amount of taxable income 
in future years, therefore, net operating losses give rise to valuable tax savings.  
Specifically, the value generated by the possibility to carry-forward accumulated losses was 
computed under each scenario as shown by Table 4.18, Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, assuming 
a tax rate of 24% on EBT. This rate was computed by dividing the 16.055 million of deferred 
tax assets from previous years cumulated losses, which are estimated, but not recorded, in the 
2016 financial statements, for the total cumulated losses of 66.9 million. This results in a tax 
rate of 24%, which coincides with the new IRES tax rate.  
NOLs, however, cannot be forecasted to continue in perpetuity, since the positive EBT 
expected to be generated by the company beyond the explicit projection period, under each 
scenario, and, therefore, the use of cumulated losses to offset taxable income, will determine a 
progressively reduction of cumulated losses, until they reach 0. Thus, the explicit projection 
period was (roughly) extended until the expiration of NOLs, assuming, in a simplified way, 
that EBT will grow at the long term growth rate in each year since 2022. Even if g actually 
refers to NOPLAT growth rate, having forecasted constant non-operating items, however, it is 
possible to reasonably assume that also EBT will grow in the long run at g. 
The present value of the tax shield flows, then, was computed by discounting the tax savings 
at the unlevered cost of capital, since the risk of achieving such benefits is the same of the 
operational income that makes the tax deduction possible. In particular, tax shield flows 
beyond 2021 were discounted at a slightly higher cost of capital (9.25% instead of 9.17%), 
because of the higher CRP expected as a consequence of Zucchi group expansion in foreign 
markets with higher country risk. 
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Table 4.18 – NOLs tax shield value in the base scenario. 
 
Table 4.19 – NOLs tax shield value in the best scenario. 
 
Table 4.20 – NOLs tax shield value in the worst scenario. 
As regards distress costs, instead, they were not directly computed. On 31st December 2016, 
indeed, the group has already borne the direct costs of distress, mainly consisting in expenses 
for lawyers, turnaround specialists, financial advisers and other professionals assisting the 
group in the formulation of the new strategic plan and the negotiation of the financial 
manoeuvre with creditors and investors. Indirect costs of distress, instead, are not directly 
observable and, therefore, estimating them is a very difficult task. Thus, rather than adding 
further subjectivity to the valuation by supposing them as equal to a certain percentage of 
Zucchi Group value, they were implicitly incorporated in the assumptions at the basis of the 
BASE CASE (€ million) 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E … 2028E
EBT 3,27 4,16 5,12 6,94 8,09 8,21 … 8,92
Compensation (80% of EBT at maximum) 2,62 3,33 4,10 5,56 6,48 6,57 … 4,02
Accumulated losses 66,90 64,28 60,95 56,85 51,30 44,82 38,26 … 0,00
Tax rate 24%
Tax shield flow 0,63 0,80 0,98 1,33 1,55 1,58 … 0,97
Ku 2017-2021 9,17%
Ku 2022-2028 9,25%
Discounti factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64 0,59 … 0,35
PV tax shield 0,58 0,67 0,76 0,94 1,00 0,93 … 0,35
TOT PV NOLs tax shield 8,93
BEST CASE (€ million) 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E … 2026E
EBT 8,111 3,46 4,59 6,30 7,98 10,00 10,28 … 11,48
Compensation (80% of EBT at maximum) 2,77 3,67 5,04 6,39 8,00 8,23 … 6,72
Accumulated losses 66,90 64,13 60,46 55,43 49,04 41,04 32,81 … 0,00
Tax rate 24%
Tax shield flow 0,66 0,88 1,21 1,53 1,92 1,97 … 1,61
Ku 2017-2021 9,17%
Ku 2022-2026 9,25%
Discounti factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64 0,59 … 0,41
PV tax shield 0,61 0,74 0,93 1,08 1,24 1,16 … 0,67
TOT PV NOLs tax shield 9,51
WORST CASE (€ million) 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E … 2052E
EBT 8,111 2,70 1,12 1,41 1,81 2,44 2,44 … 2,44
Compensation (80% of EBT at maximum) 2,16 0,89 1,13 1,45 1,96 1,96 … 0,67
Accumulated losses 66,90 64,74 63,85 62,72 61,28 59,32 57,37 … 0,00
Tax rate 24%
Tax shield flow 0,52 0,21 0,27 0,35 0,47 0,47 … 0,16
Ku 2017-2021 9,17%
Ku 2022-2026 9,25%
Discounti factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64 0,59 … 0,04
PV tax shield 0,47 0,18 0,21 0,24 0,30 0,28 … 0,01
TOT PV NOLs tax shield 4,45
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scenario analysis. For instance, when compared to healthy competitors, Zucchi Group’s 
greater inability to promptly react to the entrance of a new player in the household linen 
industry was supposed as a consequence of its crisis situation and captured in the assumptions 
at the basis of the worst scenario. 
 
4.9 Enterprise value and equity value 
 
Lastly, Zucchi Group enterprise value as of 31st December 2016 was computed under each 
scenario by summing up the unlevered value of operations, the value of tax savings and non-
operating assets37 (Table 4.21). The equity value, then, was calculated by subtracting the net 
financial position and debt equivalents38 from the enterprise value. In particular, the book 
value of these items reported in the 2016 pro-forma financial statements was assumed as a 
reasonable proxy of their market value, since the distressed debt, whose market value is 
significantly lower than its nominal value given the high default risk, has been subjected to 
write-off and, therefore, eliminated by the 2016 pro-forma financial statements. In addition, 
contrary to what usually happens in a distress setting when a debt forgiveness or conversion is 
not granted by creditors, the enterprise value is expected to be higher than the nominal value 
of debt in all the scenarios, further justifying the adoption of the nominal value of debt as a 
proxy of its market value39.   
 
                                                          
37 Non-operating assets value was assumed equal to their book value as of 31st December 2016. 
38 Minority interests, instead, are equal to 0 in 2016 financial statements. 
39 Assuming interest expenses computed on the basis of the market cost of debt. 
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Table 4.21 – Zucchi Group’s enterprise value and equity value. 
The expected enterprise value and equity value were then computed by attributing different 
probabilities of realization to each scenario. In particular, Zucchi Group’s history of 
unsuccessful restructuring attempts was taken into account in the valuation by assigning 
higher probability to worst case than to best case. The resulting weighted average equity value 
is 48.8 million (value per share 0.0194), which is in line with Zucchi Group average market 
capitalization over the last three months of 2016 (49.3 million, 0.0195 share price). The 
uncertainty about Zucchi Group’s future performance, therefore, results to be reasonably 
managed through the scenario analysis, whose underlying assumptions appear to adequately 
capture the market expectations. This conclusion, in addition, is further supported by the fact 
that the same expected enterprise value and, therefore, equity value can be obtained by 
discounting Zucchi Group operating free cash flows and tax savings in the base case at a 
higher unlevered cost of capital, which includes a company-specific risk premium equal to 
8%. In this way, the uncertainty underlying the future prospects is captured in the cost of 
capital through a premium over the CAPM dictated by Zucchi Group distressed conditions, 
rather than through the development of more optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. In 
particular, an empirical research conducted by Duff&Phelps in 2016 points out the existence, 
for listed manufacturing companies with high financial risk, of an extra-return equal to 7.53% 
or 5.34%, depending on whether the company stays in a “distress zone” (Z<1,8) or “grey 
zone” (1,8<Z<2,99), respectively, according to its Z-score computed through the Altman’s 
formula (Figure 4.4).  
(€ million) BASE CASE BEST CASE WORST CASE
Unlevered value of operations 56,88 79,10 16,15
NOLs tax shield value 8,93 9,51 4,45
Non operating assets 1,32 1,32 1,32
ENTERPRISE VALUE 67,13 89,93 21,92
Scenario probability 50% 15% 35%
ENTERPRISE VALUE (expected) 54,73
Enterprise value 67,13 89,93 21,92
NFP and debt equivalents 5,89 5,89 5,89
EQUITY VALUE 61,25 84,05 16,03
Scenario probability 50% 15% 35%
EQUITY VALUE (expected) 48,84
Number of shares outstanding 2523,24
VALUE PER SHARE 0,0194
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Figure 4.4 – Altman’s Z-score model for manufacturing companies. (Duff&Phelps 2016)  
 
By applying the Z-score model to Zucchi Group 2016 financial statements and 2016 pro-
forma financial statements data, a score lower than 1.8 was obtained, in both cases (1.0 and 
1.7 respectively). Since Zucchi Group stays in a distress zone, therefore, a company-specific 
risk premium of 8% was selected, which rounds to one digit the premium empirically 
computed by Duff&Phelps (7.53%), and substituted to the country risk premium in the 
unlevered cost of capital40. By discounting the operating free cash flows and tax savings 
forecasted in the base case for the newly computed unlevered cost of equity (14.81%), Zucchi 
Group’s enterprise value and equity value result to be equal, respectively, to 54.6 million and 
48.8 million, which are the same values obtained through the scenario analysis. This evidence 
suggests that the scenario analysis indirectly captures a level of riskiness connected with the 
company’s crisis conditions in line with the extra-premium recorded by distressed securities 
in the market.  
Lastly, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate how expected enterprise value 
changes with variations in key operating value drivers (sales annual growth rates and 
operating costs incidence on sales, Table 4.22), and in input variables affecting the continuing 
value, which accounts for 70% of the total value (long term growth rate and WACC, Table 
4.23). 
                                                          
40 As specified by Duff&Phelps (2016), indeed, the high financial risk premium was estimated as an additional 
return over the CAPM in its original version, which doesn’t include the CRP.  
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Table 4.22 – Sensitivity analysis on Enterprise Value according to variations in revenues 
annual growth rates and operating costs on sales. 
 
 
Table 4.23 – Sensitivity analysis on Enterprise Value according to variations in long term 
growth rate and WACC. 
 
4.10 The market value of debt 
 
As expressed in KPMG’s audit report, the new strategic plan would have never been able to 
generate sufficient cash flows to repay Zucchi Group’s total debt (80.04 million). As a 
consequence, the market value of Zucchi Group consolidated debt is expected to be 
significantly lower than its nominal value, justifying the huge write-off granted by creditors in 
the 2015 debt restructuring agreement. 
-4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3%
4% 27,2 27,3 27,5 27,6 27,8 28,0 28,2 28,5
3,5% 30,1 30,3 30,6 30,9 31,3 31,6 32,0 32,4
3,0% 33,0 33,4 33,8 34,3 34,7 35,2 35,7 36,3
2,5% 35,9 36,4 37,0 37,6 38,2 38,8 39,5 40,2
2,0% 38,8 39,5 40,2 40,9 41,6 42,4 43,3 44,0
1,5% 41,7 42,5 43,3 44,2 45,1 46,0 46,8 47,6
1,0% 44,6 45,5 46,5 47,5 48,4 49,3 50,2 51,1
0,5% 47,5 48,6 49,7 50,6 51,5 52,5 53,5 54,6
0,0% 50,5 51,6 52,6 53,6 54,6 55,7 56,9 58,0
-0,5% 53,3 54,3 55,4 56,6 57,7 58,9 60,2 61,5
-1,0% 55,9 57,1 58,3 59,5 60,8 62,1 63,5 64,9
-1,5% 58,5 59,8 61,1 62,4 63,9 65,3 66,8 68,4
-2,0% 61,1 62,5 63,9 65,4 66,9 68,5 70,1 71,8
-2,5% 63,7 65,2 66,7 68,3 69,9 71,6 73,4 75,3
-3,0% 66,3 67,9 69,5 71,2 73,0 74,8 76,7 78,6
Change in sales annual growth rates
C
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s/
sa
le
s
0,20% 0,60% 1,00% 1,40% 1,80% 2,20% 2,60%
11,36% 44,4 44,8 45,2 45,7 46,2 46,7 47,3
10,86% 45,6 46,1 46,6 47,1 47,7 48,3 49,0
10,36% 46,9 47,4 48,0 48,7 49,4 50,1 51,0
9,86% 48,4 49,0 49,7 50,4 51,2 52,2 53,2
9,36% 50,0 50,7 51,5 52,4 53,4 54,5 55,7
8,86% 51,8 52,6 53,6 54,6 55,8 57,1 58,6
8,36% 53,8 54,8 55,9 57,2 58,6 60,2 62,1
7,86% 56,0 57,3 58,6 60,2 61,9 63,9 66,1
7,36% 58,6 60,1 61,8 63,6 65,8 68,2 71,1
g long term
W
A
C
C
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In order to verify this statement, a second analysis was conducted with the purpose of 
estimating, first of all, the market value of Zucchi Group consolidated debt as of 31st 
December 2016, if a debt write-off had not been granted by banks. In particular, two different 
approaches were adopted in order to perform the debt valuation: the BSM model and the DCF 
model applied to cash flows to creditors. 
Both these techniques require, firstly, to forecast the evolution of Zucchi Group operating free 
cash flows and, therefore, to estimate its enterprise value. The cash flows generated from 
operations, indeed, determine the Zucchi Group ability to repay (completely or partially) its 
debt obligations, and, thus, the debt market value.  
The starting point for the estimation of future cash flows, was, in this case, the 2016 
consolidated financial statements and not its pro-forma version. As already mentioned, 
indeed, the 2016 consolidated financial statements, as drawn up by Zucchi Group’s 
accountants, don’t reflect yet the effects of the new financial manoeuvre (except for the 10 
million capital increase), and, therefore, record debt for its total amount of 80 million, include 
in the tangible assets account the real estates that should be transferred to the SPV according 
to the 2015 debt restructuring agreement (with a book value of 26.5 million) and don’t enter 
within costs the rent expense to be paid to the SPV for the plant located in Rescaldina (1 
million).  
The APV technique was then applied to compute the unlevered value of operations. In 
particular, three different scenarios were developed using the same assumptions made in 
paragraph 4.4, which attempt to express the strategic guidelines of the new strategic plan in 
quantitative terms. The only exception to this regards the operating costs, that were computed 
by applying the operating costs on sales ratio, assumed in the valuation post debt write-off, 
and reducing the obtained amount for the rent expense of 1 million, which is not paid in this 
case. Since the strategic plan is not feasible without the support of creditors, it was implicitly 
assumed that creditors did negotiate a new financial maneuver with Zucchi Group in order to 
favor its continuation as a going concern, which, however, provides for a debt rescheduling 
(that requires debt to be totally reimbursed starting from 2017 and by the end of 2021) rather 
than a debt forgiveness, in combination with the 10 million capital increase subscribed by 
Astrance Capital. This hypothetical agreement will be indicated from now on as “restructuring 
with debt rescheduling”, while “restructuring with debt write-off” will concern the debt 
agreement negotiated in December 2015.  
Free cash flows were then discounted at the unlevered cost of capital computed in the 
previous analysis, which is equal to 9.17%, and the continuing value estimated through the 
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growing perpetuity formula, adopting as cost of capital an unlevered cost of equity of 9.25%, 
a bit higher than the cost of capital used in the explicit forecast period, because of the higher 
CRP (2.43% instead of 2.36%) expected in the long run as a consequence of Zucchi Group’s 
expansion in countries with higher country risk than Italy. In this case, indeed, it was not 
considered reasonable to adopt the WACC in the growing perpetuity formula, since Zucchi 
Group appears to be still highly leveraged at the end of the explicit projection period, in all 
the scenarios, making the achievement of a target capital structure in line with the competitors 
average a quite strong assumption.   
The second component of the APV model, the present value of tax shields, was then 
computed considering not only the tax credits generated by accumulated past losses 
(estimated with the same technique applied in the case of the restructuring with debt write-off 
and explained in paragraph 4.8), but also the value of tax savings arising from the fiscal 
deducibility of interest expenses. In particular, in order to estimate this value determinant, the 
interest expenses were computed, first of all, by assuming a cost of debt around 1%. In the 
last debt restructuring agreements, indeed, banks, in order to foster Zucchi Group’s recovery, 
have granted interest rates particularly favorable for the company, despite its high default risk. 
This creditors’ practice was supposed to be adopted also in the hypothetical agreement 
regulating a financial restructuring with debt rescheduling. In particular, past debt contracts 
provided a cost of medium-long term debt equal to 6 months Euribor increased of 100 basis 
point. According to the data and forecasts provided by EURIBOR.IT (as of 22nd December 
2017), this rate was equal to -0.27% in the last months of 2017 and is expected to slightly 
increase in the next year reaching 0.50% in 2021. The cost of debt, therefore, was assumed 
equal to 0.7% in 2017, to 1.0% in 2018, 2019 and 2020 (since no precise estimation are 
provided on Euribor evolution in these years) and to 1.5% in 2021.  
Tax shield flows were then computed, as illustrated by Table 4.24 for the base case (but the 
same process was adopted also in the other scenarios), by multiplying the interest rate for the 
tax rate, supposed equal to 24%, and discounted at the unlevered cost of capital, assuming that 
these tax benefits have the same risk of the company’s operating income that makes them 
possible41. The presence of an EBIT sufficiently positive to allow the deduction of interest 
expenses for their total amount, however, was verified for each year, under each scenario.   
                                                          
41 By discounting the interest tax savings at the unlevered cost of equity, the APV converges to the CCF method. 
Differently from what suggested by the latter, however, it was preferred to continue to keep operating cash 
flows independent from leverage, rather than computing the company’s business enterprise value as the sum 
of discounted capital cash flows.  
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Beyond the explicit forecast period, instead, interest expenses and, therefore, tax shield flows, 
were supposed to grow at the long term g used to compute the continuing value of Zucchi 
Group operations. It was assumed, indeed, that Zucchi Group will resort to a greater use of 
new credit lines (hypothesizing that creditors will be willing to support the group once again) 
to finance its growth in the long term and/or to repay interests expenses and the past debt.  
 
 
Table 4.24 – Calculation of interest tax shield value. 
 
Summing up all its components, the EV of Zucchi Group was computed under each scenario, 
as shown in Table 4.25. 
 
Table 4.25 – Zucchi Group enterprise value in case of restructuring with debt rescheduling. 
In particular, in this case, cash and cash equivalents (7.2 million, which is net of the portion 
equal to 1% of revenues that was considered as working cash and included in the working 
capital) were comprised within the non-operating assets. This allowed to study the debt 
evolution without mixing it with excess cash, since they can have a different dynamic, 
especially in a distress setting, and, therefore, to estimate the value of debt rather than the 
value of the NFP.  
BASE CASE (€ million) 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Base for 
CV
Interest expenses (0,57) (0,76) (0,75) (0,71) (1,03)
Tax shield rate 24%
Tax shield flow 0,14 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,25 0,25
Ku 9,17%
Discount factor 0,92 0,84 0,77 0,70 0,64
PV tax shield flow 0,13 0,15 0,14 0,12 0,16
TOT PV tax shield flow 0,70
CV 3,19
PV CV 2,06
Interest tax shield value 2,76
(€ million) BASE CASE BEST CASE WORST CASE
Unlevered value of assets 56,1 65,5 19,7
Interest tax shield value 2,8 3,2 2,6
NOLs tax shield value 8,4 8,9 2,5
Non operating assets 8,5 8,5 8,5
ENTERPRISE VALUE 75,8 86,1 33,3
Scenario probability 50% 15% 35%
ENTERPRISE VALUE (expected) 62,4
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that the enterprise value in the worst scenario (33.3 million) 
results to be quite close to the liquidation value (31.4 million) computed through the approach 
proposed by Damodaran (2009), showing that the more pessimistic assumptions in the 
scenario analysis provide a reasonable threshold below which companies liquidation will 
probably be triggered by creditors. According to the Damodaran’s approach (2009), the 
distress sales proceeds can be estimated by adding to company’s current cash balance, the 
amount that a healthy firm operating in the same industry should be willing to pay to buy the 
distressed company’s existing assets. As suggested by Damodaran (2009), this amount can be 
computed by discounting past EBIT, which represents a measure of the earning power of 
assets, net of taxes, at the cost of capital for healthy firm, as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 (1 − 𝑡)
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
=
2,88 ∗ (1 − 28%)
8,86%
= 23.44 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
In particular, 2.88 million is the EBIT in 2016, 28% the effective tax rate computed by 
Damodaran for the apparel industry, 8.86% the previously computed WACC.  
Adding cash balance (7.91 million), the total liquidation value results equal to 31.35 million.  
Actually, estimating the potential liquidation value is a very difficult task, since it strongly 
depends on industry-specific factors and company’s features and, therefore, there are no 
universally recognized models to compute it. In particular, the approach based on the earning 
power of assets is a very simplified way to calculate potential distress sale proceeds, which 
provides mostly an intuition about the liquidation value rather than a precise estimate. In any 
case, this approach was preferred to the application of a discount on the book value of assets 
or on the enterprise value, since the latter would have brought to results more affected by the 
subjectivity of the appraiser, given also the difficulty of obtaining data about the distress sales 
of comparable companies on which building an estimate of the discount.  
By adopting the same scenario probabilities used in the valuation of the enterprise value in the 
case of restructuring with debt write-off, then, Zucchi Group expected enterprise value was 
computed, resulting equal to 62.4 million. The latter is not particularly higher than the 
enterprise value expected in case of debt-write off (54.7 million). This resulting limited 
difference, however, can be explained by several factors. First of all, in the case of 
restructuring with debt rescheduling the enterprise value in the best scenario is closer to the 
enterprise value in the base scenario than in the case of restructuring with debt write-off, 
contributing, therefore, to determine a lower expected value. This can be mainly attributed to 
the fact that, in the valuation under restructuring with debt write-off, Zucchi Group was 
considered as more efficient in terms of operating costs on sales in the best scenario than in 
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other scenarios in 2021, largely because in the more optimistic scenario the sale of real estates 
transferred to the SPV was assumed to be concluded in 2020. As a consequence, in this 
scenario the rent expense is expected not to be paid in 2021, determining the elimination of 
fixed costs for 1 million and, therefore, a more pronounced improvement in the EBITDA 
margin than in other scenarios. In the valuation of the enterprise value under restructuring 
with debt rescheduling, instead, the rent expenses were eliminated in all scenarios and 
therefore, the efficiency level expressed in terms of operating costs on sales in the base 
scenario is closer to the one experienced in the best scenario in respect to the case of 
restructuring with debt write-off. This less pronounced difference, then, impinges on the 
continuing value, since the NOPLAT generated in the last year of explicit forecast (2021) is 
the starting point for the computation of the FCFs in the long term and, therefore, the 
continuing value.  
Secondly, in the valuation under restructuring with debt rescheduling, the discount rate used 
in the growing perpetuity formula for the computation of the continuing value is higher than 
the one used in the valuation under debt write-off, given the greater difficulties of Zucchi 
Group in overcoming the financial distress and reaching a target capital structure in line with 
the industry average. This choice further contributed to lower the expected enterprise value 
obtained in case of restructuring with debt rescheduling and to move it closer to the value 
obtained under restructuring with debt write-off. 
Finally, it is also necessary to note that in the valuation under restructuring with debt 
rescheduling, all the assets that should be transferred to the SPV according to the 2015 debt 
restructuring agreement, were considered as operating assets. This valuation choice is 
questionable, given that Zucchi Group decision to use such assets to service debt seems to 
indicate that their contribution to operations is limited. An exception, in any case, is made for 
Rescaldina plant for which a rent expense is regulated in the 2015 debt restructuring 
agreement, suggesting the operating nature of the asset. However, since the 2016 financial 
statements doesn’t provide separated information about the book value of Rescaldina plant, it 
was chosen to adopt a more conservative perspective and to consider all the assets as 
operating. Considering all the assets as non-operating, instead, would have resulted in an 
over-optimistic valuation, because cash flows would have been assumed to be generated also 
thanks to the contribution of Rescaldina operations, but no cost items connected with the use 
of such asset would have been included in the income statements, since both the rent expense 
and depreciation are eliminated from the profit and loss statement.  
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4.10.1 BSM model 
 
The expected enterprise value resulting from the valuation under restructuring with debt 
rescheduling represents the first key determinant of equity and debt value when they are 
estimated within the option pricing theory framework. As already explained in Chapter 2, 
according to the model developed by Black and Scholes (1973), then further elaborated by 
Merton (1974) (from now on: the BSM model), equity can be likened to a call option on 
company’s assets, or, from a different perspective, but with equivalent results, risky debt can 
be interpreted as a combination of risk-free debt plus a put option granted by creditors to 
shareholders to divest firm’s underlying assets upon maturity at the debt nominal value. In 
particular, in a distress setting the value of such put option can reach significant levels, which 
are positive for shareholders and negative for debtholders, given that frequently distressed 
firm’s enterprise value is lower than the debt nominal value at the debt maturity.  
In order to estimate the value of such put option and, therefore, the market value of Zucchi 
Group’s equity and debt, the BSM model was adopted, assuming, as already explained, that a 
debt rescheduling, rather than a debt write-off, was agreed with creditors in the last debt 
restructuring agreement.  
First of all, Zucchi Group equity value was computed by applying the pricing formula for a 
call option developed by BSM (under the assumption of no dividends): 
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑁(𝑑2) 
𝑑1 =  
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆
𝐾) +  (𝑟 +
𝜎2
2 ) 𝑡
𝜎√𝑡
 
𝑑2 =  𝑑1 −  𝜎√𝑡 
  
When applied to equity valuation, the first determinant of such formula is the current value of 
firm’s underlying asset (𝑆), which was assumed equal to the previously computed expected 
enterprise value (62.4 million). The strike price of the option (𝐾), instead, is represented by 
the debt nominal value upon maturity. However, since the BSM model treats the debt as a 
zero-coupon bond, some elaborations were required to apply it to the typical case of debt with 
periodic reimbursement and remuneration.  
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Table 4.25 – Risk-free debt value and debt duration estimation. 
As shown in Table 4.2542, the debt initial (risk-free) value (83.46 million) was firstly 
computed by discounting at the risk-free rates, which are equal, in this order, to the 1 year 
EURIRS, 2 years EURIRS, 3 years EURIRIS, 4 years EURIRS and 5 years EURIRS as of 
December 2016, the cash flows to creditors, which are constituted by the interests and coupon 
payments forecasted in the next years (plus, in 2021, the residual value of debt at the end of 
the projection period). Secondly, debt duration (4.61 years) was calculated as a weighted 
average of cash flows maturities and, lastly, the debt nominal value upon maturity (83.92 
million) was estimated by capitalizing the risk-free debt value at the risk-free rate over a 
period equal to that of the duration of debt. Given that the debt duration is close to 5 years, the 
5 years EURIRS was used in this case and in the BSM formula.  
Finally, enterprise value volatility (𝜎) was assumed equal to 43%, in line with the 
Damodaran’s estimate for the apparel industry (42.97%, updated to 2016). 
 
                                                          
42 Calculations in Table 4.24 were based on the free cash flow to creditors forecasted in the base scenario. The 
same computation in the best scenario and worst scenario led to some slight differences in debt duration and 
risk-free value, which, however, didn’t affect significantly the BSM results.  
2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
Time 1 2 3 4 5
Reorganized debt (nominal value) 80,04 76,43 75,76 73,48 68,64 63,17
Debt variation from plan 3,61 0,67 2,28 4,84 5,47
Debt at the end of the projected period 63,17
Interest expense from plan 0,57 0,76 0,75 0,71 1,03
Free cash flow to debt (FCD) 4,18 1,43 3,03 5,55 69,67
Risk-free rate -0,17% -0,13% -0,06% 0,01% 0,12%
Discount factor 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,99
PV FCD 4,19 1,43 3,03 5,55 69,26
Risk free debt value 83,46
FCF x time 4,19 2,86 9,10 22,18 346,28
Sum (FCD x time) 384,61
Duration 4,61
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Table 4.26 – Risky debt value estimation through BSM model. 
 
Combining all the option pricing determinants according to the BSM formula (Table 4.26), it 
results that the equity is not worthless, as suggested by its negative book value on 31st 
December 2016, but it has a market value of 16.61 million. By subtracting the latter from the 
expected enterprise value, then, it is possible to compute the market value of debt, which is 
equal to 45.84 million. As expected, the market value of debt is significantly lower than its 
nominal value, providing evidence in favor of the hypothesis tested by this second analysis, 
according to which, as stated by KMPG in its audit report, Zucchi Group expected cash flows 
will not be sufficiently high to repay the total debt amount, even if the implementation of the 
new strategic plan is expected to bring performance improvements. Despite the volatility 
characterizing the future evolution of enterprise value, indeed, the probability that the value of 
the firm’s assets will be lower than debt face value is significant (78%). In particular, the 
difference between debt nominal value and market value (37.62 million) at the valuation date, 
quantifies the sacrifice that creditors are willing to accept if they estimate their recovery 
deriving from supporting Zucchi Group continuation as a going concern through debt 
rescheduling as higher than the value of their claims in the case in which other feasible 
solutions to exit the crisis (including liquidation) are selected.  
 
4.10.2 DCF model applied to cash flows to debt 
 
A second estimate of the market value of Zucchi Group consolidated debt, then, was 
developed by applying the DCF model to free cash flows to creditors. The most critical issue 
BSM MODEL 2016
EV (S) 62,45
Risk free debt value 83,46
Debt duration (t) 4,61
Risk free rate (r) 0,12%
Debt nominal value at maturity (K) 83,92
EV volatility (σ ) 43%
d1 0,15
d2 -0,78
N(d1) 0,56
N(d2) 0,22
Equity value 16,61
Debt value 45,84
Put value of debt 37,62
Risk neutral probability of default 78,10%
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of this approach, however, consists on deriving the market cost of debt used to discount the 
cash flows, which may not correspond to the cost agreed with creditors, since the latter can 
decide to grant favorable rates for the firm, in order to foster its recovery. As suggested by 
Buttignon (2014), the market value of debt was computed through an iterative calculation, 
which first requires to compute the interest coverage ratio by dividing EBIT for the interest 
expenses. The latter were calculated by multiply the market cost of debt, computed as the sum 
of the risk-free rate and a default spread initially assumed equal to an input number randomly 
chosen, for the nominal value of the reorganized debt computed as the average between its 
level at the beginning and at the end of the year. Then, on the basis of the interest coverage 
ratio, a rating class was associated to the group in each year and a credit default spread was 
forecasted, according to the table presented in Appendix 6. The market cost of debt was 
therefore calculated by summing up the risk-free rate with the resulting credit spread and it 
was then used to compute the financial expenses. This, in turn, modifies the interest coverage 
and therefore the rating class, giving rise to an iterative process that finally allows to calculate 
the market cost of debt in each year of projection. 
This rate was then used to compute the present value of free cash flows to debt, which are 
equal to the interest and debt repayments executed by Zucchi Group according to the 
evolution of its performance expected in the base case, assuming the debt value at the end of 
the projection period as equal to its nominal value in the last year43.  
  
This second approach, therefore, manages the uncertainty about Zucchi Group’s future 
prospects by discounting free cash flow to debt forecasted in the base scenario at the market 
cost of debt (which include the default spread), rather than through the scenario analysis (in 
combination with the use of risk-free discount rate), and estimates the market value of debt as 
equal to 41.91 million (Table 4.27).  
This result not only provides further evidence about Zucchi Group’s inability to meet its debt 
obligations, despite the performance recovery expected from the implementation of the 
strategic plan, but it is also quite close to the estimate obtained through the BSM model (45.8 
million), in spite of the several assumptions underlying the two methods and their significant 
impact on the results (specifically, the market cost of debt and the variance of the EV for the 
DCF model applied to FCD and the BSM model, respectively) 
 
                                                          
43 In any case, it had been verified that this value was not higher than the residual value of Zucchi Group assets 
at the end of the explicit projection period. 
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Table 4.27 - Risky debt value estimation through DCF model applied to FCD. 
 
4.10.3 Further intuitions on the market value of debt 
 
Summing up, both the valuation techniques confirm that Zucchi Group is expected not to be 
able to reimburse its total debt in the 5 years following the valuation date, in spite of the signs 
of recovery that are assumed to emerge from the implementation of the strategic plan. This 
justifies, therefore, the choice of creditors to write-off Zucchi Group’s debt, rather than opting 
for its rescheduling.  
The debt forgiveness actually granted by banks, however, is higher than the one suggested by 
the implementation of the BSM model and DCF model. By writing-off 50 million debt and 
allocating to the SPV the residual 30 million, which are expected to be reimbursed through 
assets disposal, indeed, creditors seem to have attributed to the total debt of 80 million a 
market value of 30 million, that is lower than the one computed through the BSM model (45.8 
million) and DCF model (41.9 million) in paragraph 4.10.1 and paragraph 4.10.2, 
respectively. This difference can be explained by two main arguments. First of all, creditors 
valued debt at the end of 2015, before the signature of the 2015 debt restructuring agreement 
which had taken place on 23rd December 2015, when the main financial ratios describing 
Zucchi Group’s operating performance were still in a negative area. At that date, therefore, 
the first signs of recovery experienced in 2016 were only a forecast, at best, and not a real 
fact. The valuation conducted as of 31st December 2016, instead, is rooted in the 2016 Zucchi 
(€ million) 2016A 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E
EBIT 3,35 4,09 5,10 6,97 8,16
Interest expenses (revised at market cost of debt) 15,51 15,12 14,88 14,22 10,62
EBIT/Int expenses 0,22 0,27 0,34 0,49 0,77
Rating class D D D D C
Credit or default spread 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 20,00% 16,00%
Risk free rate -0,17% -0,13% -0,06% 0,01% 0,12%
Market cost of debt 19,83% 19,87% 19,94% 20,01% 16,12%
Reorganized debt (nominal value) 80,04 76,43 75,76 73,48 68,64 63,17
Interest expense from plan 0,57 0,76 0,75 0,71 1,03
Debt variation from plan 3,61 0,67 2,28 4,84 5,47
Free cash flows to debt (FCD) from plan 4,18 1,43 3,03 5,55 6,50
Discount factor 0,83 0,70 0,58 0,48 0,47
PV FCD 3,49 0,99 1,76 2,67 3,08
TOT PV FCD 11,99
Debt value at the end of the projection period 29,92 63,17
Market value of debt 41,91
Nominal value of debt 80,04
Shareholder's value of the reorganization plan 38,13
Discount on the nominal value of debt 47,63%
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Group slightly improved conditions and forecasts the continuation of this positive trend in the 
future years in both base and best scenario44. The presence of less pronounced actual 
evidences in favour of Zucchi Group forthcoming recovery at the time in which valuation was 
performed by creditors, therefore, could have affected the development of the assumptions 
about the evolution of the group’s key value drivers, leading to creditors’ more conservative 
estimates. The latter results in an expected enterprise value closer to the previously computed 
liquidation value and, therefore, in lower cash flows to creditors than the ones forecasted in 
paragraph 4.10.2, leading, regardless the valuation technique adopted (BSM model or DCF 
model applied to FCD), to a lower market value of debt than the one estimated as of 31st 
December 2016. In particular, if the assumptions at the basis of the worst scenario had been 
used in order to build the reference scenario, the DCF model applied to FCD would have 
resulted in a market value of debt equal to 20.4 million. This suggests that creditors probably 
translated the strategic guidelines provided in the 2015-2020 Restructuring Plan into 
assumptions about the evolution of Zucchi Group’s key value drivers which lie between the 
assumptions underlying the base case and the assumptions underlying the worst case in the 
scenario analysis performed in paragraph 4.4.  
Secondly, it should be noted that the market value of debt that seems to emerge by the 2015 
debt restructuring agreement (30 million) is actually the result of the negotiation between 
different claimholders, and, therefore, of the interaction of stakeholders’ strategic behaviours 
and bargaining powers, which are determinants of value not considered in the BSM model 
adopted in paragraph 4.10.1. When the BSM model is used to price corporate debt and 
equity, indeed, it is necessary to remember that it is based on several simplified assumptions 
which partially compromise the reliability of results when applied to real world cases. For 
instance, as already explained, the model considers a zero coupon debt with no special 
features and assumes that default can occur only at the debt maturity date. In case of periodic 
debt reimbursements and remunerations, as it is typical in real cases, however, default can be 
strategically triggered by shareholders before the debt maturity date to extract concessions 
from creditors. The latter anticipate the opportunistic behaviour of equity holders, that makes 
the debt riskier, and reflect it on lower debt value and higher yield spreads (Mella-Barral & 
Perraudin 1997, Acharya et al. 2006). The lower market value of debt suggested by the 2015 
debt restructuring agreement, therefore, could also be explained by these strategic components 
not considered in the BSM model applied in paragraph 4.10.1. Even if this limitation could 
                                                          
44 In the worst scenario, instead, the 2016 is considered as a lucky year for the group, whose performance is 
expected to worsen in 2018, also because of the entrance of a new player in the household linen industry, and 
then to slowly recover in the next years.    
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theoretically be overcome by adopting one of the several approaches rooted in the Merton’s 
model and developed in the attempt to introduce stakeholders’ behavior and bargaining power 
in the pricing of corporate securities, their little practical applicability makes them impossible 
to be adopted without adding further subjectivity to the valuation.   
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
If estimating the company value is a difficult task at the best of times, it becomes even more 
complex when the firm presents the features of distress. The corporate crisis, indeed, results in 
a progressive deterioration of firm’s economic value at the expense of all its stakeholders, 
partially invalidating the use of traditional valuation techniques, which are generally designed 
for healthy and growing firms. A clear understanding of the crisis phenomenon, therefore, is 
the starting point to better figure out the effects of distress at the valuation process level. An 
in-depth analysis of crisis causes, signals, evolutionary path and potential solutions, indeed, 
provides a useful tool to interpret company’s historical performance and to predict its future 
prospects, whose characteristics and underlying uncertainty, being a key determinant of 
company’s current economic value, are required to be appropriately captured and managed in 
the valuation.  
Specifically, the analysis preparatory to the valuation starts from the identification of the 
causes originating the company’s downward turn, and, therefore, of all internal and external 
factors, that, by acting together, reciprocally amplify their effect on company performance. A 
firm, indeed, is seldom in trouble for only one reason. First of all, therefore, the signals of 
decline have to be promptly detected through a ratio analysis, models combining accounting 
measures to judge company’s financial health, or, sometimes, simple intuitions, and traced 
back to the originating events, in order to identify the cause-effect relations underlying the 
distress. The earlier that the signals of crisis are identified, the less expensive and more 
effective are the available tools to restore company performance and, therefore, the higher is 
the probability that the company will continue to operate as a going concern. If the signals of 
distress are not promptly detected, instead, the downward trend inherent in the crisis 
phenomenon will proceed through its different stages, until causing the firm’s going concern 
value to be lower than the face value of debt. At this step, the crisis is no longer only 
potential, but it is still reversible if radical restructuring actions are implemented. Solutions 
that go beyond “quick-fixes” and “band-aid” approaches, therefore, have to be designed by 
the current or new ownership at the managerial, operational, portfolio and financial levels and 
negotiated with creditors through out-of-court workouts or in-court resolutions. In particular, 
the contents of the restructuring plan, which are expected to cause a market reaction as soon 
as they are publically announced depending on whether they reveal more or less unfavorable 
information about the company’s actual conditions and future cash flows than the market 
previously realized, have to be carefully judged when valuing a distressed company. In this 
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context, indeed, it becomes fundamental to understand whether the designed solution 
appropriately acts on the causes of the crisis, strongly fostering the continuation of the 
company as a going concern, or whether liquidation still remains a highly likely scenario.  
The probability that the firm will cease its operations, in fact, is one of the elements 
characterizing distressed firm’s future prospects that make the estimation of its economic 
value particularly complex. Traditional valuation techniques indeed, implicitly assume the 
firm as a going concern with potentially infinite life, generally forecasting that the company 
will grow in perpetuity in the long run. Distressed firms’ declining revenues, shrinking 
operating margins and high leverage levels, instead, not only may prevent the firm to reach a 
steady state at the end of the explicit projection period, but even can determine the firm’s 
liquidation in the very near future if restructuring actions are not implemented or reveal 
themselves to be ineffective. Probability of default and liquidation value, therefore, should be 
incorporated in distressed firm valuation, giving rise to additional estimation issues. Despite 
the several approaches developed in the literature to estimate these value determinants, 
indeed, each proposed method presents its own limitations, which are more or less crucial 
depending also on firm-specific conditions, making it impossible to universally identify the 
best approach.  
Another valuation component which is generally not considered when valuing healthy 
companies, then, consists on the costs of distress. However, while direct costs of distress can 
be estimated by looking at actual bankruptcies, indirect costs of distress are not directly 
observable and, therefore, difficult to measure, even if empirically researches point out that 
they are far too substantial to be ignored in valuation. In addition to these value determinants, 
whose estimation complexity jeopardizes the accuracy of the valuation results, strategic 
factors can intervene in the valuation. This frequently happens when, as it is typical for 
distressed firms, the market process is substituted by an administrative process of bankruptcy, 
which, by limiting the amount and quality of available information, creates room for strategic 
behaviors. Since the output of the valuation process determines the size of the pie to be 
divided among company’s claimholders and drives the projected recoveries, indeed, junior 
and senior debt holders can have opposite incentive to support, respectively, upwardly or 
downwardly biased estimates. On the other hand, then, shareholders can opt for strategically 
triggering default in order to extract more concessions from creditors. The result of the 
valuation performed by each claimholder, therefore, will be driven by their own strategic 
incentives and will already discount the lower recovery expected in case of other 
claimholders’ subsequent strategic actions. 
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These peculiarities of distressed firm valuation have drawn the attention of a large part of the 
corporate finance literature, which, however, has frequently approached this critical issue 
through the elaboration of theoretical models that, in the attempt to be as comprehensive as 
possible, finally show little applicability to real world cases. The most practical solution to 
value firm in a distress setting, therefore, still consists on adjusting traditional valuation 
techniques to appropriately reflect distress effects on firm value. In particular, when the 
distress is severe enough to be terminal, the traditional asset approach provides a useful basis 
for the estimation of the liquidation value, to which a further discount has to be applied in 
case of forced liquidation, since the urgency of the sale and the lower firm’s bargaining power 
can result in lower proceeds than in case of orderly liquidation. When there is a real chance 
that the firm will survive the crisis, instead, the liquidation scenario should be combined with 
going concern scenarios. In the latter case, however, the income approach results more 
suitable to capture the uncertainty underlying company’s future cash flows, generally 
managed through an accurate scenario analysis or the adoption of more complex statistical 
techniques as the Monte Carlo simulation. As regards the cash flows discount rate, instead, 
the characteristics of distressed firms, as the unique dynamic of debt to equity ratio, 
invalidate, among others, the common practice of assuming a constant target capital structure 
during the explicit forecast period, making the adoption of the WACC and, therefore, of the 
DCF model, generally not suitable in a distress setting. In this context, the APV method and 
the CCF method, instead, reveal their technical superiority to the DCF model, by relying on 
the unlevered cost of equity to discount cash flows from operations and by separating them 
from the benefits arising from debt tax shields and other tax credits, which can represent a 
substantial source of value for distressed companies and require to be carefully forecasted 
given the peculiar dynamic that they can experience in a distress setting. The different 
discount rate adopted to value the tax shields, then, determines which one between the APV 
method and the CCF method is the more appropriate technique depending on company’s debt 
strategy. These methods, in addition, serve better the purpose of distressed firm valuation than 
the market approach that is generally less suitable to distress contexts given the difficulty of 
identifying comparable companies with the same degree of distress of the company being 
valued and the typical presence of negative measures of value and, therefore, negative 
multiples.  
Alongside the traditional valuation approaches, whose limitations in a distress setting, 
possible solutions and solutions’ drawbacks are summarized in Table 5.1, another 
increasingly used framework for the valuation of distressed companies is the one provided by 
 214 
 
the option pricing theory. By considering the equity as a call option on firm’s assets value, the 
option pricing model for the valuation of corporate securities allows to value the firm’s equity 
even when the traditional valuation approaches, by resulting in firm value estimates under a 
going concern or liquidation scenario lower than outstanding debt face value, erroneously 
suggest that the equity is worthless. Even this approach, however, presents several limitations 
rooted in its simplified underlying assumptions that, despite the several attempts reported in 
the literature, have not already be overcome in a comprehensive model, without renouncing to 
its practical applicability. 
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Adjusted 
Book Value 
Method  
 
Replacement 
Cost Method  
Suitability only in liquidation 
scenario 
 
Important determinants of 
(forced) liquidation value are 
not taken into account (sale’s 
urgency, firm’s low 
bargaining power, liquidation 
costs, ..) 
Apply to the resulting value 
a discount based on the 
experience of distress sale of 
other firms operating in the 
industry  
Firm’s peculiarities in 
respect to comparable 
companies may require a 
case by case analysis 
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M
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P
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H
 
Traditional 
income 
approach (as 
a group) 
Inability to manage the high 
uncertainty underlying 
distressed firm’s future cash 
flows 
 
Positive growth rates assumed 
in perpetuity to compute the 
terminal value fail to account 
for the possibility of firm’s 
exit from the business and/or 
liquidation.   
Scenario analysis 
 
Underlying assumptions 
and scenario probabilities 
are strongly affected by 
analyst’s subjectivity 
 
Distress is considered as a 
discrete variable and not as 
a continuous risk  
Monte Carlo Simulation 
Computationally intensive 
technique 
 
Selecting the probability 
distributions of critical 
variables is a difficult task 
which strongly affects the 
outcome 
Adjust going concern DCF 
for default probability 
Less accurate estimate 
than the one resulting from 
scenario analysis and 
simulations 
Discounted 
Cash Flow 
Method 
Discount rate contortions 
 
 
 
Include bankruptcy costs 
and probability of default 
directly in the WACC 
formula 
Assumptions underlying 
the derivation of the 
formula are not reliable 
Regression beta are not 
reliable 
 
Re-lever bottom-up 
unlevered beta  
Further estimation issues 
arise from the computation 
of beta debt  
Use healthy firms average 
beta and add a distress 
premium 
Distress risk puzzle 
Yield to maturity is not a good 
proxy of the cost of debt 
Apply CAPM to risky debt 
Estimation issues 
connected with the 
computation of beta debt 
Add a default spread to the 
risk-free rate 
Default spread are based 
only on historical data and 
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the method is not forward 
looking  
Subtract the yield equivalent 
of expected default loss 
from the promise yield 
Dependence on Merton’s 
model limitations.  
Constant target debt to equity 
ratio in line with industry 
average over the entire 
valuation period results in 
firm value overestimation 
Adjust debt to equity ratio 
year by year, as the 
restructuring process 
progresses 
Complex process that can 
lead to significant errors 
Adjusted 
Present 
Value 
Method 
Discount interest tax shields at 
the cost of debt unrealistically 
assuming constant debt level 
over the entire valuation 
period 
Use the unlevered cost of 
equity to discount tax 
shields flows  
Peers selection can 
strongly affects the 
resulting discount rate 
Distress costs require to be 
explicitly estimated  
Compute distress costs as 
the difference between firm 
going concern and distress 
sale value 
 
Compute distress costs as a 
percentage of the firm’s pre 
distress value looking at 
their magnitude in actual 
bankruptcies 
Simplified approaches that 
lack of precision and don’t 
account for firm-specific 
features 
Capital 
Cash Flows 
Method 
NOLs at the end of the 
explicit forecast period are 
incorrectly incorporated in the 
terminal value and assumed to 
grow in perpetuity since they 
are part of the CCF 
Extend explicit forecast 
period until NOLs 
expiration 
Increasing uncertainty of 
future cash flows 
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Comparable 
Companies 
Method 
 
Comparable 
Transactions 
Method 
Peers selection when other 
players in the industry are 
healthy and growing 
Select distressed comparable 
companies from other 
industries 
Comparables from other 
industry may be in a better 
position in terms of 
generating distress sale 
proceeds  
 
Firms may be distressed at 
a different degree, 
justifying differences in 
multiplies. 
Analysts subjectivity in 
interpreting distressed firms 
lower than healthy peers’ 
average multiples as a 
discount due to default risk 
and not as a sign of mispricing 
Distress explicit 
incorporation: computing 
firm’s value as a weighted 
average of distress sale 
value and going concern 
relative value, where 
weights are, respectively, 
the probability of default 
and its complementary 
Estimating distress sale 
value and probability of 
default is not 
straightforward in practice 
Negative multiples 
Adopt revenues multiple 
Information about firm’s 
operating efficiency is 
ignored  
Apply healthy comparables 
multiples to future measures 
of value 
Firm’s continuation as a 
going concern is taken for 
granted 
Table 5.1 – Traditional valuation methods limitations in a distress setting. 
 
Shifting from theory to practice, with the purpose of providing a practical approach to the 
valuation of distressed companies, then, the economic value of Zucchi Group was 
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investigated and estimated by combining different valuation techniques, appropriately 
adjusted to incorporate distress.  
Specifically, Zucchi Group is an Italian company operating in the household linen industry 
that, after more than 80 years of growth, started to reveal the first signals of decline in the 
early 2000s. From then on, the ineffectiveness of the restructuring actions implemented in the 
attempt to restore the group’s operating performance and financial health led to a progressive 
intensification of the distress conditions, which reached a “make or break” point in December 
2015, when the public prosecutor notified the company a bankruptcy petition. As emerged 
from the crisis analysis performed by comparing Zucchi Group’s key financial ratios over 
time and with comparable companies, a combination of several causes can be identified 
behind the prolonged downward trend suffered by the company (Figure 5.1). In particular, 
even if external factors, such as the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis and 
the increasing competitiveness of imports in the household linen industry, negatively 
impacted the group performance, the main causes of the crisis showed to have an internal 
nature. The company’s inability to promptly adapt to the changing macroeconomic and 
industry conditions, indeed, can be attributed to the group too rigid costs and production 
structure, whose origins can be traced back to the inefficient approach to merger and 
acquisitions adopted by the group during its expansion period. The resulting distress at the 
operating level, then, was exacerbated by an excessive recourse to financial leverage, that, in 
turn, was progressively amplified by the lack of a stable recovery in operating cash flows.  
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Figure 5.1 – The main causes of Zucchi Group crisis. 
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Solutions to overcome all these causes of distress are provided for the first time in the 2015-
2020 Restructuring Plan. Differently from the previous attempts to exit the crisis, indeed, the 
latter not only provides for a more radical financial restructuring through the write-off of a 
substantial portion of Zucchi Group’s consolidated debt, but also exploit the opportunities 
offered by the external environment, such as the expansion in foreign markets, only after 
having focused on group costs and production structure, through actions aimed at a stable 
reduction of structural costs and the disposal of redundant assets. The strategic guidelines of 
the restructuring plan, in addition, seems to be in line with latest market trends and 
competitors’ KSFs by pursuing, among other objectives, the strengthening of the e-commerce 
network and the enhancement of customer experience in shop.  
All these elements, in addition to the first signs of recovery reported by the group in 2016 
annual financial statements and September 2017 quarterly financial statements, supported the 
adoption of a going concern hypothesis as a framework for the valuation. Nonetheless, the 
pronounced inversion in the operating performance expected from the implementation of the 
restructuring plan in the base and best scenarios, was combined with the less optimistic future 
prospects underlying the worst scenario. In particular, as shown in Figure 5.2, while the free 
cash flows are expected to remain positive over the entire period of explicit projection in the 
base scenario, despite the no trivial capital expenditure forecasted in 2018 and 2019, in the 
worst case scenario the free cash flows are expected to come back to negative levels and then 
to stabilize to a positive level below the one forecasted for 2017, assuming the signals of 
recovery documented in the last available 2017 quarterly financial statements as 
extraordinarily favorable results. This determined Zucchi Group enterprise value in the worst 
scenario to be extremely lower in respect to base and best scenario and close to the computed 
liquidation value, but in any case higher than the latter, further justifying the adoption of a 
going concern framework for the valuation.   
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Figure 5.2 – FCFs and ROIC projections in the base and worst scenarios.  
 
The uncertainty underlying Zucchi Group future prospects, therefore, was first of all managed 
through the development of a scenario analysis, starting from a 2016 financial statements 
appropriately adjusted in order to completely reflect the effects of the 2015 debt restructuring 
agreement on consolidated balance sheet and income statement. The unlevered cost of capital, 
computed through the CAPM, was then used to discount the operating free cash flows over 
the explicit projection period while the WACC was adopted in the growing perpetuity 
formula. A mixed version of the APV method, therefore, was implemented to value Zucchi 
Group, resorting to the DCF technique for the computation of Zucchi Group value beyond the 
explicit forecast period, under the assumption that the group will reach a steady state in 2021 
and will converge to a capital structure in line with the industry average in the long run. In 
particular, given that the continuing value is responsible for a significant portion of total 
enterprise value, as it is typical for firms undertaking a restructuring plan, the reliability of its 
underlying assumptions was verified and confirmed through the adoption of a market 
approach based on comparable companies EV/EBITDA multiple. By applying the industry 
average multiple to the firm’s measure of value expected in the first year reflecting firm’s 
normalized operations, the main limitations of the market approach to value distressed firms 
are circumvented and a useful market check provided on the estimate resulting from the DCF 
method.  
Particular attention was then dedicated to another important determinant of value in a distress 
setting, the tax loss carry-forward, which cannot be assumed to continue in perpetuity, 
requiring, therefore, that NOLs are explicitly forecasted until their expiration. Finally, by 
summing up all its components, Zucchi Group’s enterprise value was estimated in each 
3,14
0,21
1,85
4,40
5,29
11,8%
13,5%
15,3%
19,9%
22,9%
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
-2,00
-1,00
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Base Scenario
FCF (€ million) ROIC
3,54
(0,13)
(1,13)
0,21 1,26
10,0%
4,2% 4,7%
5,7%
7,4%
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
(2,00)
(1,00)
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Worst Scenario 
FCF (€ million) ROIC
 220 
 
scenario and its expected value computed by attributing different probability of realization to 
each scenario. The equity value was then derived by subtracting the value of NFP and debt 
equivalent and it resulted to be in line with Zucchi Group average market capitalization over 
the last three months of 2016. A second estimation of Zucchi Group expected equity value 
was then performed by capturing the uncertainty underlying Zucchi Group future prospects in 
the discount rate, rather than by means of the scenario analysis, and discounting, therefore, the 
free cash flows in the base scenario at a higher discount rate which incorporates a distress 
premium in line with the excess return reported in the market by stocks of companies with 
high financial risk. Also in this second case, the estimate resulted to be in line with Zucchi 
Group market capitalization and, therefore, with the output of the valuation conducted 
through the scenario analysis, pointing out that the uncertainty about Zucchi Group’s future 
performance was reasonably managed through the scenario analysis, whose underlying 
assumptions appear to adequately capture the market expectations. By combining different 
methods of the income approach and limiting the subjectivity in the development of the 
scenario analysis through several market checks, the proposed valuation process, therefore, 
results to adequately reflect in company’s economic value the riskiness typical of distressed 
firms, maintaining at the same time a high applicability to real world cases.  
A second analysis was then conducted to deal with the estimation of the market value of debt, 
which is another critical issue in distressed firm valuation. For this purpose, it was supposed 
that 2015 debt restructuring agreement provided for a simple debt rescheduling, rather than 
regulating the creation of a SPV and the debt write-off. Under this assumption, the enterprise 
value was estimated in each scenario and the debt market value computed through two 
different approaches. Firstly, the distressed debt was interpreted as a combination of risk-free 
debt plus a put option granted by creditors to shareholders and its value computed through the 
option pricing model (BSM model). Secondly, the DCF model was applied to free cash flows 
to debt, by discounting the latter at a market cost of debt computed through an iterative 
process. Both the methods result in a market value of debt lower than its nominal value, 
supporting the conclusion reached by KPMG in its audit report about the inability of Zucchi 
Group future cash flows to meet total debt obligations, despite the performance improvements 
expected from the implementation of the strategic plan, and justifying, therefore, the 
creditors’ choice to grant a debt forgiveness.  
The assignation of a rating class solely on the basis of the interest coverage ratio and the 
derivation of the enterprise value volatility from the industry average, however, are two 
simplified assumptions at the basis of the models that can significantly impact the results, as 
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well as the presence of a single debt layer, which was supposed in the case of Zucchi Group, 
since no public available documents provide detailed information about the debt composition, 
but it is seldom the case in a distress setting. In addition, the role played by strategic factors in 
the valuation of corporate securities is not taken into account in the adopted option pricing 
model. Solving these limitations, however, as proposed by different theoretical model in the 
literature, will come at the expense of its practical applicability.    
As regards the computation of the enterprise value, instead, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted to verify how it is expected to vary by changing the assumptions underlying key 
inputs variables. A similar analysis, however, could result interesting to be performed also on 
the probabilities of realization of each scenario, which, in the Zucchi Group case, were 
assigned on the basis of intuitions developed from the analysis of company’s history. When 
firm’s conditions suggest that the distress could be terminal, instead, the probability of default 
should be computed and associated to the liquidation scenario.  
In conclusion, despite its limitations, the proposed approach to the valuation of distressed 
companies was proven to provide a useful solution to adequately model the main features of 
distressed firms that, as Zucchi Group, are subjected to a restructuring at both the strategic 
and financial level in the attempt to overcame the crisis, without renouncing to the practical 
applicability of the valuation process, in a context in which, however, building a 
comprehensive and, at the same time, concrete model for valuing distressed firms still remain 
an open challenge and an alluring venture.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1 – Zucchi Group’s reorganized financial statements and key ratios. 
 
(€ million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Working cash* 3,7 3,9 4,1 3,9 3,5 3,3 3,0 2,8 2,6 2,2 1,9 1,8 1,6 1,5 1,0 0,9 0,8
Trade receivables 121,9 123,1 135,2 121,6 115,5 122,5 113,1 111,2 96,5 81,1 76,4 61,0 51,2 45,8 27,0 22,9 22,7
Inventories 110,4 132,8 130,1 151,9 151,5 125,4 104,6 98,2 91,9 84,2 71,2 71,0 48,1 45,9 37,2 21,3 20,8
Trade payables (58,7) (61,6) (61,7) (57,8) (51,4) (50,5) (58,0) (54,7) (51,4) (42,8) (50,9) (35,1) (32,1) (29,4) (21,2) (24,9) (11,5)
Trade working capital 177,3 198,1 207,7 219,6 219,1 200,7 162,7 157,5 139,5 124,7 98,6 98,7 68,8 63,7 44,0 20,3 32,9
Other operating current assets 14,8 14,2 12,7 14,1 11,8 14,1 14,2 9,6 9,2 6,9 3,6 3,4 5,4 3,4 3,2 2,3 4,3
Other operating current l iabilities (18,9) (21,0) (24,5) (26,7) (22,4) (16,1) (18,2) (15,5) (15,9) (15,7) (9,5) (9,7) (8,7) (9,4) (5,8) (8,1) (5,5)
Other current assets and liabilities (4,0) (6,9) (11,8) (12,6) (10,5) (2,0) (4,0) (5,9) (6,7) (8,8) (5,8) (6,3) (3,3) (6,0) (2,6) (5,9) (1,3)
Net working capital 173,3 191,2 195,9 207,1 208,6 198,7 158,7 151,6 132,8 115,9 92,8 92,4 65,5 57,7 41,4 14,4 31,6
Operating fixed capital 118,1 119,5 115,6 117,1 122,0 150,2 114,9 85,9 77,0 79,2 73,5 68,4 63,3 62,7 37,9 34,5 32,9
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 1,0 1,2 0,6 4,1 4,1 3,2 2,0 0,3 1,0 0,8 1,8 1,5 2,6 3,7 0,9 1,0 1,0
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 9,6 6,7 5,5 8,2 7,3 (3,9) (8,0) (4,3) (4,9) (6,4) (6,7) (5,9) (6,4) (6,0) (6,9) (6,6) (6,2)
Operating non-current l iabilities (1,5) (1,1) (0,7) 0,0 0,0 (3,2) (2,1) 0,0 (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,7)
Operating provisions (1,3) (1,4) (2,6) (1,5) (1,6) (1,4) (1,3) (1,0) (1,4) (1,4) (1,4) (1,3) (1,0) (1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 7,8 5,3 2,8 10,8 9,8 (5,4) (9,4) (5,0) (5,4) (7,1) (6,2) (5,8) (4,9) (3,5) (7,1) (6,6) (7,0)
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 299,2 316,1 314,3 335,0 340,5 343,5 264,3 232,6 204,4 188,0 160,1 155,0 123,8 116,9 72,3 42,2 57,5
Goodwill  and similar intangibles 11,7 11,7 13,3 14,9 16,3 15,3 13,4 12,5 12,6 10,5 1,8 1,3 1,0 2,0 0,9 0,5 0,4
Deferred tax asset/(liabilities) on similar intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 1,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 11,7 11,7 13,3 14,9 16,3 15,3 13,4 12,5 13,9 11,9 1,8 1,3 1,0 2,0 0,9 0,5 0,4
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 310,9 327,8 327,6 349,9 356,8 358,8 277,7 245,0 218,3 199,9 161,9 156,3 124,8 118,9 73,3 42,8 57,9
Non-operating current assets 0,4 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,1 0,0 1,1 1,8 0,6 1,0 1,0 1,6 0,4 0,4 0,3
Other non-operating current l iabilities (9,5) (7,6) (6,4) (4,8) (3,7) (2,6) (1,4) (2,2) (0,2) (2,9) (0,3) (0,4) (1,1) (0,3) (0,3) (0,7) (0,8)
Non-operating non-current assets 7,1 7,9 8,4 7,5 6,1 6,0 26,7 38,2 24,1 6,6 45,4 4,2 1,6 1,5 32,2 0,6 0,5
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 0,0 0,0 0,0 (1,6) (2,3) (0,9) 2,4 1,1 0,5 (5,1) (3,5) (2,1) 0,9 0,2 3,3 2,0 1,3
Non-operating non-current l iabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 (14,5) (6,0) 0,0 (41,5) 0,0 0,0 0,0 (31,6) 0,0 0,0
Non-operating assets (2,0) 1,0 2,7 1,6 0,4 3,1 27,8 22,5 19,5 0,3 0,7 2,7 2,5 3,0 4,1 2,2 1,3
TOTAL FUNDS INVESTED 308,9 328,7 330,3 351,4 357,2 362,0 305,5 267,6 237,8 200,2 162,6 159,0 127,4 121,9 77,3 45,0 59,2
REORGANIZED BALANCE SHEET (Invested Capital)
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(€ million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Excess cash (30,0) (34,6) (30,5) (32,9) (37,9) (31,2) (26,5) (22,6) (17,9) (3,6) (2,3) (6,1) (8,1) (11,2) (6,9) (9,4) (7,2)
Long-term borrowings 21,1 23,1 35,7 26,2 64,2 40,1 14,5 46,9 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 28,7 0,0 0,0 0,0
Short-term borrowings 75,3 97,8 84,8 123,6 120,7 145,3 137,8 73,4 133,2 128,4 125,6 131,0 111,6 75,0 97,3 80,3 80,0
Net financial position 66,5 86,3 90,0 116,9 146,9 154,2 125,8 97,6 120,6 125,1 123,5 125,0 103,5 92,5 90,4 70,9 72,9
Provision for employee benefit 30,8 29,8 30,8 31,4 29,5 30,4 26,0 21,6 18,4 16,1 14,0 12,1 12,8 12,8 9,6 7,7 7,0
Non-operating provisions 1,5 1,1 2,2 2,9 9,8 23,5 11,6 6,1 7,9 16,9 2,9 1,6 1,3 5,0 3,7 6,1 4,6
Debt equivalents 32,3 30,8 33,0 34,3 39,3 54,0 37,5 27,8 26,3 33,0 16,8 13,8 14,1 17,8 13,3 13,8 11,6
Net financial position and debt equivalents 98,8 117,1 123,0 151,2 186,2 208,2 163,4 125,4 146,9 158,1 140,3 138,8 117,6 110,3 103,8 84,6 84,5
Minority interests 43,4 25,2 22,5 22,1 18,1 20,3 20,0 20,6 10,1 8,4 8,8 8,0 6,7 5,3 (0,0) 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 166,7 186,4 184,8 178,1 152,9 133,5 122,2 121,5 80,9 33,7 13,4 12,2 3,0 6,3 (26,5) (39,6) (25,3)
TOTAL SOURCE OF FINANCING 308,9 328,7 330,3 351,4 357,2 362,0 305,5 267,6 237,8 200,2 162,6 159,0 127,4 121,9 77,3 45,0 59,2
*Working cash on revenues 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0%
REORGANIZED BALANCE SHEET (Source of financing)
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(€ million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Revenues 375,0 385,6 405,4 388,6 355,0 330,3 300,5 279,6 258,7 221,9 188,2 184,9 159,0 151,0 100,2 92,9 80,4
Other income 1,8 2,4 2,9 2,4 5,4 2,8 1,0 4,1 2,9 2,6 3,3 2,2 2,4 1,3 0,6 0,2 0,5
Operating costs (329,8) (342,6) (361,9) (351,9) (321,1) (328,3) (284,8) (261,4) (269,1) (226,4) (179,7) (189,5) (163,5) (163,9) (111,3) (98,3) (76,3)
EBITDA 47,0 45,3 46,5 39,1 39,3 4,8 16,6 22,3 (7,5) (1,9) 11,8 (2,4) (2,1) (11,6) (10,5) (5,1) 4,6
Depreciation (19,7) (21,5) (22,7) (23,0) (23,6) (19,8) (17,5) (14,7) (11,7) (11,9) (7,7) (6,1) (5,5) (4,8) (2,8) (2,3) (1,5)
EBITA 27,3 23,9 23,8 16,1 15,7 (15,0) (0,8) 7,7 (19,2) (13,7) 4,1 (8,5) (7,6) (16,4) (13,3) (7,5) 3,1
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (4,5) (5,5) (3,9) (3,6) (4,2) (2,9) (2,9) (2,5) (2,7) (1,9) (0,8) (0,6) (0,4) (0,5) (0,5) (0,2) (0,2)
EBIT 22,8 18,4 20,0 12,4 11,5 (18,0) (3,7) 5,2 (21,9) (15,6) 3,3 (9,1) (8,0) (16,9) (13,8) (7,7) 2,9
Impairment losses
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 3,9 5,7 3,6 4,3 (12,5) (29,2) 5,7 0,8 2,3 (16,2) (0,9) (2,9) (0,1) (5,2) (1,4) (6,4) 2,9
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,0 (0,3) 0,0 3,5 (1,1) (0,3) 0,1 (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) 0,0 (0,0) 0,0
      Exchange rate gains (losses) 0,1 0,4 (0,0) (1,5) (0,1) 0,3 (0,5) (0,6) (2,6) 0,1 1,0 1,1 (0,3) (0,4) (0,0) (1,0) (0,0)
      Interest income (expense) (2,9) (3,5) (3,5) (3,6) (5,3) (4,2) (8,4) (7,7) (10,6) (6,6) (3,0) (5,5) (3,2) 8,0 (1,7) (1,5) (0,1)
Net financial result (2,8) (3,1) (3,6) (5,2) (5,4) (3,9) (8,8) (8,3) (13,2) (6,5) (2,0) (4,4) (3,5) 7,6 (1,7) (2,5) (0,1)
EBT 24,1 21,1 20,1 11,6 (8,4) (57,4) (7,7) 1,1 (35,3) (44,6) 0,2 (17,2) (12,0) (14,6) (19,6) (18,2) 5,6
Taxes (4,3) (11,3) (12,9) (10,6) (8,6) 6,2 (3,4) (2,2) (3,8) (4,2) 0,4 0,5 1,3 (0,6) (1,2) (1,4) (1,1)
Result from discontinued operation 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 (20,8) 0,0 0,0 0,0 (18,7) 0,0 0,0
Group Net Income 19,7 9,8 7,2 0,9 (17,0) (51,1) (11,2) (1,1) (39,1) (48,8) (20,2) (16,7) (10,6) (15,2) (39,4) (19,5) 4,5
Minority result 0,0 2,9 1,5 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,5 1,3 (1,2) (1,6) 0,3 (0,8) (1,3) (1,4) (5,3) 0,0 0,0
Net Income 19,7 6,9 5,7 0,6 (17,0) (51,1) (11,6) (2,4) (37,9) (47,1) (20,5) (16,0) (9,4) (13,8) (34,1) (19,5) 4,5
REORGANIZED INCOME STATEMENT
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(€ million) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EBITA 23,9 23,8 16,1 15,7 (15,0) (0,8) 7,7 (19,2) (13,7) 4,1 (8,5) (7,6) (16,4) (13,3) (7,5) 3,1
Operating taxes (12,0) (13,9) (11,8) (15,3) (4,9) (5,0) (5,0) (7,6) (11,6) (0,7) (1,8) 0,2 (0,3) (2,2) (4,1) (0,3)
NOPLAT 11,8 9,9 4,2 0,5 (20,0) (5,8) 2,6 (26,7) (25,4) 3,4 (10,3) (7,4) (16,7) (15,5) (11,6) 2,7
Depreciation 21,5 22,7 23,0 23,6 19,8 17,5 14,7 11,7 11,9 7,7 6,1 5,5 4,8 2,8 2,3 1,5
Gross cash flow 33,3 32,5 27,2 24,0 (0,2) 11,6 17,3 (15,1) (13,5) 11,1 (4,2) (1,9) (11,8) (12,7) (9,3) 4,2
Change in operating working capital (17,9) (4,7) (11,1) (1,5) 9,9 40,0 7,1 18,8 16,9 23,1 0,4 26,9 7,8 16,3 27,0 (17,2)
Net capital expenditures (22,9) (18,8) (24,5) (28,5) (48,0) 17,8 14,3 (2,7) (14,1) (2,0) (1,0) (0,4) (4,3) 21,9 1,1 0,0
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 2,5 2,5 (8,0) 1,0 15,2 4,0 (4,4) 0,4 1,7 (0,9) (0,5) (0,9) (1,4) 3,6 (0,4) 0,3
Gross investment (38,4) (20,9) (43,6) (29,1) (22,9) 61,8 17,0 16,5 4,6 20,3 (1,0) 25,7 2,1 41,8 27,7 (16,8)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles (5,1) 11,6 (16,4) (5,0) (23,1) 73,4 34,4 1,4 (9,0) 31,4 (5,3) 23,8 (9,8) 29,1 18,4 (12,6)
Investments in goodwill  and other intangibles (5,5) (5,4) (5,3) (5,6) (1,9) (1,0) (1,5) (4,2) 0,1 9,2 (0,1) (0,1) (1,5) 0,6 0,1 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles (10,6) 6,2 (21,7) (10,7) (25,0) 72,4 32,8 (2,8) (8,8) 40,6 (5,4) 23,7 (11,2) 29,7 18,6 (12,6)
Investments in non-operating assets (2,9) (1,7) 1,1 1,1 (2,7) (24,7) 5,3 3,1 19,1 (0,3) (2,0) 0,1 (0,5) (1,0) 1,8 0,9
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 (3,1) (6,1) (0,9) 0,0 (1,4) (6,0) (0,2) (0,7) (0,3) (0,0) (2,8) (1,5) (0,0)
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 5,7 3,6 4,3 (12,5) (29,2) 5,7 0,8 2,3 (16,2) (0,9) (2,9) (0,1) (5,2) (1,4) (6,4) 2,9
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,0 (0,3) 0,0 3,5 (1,1) (0,3) 0,1 (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) 0,0 (0,0) 0,0
Non-operating taxes 0,8 1,1 1,2 6,7 11,1 1,6 2,8 3,8 7,5 1,1 2,3 1,1 (0,3) 1,0 2,8 (0,8)
Discontinued operations 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 (20,8) 0,0 0,0 0,0 (18,7) 0,0 0,0
Non-operating cash flow 3,6 3,0 6,7 (6,7) (27,1) (18,3) 12,4 6,6 4,1 (21,1) (3,4) 0,8 (6,1) (22,8) (3,3) 2,9
Cash available to investors (6,9) 9,2 (15,0) (17,4) (52,0) 54,1 45,2 3,8 (4,7) 19,5 (8,8) 24,5 (17,3) 6,9 15,3 (9,6)
Net financial result (3,1) (3,6) (5,2) (5,4) (3,9) (8,8) (8,3) (13,2) (6,5) (2,0) (4,4) (3,5) 7,6 (1,7) (2,5) (0,1)
Change in debt equivalents (1,5) 2,2 1,2 5,1 14,7 (16,4) (9,8) (1,4) 6,7 (16,2) (3,1) 0,4 3,7 (4,5) 0,4 (2,2)
Change in minority interests (21,1) (4,2) (0,7) (4,0) 2,2 (0,8) (0,7) (9,4) (0,0) 0,0 0,0 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 0,0 0,0
Change in shareholders' equity 12,7 (7,3) (7,3) (8,3) 31,7 0,4 1,8 (2,7) (0,0) 0,3 14,7 0,2 17,0 1,4 6,4 9,9
Decrease (increase) in net financial position (19,9) (3,7) (26,9) (30,0) (7,3) 28,4 28,2 (22,9) (4,5) 1,6 (1,5) 21,6 10,9 2,1 19,6 (2,0)
Beginning net financial position 66,5 86,3 90,0 116,9 146,9 154,2 125,8 97,6 120,6 125,1 123,5 125,0 103,5 92,5 90,4 70,9
Ending net financial position 86,3 90,0 116,9 146,9 154,2 125,8 97,6 120,6 125,1 123,5 125,0 103,5 92,5 90,4 70,9 72,9
FREE CASH FLOWS CALCULATION
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
PROFITABILITY
ROE 11,8% 3,9% 3,1% 0,3% -10,3% -35,7% -9,1% -2,0% -37,5% -82,3% -87,1% -124,5% -122,8% -295,9% 338,0% 59,1% -13,8%
ROIC 7,1% 3,7% 3,0% 1,3% 0,1% -5,6% -1,8% 1,0% -11,5% -12,1% 1,9% -6,5% -5,3% -13,7% -16,1% -20,1% 5,4%
Premium over book capital 1,04 1,04 1,04 1,04 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,06 1,07 1,04 1,01 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,01 1,01
ROIC without goodwill 7,4% 3,8% 3,1% 1,3% 0,1% -5,8% -1,9% 1,1% -12,2% -12,9% 2,0% -6,5% -5,3% -13,9% -16,4% -20,3% 5,5%
Pretax ROIC 9,1% 7,8% 7,6% 5,0% 4,7% -4,4% -0,3% 3,1% -8,8% -7,0% 2,3% -5,4% -5,5% -13,6% -14,1% -13,1% 6,1%
Operating margin (ROS) 7,3% 6,2% 5,9% 4,1% 4,4% -4,6% -0,3% 2,7% -7,4% -6,2% 2,2% -4,6% -4,8% -10,9% -13,3% -8,1% 3,8%
Revenues/invested capital 1,25 1,25 1,29 1,20 1,05 0,97 0,99 1,13 1,18 1,13 1,08 1,17 1,14 1,25 1,06 1,62 1,61
Net working capital/revenues 46,2% 47,3% 47,7% 51,9% 58,5% 61,7% 59,5% 55,5% 55,0% 56,0% 55,5% 50,1% 49,7% 40,8% 49,5% 30,0% 28,6%
Operating fixed assets/revenues 31,5% 30,8% 29,0% 30,0% 33,7% 41,2% 44,1% 35,9% 31,5% 35,2% 40,6% 38,4% 41,4% 41,7% 50,2% 39,0% 41,9%
GROWTH RATES
Revenues 2,8% 5,1% -4,2% -8,6% -6,9% -9,0% -7,0% -7,5% -14,2% -15,2% -1,7% -14,0% -5,0% -33,6% -7,3% -13,5%
EBITDA -3,6% 2,5% -15,9% 0,5% -87,8% 248,4% 34,3% -133,6% -74,9% -726,5% -120,3% -13,4% 456,5% -9,1% -51,0% -188,9%
EBITA -12,7% -0,1% -32,4% -2,2% -195,6% -94,6% -1045,3% -349,4% -28,3% -129,8% -306,9% -10,1% 115,6% -18,8% -43,7% -140,8%
NOPAT -46,4% -16,3% -57,1% -89,3% -4507,5% -70,9% -145,6% -1109,0% -5,1% -113,4% -402,6% -28,2% 125,4% -7,1% -24,9% -123,4%
IC 5,4% 0,0% 6,8% 2,0% 0,6% -22,6% -11,8% -10,9% -8,5% -19,0% -3,4% -20,2% -4,7% -38,4% -41,6% 35,3%
IC excluding goodwill 5,6% -0,5% 6,6% 1,6% 0,9% -23,1% -12,0% -12,1% -8,0% -14,9% -3,1% -20,1% -5,6% -38,2% -41,6% 36,2%
Net working capital 10,4% 2,5% 5,7% 0,7% -4,7% -20,1% -4,5% -12,4% -12,7% -19,9% -0,4% -29,2% -11,9% -28,2% -65,2% 119,0%
Operating fixed capital 1,2% -3,3% 1,3% 4,2% 23,1% -23,5% -25,2% -10,4% 2,9% -7,2% -6,9% -7,5% -0,9% -39,5% -9,1% -4,5%
WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Days in revenues)
Working Cash 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Receivables 119 116 122 114 119 135 137 145 136 133 148 120 118 111 98 90 103
Inventories 107 126 117 143 156 139 127 128 130 139 138 140 110 111 136 84 95
Suppliers 57 58 56 54 53 56 70 71 73 70 99 69 74 71 77 98 52
Other current assets and liabilities 4 7 11 12 11 2 5 8 9 15 11 12 8 15 10 23 6
Net working capital 169 181 176 195 214 220 193 198 187 191 180 182 150 139 151 57 143
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
NFP/Equity 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,8 1,1 1,4 1,1 0,9 1,6 3,8 6,3 6,9 12,0 9,5 -3,9 -2,1 -3,3
NFP/EBITA 3,6 4,9 5,2 9,4 11,8 -13,8 -200,9 16,3 -7,7 -11,5 34,3 -16,4 -15,5 -6,7 -7,8 -11,3 27,7
NFP/EBITDA 2,1 2,6 2,6 3,9 4,7 43,6 9,8 5,6 -19,6 -84,1 11,9 -57,9 -56,6 -9,6 -9,9 -16,5 18,5
COVERAGE
EBIT/interest 9,2 7,0 6,6 4,6 -0,8 -12,7 0,1 0,8 -2,0 -5,8 0,7 -2,3 -2,6 2,8 -10,8 -10,8 82,9
EBITA/interest 9,4 6,9 6,7 4,4 3,0 -3,6 -0,1 1,0 -1,8 -2,1 1,4 -1,5 -2,4 2,1 -8,0 -5,1 44,2
EBITDA/interest 16,2 13,1 13,1 10,7 7,5 1,1 2,0 2,9 -0,7 -0,3 3,9 -0,4 -0,6 1,5 -6,3 -3,5 66,3
Cash available for investors/NFP -5,9% 7,5% -9,9% -9,3% -25,0% 33,1% 36,0% 2,6% -3,0% 13,9% -6,3% 20,9% -15,7% 6,6% 18,0% -11,4%
FCF from operation/NFP -9,0% 5,0% -14,3% -5,7% -12,0% 44,3% 26,2% -1,9% -5,6% 28,9% -3,9% 20,1% -10,2% 28,6% 22,0% -14,9%
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (€ thousand)
Revenues per employee 109,7 110,2 113,6 108,6 108,4 110,1 132,2 124,0 119,2 115,0 140,0 149,5 129,2 123,8 131,2 137,3 131,2
EBITDA per employee 13,8 12,9 13,0 10,9 12,0 1,6 7,3 9,9 -3,5 -1,0 8,8 -1,9 -1,7 -9,5 -13,7 -7,6 7,5
KEY RATIOS
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CALEFFI
Revenues (€ mill ion) 57,1 58,2 60,5 57,5 58,2 55,5 50,8 56,2 52,1 55,5 59,2
Sales growth rate 17,97% 1,97% 4,00% -5,01% 1,32% -4,60% -8,62% 10,72% -7,23% 6,47% 6,65%
EBITDA margin 11,60% 10,39% 6,43% 7,04% 4,05% 3,92% -1,77% 6,01% 2,15% 5,65% 4,50%
Net margin 4,49% 4,17% 0,65% 1,28% -0,18% -0,68% -3,38% 1,00% -2,44% 0,53% 0,85%
Operating fixed capital/Sales 4,38% 4,28% 4,74% 5,49% 4,92% 4,74% 7,36% 9,01% 10,06% 9,38% 8,77%
NWC/Sales 36,84% 37,14% 30,05% 28,32% 29,98% 31,33% 29,10% 22,84% 27,63% 30,79% 28,49%
NWC turnover 2,71 2,69 3,33 3,53 3,34 3,19 3,44 4,38 3,62 3,25 3,51
Current ratio 1,77 1,86 1,52 1,65 1,65 1,79 1,46 1,50 1,76 1,84 1,55
Quick ratio 1,32 1,26 0,95 1,06 1,00 0,93 0,90 0,81 1,02 1,19 0,94
EBITDA/Interest expenses 11,82 8,43 3,36 7,51 6,59 3,56 -1,30 4,93 1,46 5,10 6,20
NFP/EBITDA 2,61 1,59 3,28 2,82 4,59 7,54 -18,29 3,25 10,00 3,15 4,89
NFP/Equity 1,02 0,55 0,90 0,75 0,74 1,03 1,40 0,88 1,04 0,69 1,23
ROE 15,60% 13,10% -0,94% 5,24% 0,12% -3,95% -17,76% 4,87% -12,02% 2,55% 3,50%
Revenues per employee (€ thousand) 350,0 326,8 295,1 297,8 303,3 293,9 302,2 349,1 270,2 286,2 290,2
EBITDA per employee (€ thousand) 40,6 34,1 19,2 21,0 12,4 9,8 -5,3 21,1 5,9 16,3 13,1
GABEL
Revenues (€ mill ion) 84,6 89,3 88,7 93,4 85,7 76,7 70,7 62,4 60,8 60,1 59,9
Sales growth rate 1,20% 5,54% -0,69% 5,37% -8,29% -10,47% -7,81% -11,80% -2,59% -1,17% -0,21%
EBITDA margin 6,85% 7,64% 7,25% 5,14% 3,54% 4,71% -4,84% -2,50% -2,27% -1,43% 0,37%
Net margin 1,40% 2,50% 2,41% 1,64% 2,11% 0,47% -9,50% -7,89% -6,21% -5,62% -2,04%
Operating fixed capital/Sales 19,93% 19,10% 18,91% 16,97% 17,59% 15,64% 12,95% 17,29% 20,01% 19,32% 18,66%
NWC/Sales 27,60% 25,99% 28,57% 31,65% 37,08% 45,07% 46,39% 44,52% 39,06% 32,92% 30,68%
NWC turnover 3,62 3,85 3,50 3,16 2,70 2,22 2,16 2,25 2,56 3,04 3,26
Current ratio 1,54 1,55 1,72 1,80 1,92 2,13 1,88 1,96 1,60 1,62 1,59
Quick ratio 0,81 0,81 0,88 0,96 1,07 1,09 0,90 1,03 0,80 0,81 0,81
NFP/EBITDA 4,28 3,42 3,98 5,76 7,24 4,51 -4,71 -8,90 -12,10 -14,13 43,60
NFP/Equity 0,50 0,63 0,67 0,71 0,54 0,42 0,51 0,46 0,62 0,44 0,42
ROE 3,30% 5,96% 5,56% 3,93% 4,43% 0,94% -20,97% -15,97% -13,95% -12,19% -4,62%
Revenues per employee (€ thousand) 180,0 187,2 184,0 182,5 174,2 162,9 152,8 135,3 149,7 152,8 173,2
EBITDA per employee (€ thousand) 13,0 14,4 13,4 9,4 6,2 7,7 -7,5 -3,4 -3,4 -2,2 0,7
SPRINGS GLOBAL
Revenues (€ mill ion) 1248,6 929,3 754,1 629,8 605,7 368,3 440,3 534,5 547,3 593,1 604,7
Sales growth rate n.a. -25,57% -18,85% -16,48% -3,83% -39,19% 19,54% 21,40% 2,40% 8,37% 1,95%
EBITDA margin 0,40% -4,30% 2,50% 3,10% 11,20% 11,60% 12,80% 7,60% 9,10% 10,30% 11,50%
Net margin -6,33% -12,08% -11,88% 1,62% -0,95% -29,12% -8,52% -2,60% -1,36% 0,99% -0,32%
Operating fixed capital/Sales 31,03% 39,81% 44,89% 49,62% 48,20% 73,25% 57,36% 45,57% 42,03% 36,00% 33,19%
NWC/Sales 23,30% 28,68% 28,30% 25,25% 24,71% 46,78% 36,25% 23,24% 25,23% 27,49% 24,80%
NWC turnover 4,29 3,49 3,53 3,96 4,05 2,14 2,76 4,30 3,96 3,64 4,03
Current ratio 2,32 2,24 1,90 1,78 1,96 1,92 1,74 1,48 1,90 1,71 1,67
Quick ratio 1,09 1,16 0,91 0,96 1,14 0,98 0,93 0,83 1,08 0,93 0,98
NFP/EBITDA 63,34 -4,30 9,08 5,67 2,22 5,82 3,78 5,54 4,97 4,43 4,26
NFP/Equity 0,69 0,37 0,41 0,25 0,35 0,79 0,67 0,75 0,87 0,96 1,10
ROE -17,25% -17,10% -20,40% 2,40% 1,80% -9,90% -0,10% -4,50% -2,60% 2,10% -0,70%
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Appendix 3 – Financial statements projections: Base scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Working cash* 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8
Trade receivables 21,5 21,7 21,8 22,1 22,6
Inventories 19,7 19,7 19,5 19,6 19,6
Trade payable (10,9) (11,0) (11,2) (11,5) (11,9)
Trade working capital 31,0 31,1 30,9 31,1 31,2
Other current assets and liabilities 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Net working capital 31,0 31,8 31,6 31,8 31,9
Total operating fixed capital 6,4 8,4 10,4 10,7 11,1
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0)
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 30,4 33,2 35,0 35,5 36,0
Goodwill  and other similar intangibles 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 30,7 33,4 35,1 35,6 36,0
Non-operating assets 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Total funds invested 32,0 34,7 36,5 36,9 37,3
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Invested Capital)
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Net financial position (8,7) (8,9) (10,8) (15,1) (20,4)
Debt equivalents 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6
Net financial position and debt equivalents 2,9 2,7 0,8 (3,5) (8,8)
Minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 29,1 32,0 35,6 40,5 46,1
Total source of financing 32,0 34,7 36,5 36,9 37,3
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Source of Financing)
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenues 76,4 77,2 78,3 80,4 82,8
Other income 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Operating costs (73,0) (73,1) (73,2) (73,4) (74,7)
EBITDA 3,9 4,6 5,6 7,5 8,7
Depreciation (0,3) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,5)
EBITA 3,6 4,3 5,2 7,0 8,2
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
EBIT 3,5 4,2 5,2 7,0 8,1
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
      Interest (expense) income 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
      Net financial results (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
EBT 3,3 4,2 5,1 6,9 8,1
Taxes (1,0) (1,3) (1,5) (2,1) (2,4)
Group Net Income 2,3 2,9 3,6 4,9 5,7
Minority result 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income 2,3 2,9 3,6 4,9 5,7
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBITA 3,6 4,3 5,2 7,0 8,2
Operating taxes (1,1) (1,3) (1,6) (2,1) (2,5)
NOPLAT 2,5 3,0 3,7 4,9 5,7
Depreciation 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5
Gross cash flow 2,8 3,3 4,0 5,4 6,2
Change in operating working capital 0,6 (0,8) 0,2 (0,2) (0,1)
Net capital expenditures (0,2) (2,3) (2,3) (0,8) (0,8)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Gross investment 0,3 (3,1) (2,2) (1,0) (0,9)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 3,1 0,2 1,8 4,4 5,3
Investments in goodwill  and other intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3,1 0,2 1,8 4,4 5,3
Investments in non-operating assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating taxes 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating cash flow (0,1) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Cash available to investors 3,0 0,3 1,9 4,4 5,3
Net financial result (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Change in debt equivalents 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in shareholders' equity (0,0) (0,0) 0,0 0,0 (0,0)
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 3,0 0,2 1,8 4,4 5,3
Beginning net financial position (5,7) (8,7) (8,9) (10,8) (15,1)
Ending net financial position (8,7) (8,9) (10,8) (15,1) (20,4)
FREE CASH FLOW FORECASTS
 232 
 
Appendix 4 – Financial statements projections: Best scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Working cash* 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,9
Trade receivables 22,0 22,0 22,2 22,7 23,0
Inventories 20,1 20,0 20,1 20,2 20,1
Trade payable (11,1) (11,3) (11,6) (12,1) (12,4)
Trade working capital 31,8 31,5 31,4 31,6 31,7
Other current assets and liabilities 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Net working capital 31,8 32,2 32,1 32,3 32,4
Total operating fixed capital 6,4 8,5 10,5 10,9 11,3
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0)
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 31,2 33,7 35,7 36,3 36,7
Goodwill  and other similar intangibles 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 31,5 33,8 35,8 36,4 36,7
Non-operating assets 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Total funds invested 32,8 35,2 37,2 37,7 38,1
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Invested Capital)
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Net financial position (8,1) (8,9) (11,3) (16,4) (23,0)
Debt equivalents 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6
Net financial position and debt equivalents 3,5 2,7 0,3 (4,7) (11,4)
Minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 29,3 32,5 36,9 42,5 49,5
Total source of financing 32,8 35,2 37,2 37,7 38,1
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Source of Financing)
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenues 78,0 79,2 81,4 84,6 88,0
Other income 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Operating costs (74,4) (74,7) (75,1) (76,6) (78,0)
EBITDA 4,1 5,0 6,8 8,5 10,6
Depreciation (0,3) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,5)
EBITA 3,8 4,7 6,4 8,1 10,1
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
EBIT 3,7 4,6 6,3 8,0 10,0
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
      Interest (expense) income 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
      Net financial results (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
EBT 3,5 4,6 6,3 8,0 10,0
Taxes (1,0) (1,4) (1,9) (2,4) (3,0)
Group Net Income 2,4 3,2 4,4 5,6 7,0
Minority result 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income 2,4 3,2 4,4 5,6 7,0
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBITA 3,8 4,7 6,4 8,1 10,1
Operating taxes (1,1) (1,4) (1,9) (2,4) (3,0)
NOPLAT 2,7 3,3 4,5 5,7 7,1
Depreciation 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5
Gross cash flow 2,9 3,6 4,8 6,1 7,5
Change in operating working capital (0,2) (0,4) 0,0 (0,2) (0,0)
Net capital expenditures (0,2) (2,4) (2,4) (0,8) (0,9)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Gross investment (0,5) (2,7) (2,4) (1,1) (0,9)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 2,5 0,9 2,4 5,1 6,7
Investments in goodwill  and other intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 2,5 0,9 2,4 5,1 6,7
Investments in non-operating assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating taxes 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating cash flow (0,1) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Cash available to investors 2,4 0,9 2,4 5,1 6,7
Net financial result (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Change in debt equivalents 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in shareholders' equity (0,0) 0,0 (0,0) (0,0) 0,0
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 2,3 0,8 2,4 5,0 6,6
Beginning net financial position (5,7) (8,1) (8,9) (11,3) (16,4)
Ending net financial position (8,1) (8,9) (11,3) (16,4) (23,0)
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Appendix 5 – Financial statements projections: Worst scenario. 
 
 
 
 
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Working cash* 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Trade receivables 20,7 19,8 20,4 20,7 21,0
Inventories 19,2 18,9 19,4 19,5 19,6
Trade payable (10,5) (9,9) (10,0) (10,4) (10,4)
Trade working capital 30,2 29,4 30,5 30,6 30,8
Other current assets and liabilities 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Net working capital 30,2 30,1 31,2 31,3 31,5
Total operating fixed capital 6,4 7,5 8,5 9,6 9,9
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0) (7,0)
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 29,6 30,6 32,8 33,9 34,4
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 29,9 30,8 32,9 34,0 34,5
Non-operating assets 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Total funds invested 31,2 32,1 34,3 35,3 35,8
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Invested Capital)
(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Net financial position (9,1) (9,0) (7,8) (8,0) (9,3)
Debt equivalents 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6
Net financial position and debt equivalents 2,5 2,6 3,8 3,6 2,3
Minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Shareholders' equity 28,7 29,5 30,5 31,7 33,5
Total source of financing 31,2 32,1 34,3 35,3 35,8
PROJECTED BALANCE SHEET (Source of Financing)
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Revenues 73,2 69,5 70,2 71,3 72,6
Other income 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Operating costs (70,4) (68,5) (68,9) (69,6) (70,2)
EBITDA 3,3 1,5 1,8 2,3 3,0
Depreciation (0,3) (0,3) (0,3) (0,4) (0,4)
EBITA 3,0 1,3 1,5 1,9 2,5
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
EBIT 2,9 1,2 1,4 1,9 2,5
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
      Interest (expense) income 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
      Net financial results (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
EBT 2,7 1,1 1,4 1,8 2,4
Taxes (0,8) (0,3) (0,4) (0,5) (0,7)
Group Net Income 1,9 0,8 1,0 1,3 1,7
Minority result 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net Income 1,9 0,8 1,0 1,3 1,7
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(€ million) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
EBITA 3,0 1,3 1,5 1,9 2,5
Operating taxes (0,9) (0,4) (0,4) (0,6) (0,8)
NOPLAT 2,1 0,9 1,0 1,3 1,8
Depreciation 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4
Gross cash flow 2,4 1,2 1,4 1,7 2,2
Change in operating working capital 1,4 0,1 (1,1) (0,1) (0,2)
Net capital expenditures (0,2) (1,4) (1,4) (1,4) (0,7)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Gross investment 1,1 (1,3) (2,5) (1,5) (0,9)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 3,5 (0,1) (1,1) 0,2 1,3
Investments in goodwill  and other intangibles 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3,5 (0,1) (1,1) 0,2 1,3
Investments in non-operating assets 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Impairment losses 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items (0,2) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Interest income (expense) from investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating taxes 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-operating cash flow (0,1) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Cash available to investors 3,4 (0,1) (1,1) 0,2 1,3
Net financial result (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Change in debt equivalents 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in minority interests 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Change in shareholders' equity (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) 0,0 (0,0)
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 3,4 (0,1) (1,1) 0,2 1,2
Beginning net financial position (5,7) (9,1) (9,0) (7,8) (8,0)
Ending net financial position (9,1) (9,0) (7,8) (8,0) (9,3)
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Appendix 6 – Interest coverage ratio, credit rating, default spread and beta debt. 
 
 
Source: Default Spreads for 10-year U.S. Corporate Bonds updated to January 2016 by 
Damodaran and Debt Beta of U.S Corporate Bonds estimated by Duff&Phelps (last available 
update: December 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
greater than to
-100.000,0 0,5 D 20,00% 0,88
0,5 0,8 C 16,00% 0,88
0,8 1,2 CC 12,00% 0,88
1,3 1,5 CCC 9,00% 0,83
1,5 2,0 B- 7,50% 0,61
2,0 2,5 B 6,50% 0,61
2,5 3,0 B+ 5,50% 0,61
3,0 3,5 BB 4,25% 0,31
3,5 4,0 BB+ 3,25% 0,31
4,0 4,5 BBB 2,25% 0,08
4,5 6,0 A- 1,75% -0,07
6,0 7,5 A 1,25% -0,07
7,5 9,5 A+ 1,10% -0,07
9,5 12,5 AA 1,00% -0,10
12,5 100.000,0 AAA 0,75% -0,29
INTEREST COVERAGE RATIO 
Rating Spread Beta Debt
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